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Three Wittgensteins
Thomas J. Brommage, Jr.
ABSTRACT
There are historically three main trends in understanding Wittgenstein's  Tractatus. The 
first is the interpretation offered by the Vienna Circle.  They read Wittgenstein as arguing 
that neither metaphysical nor normative propositions have any cognitive meaning, and 
thus  are  to  be  considered  nonsense.   This  interpretation  understands  Wittgenstein  as 
setting  the  limits  of  sense,  and  prescribing  that  nothing  of  substantive  philosophical 
importance lies beyond that line.  The second way of reading the  Tractatus, which has 
became popular since the 1950s, is the interpretation which most currently accept as the 
early Wittgenstein's view; for this reason I refer to it as the 'standard reading.'  According 
to this interpretation, Wittgenstein did not consider metaphysical and ethical discourse as 
nonsense.  Rather,  relying  upon  the  distinction  between  saying  [sagen]  and  showing 
[zeigen], he meant that these truths cannot be uttered, but instead are only shown.  The 
standard reading can perhaps be best understood in contrast with the third interpretation, 
dubbed  the  “resolute  reading.”   The  resolute  reading  takes  seriously  Wittgenstein's 
remark at 6.54 that “[m]y propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands 
me  finally  recognizes  them  as  nonsense  [unsinnig].”   According  to  the  resolute 
interpretation,  Wittgenstein  is  not  advancing  a  series  of  philosophical  theses  in  the 
Tractatus.  Rejecting  the  distinction  characteristic  of  standard  readings,  between 
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propositions without sense [sinnlos] and just plain nonsense [unsinnig], these interpreters 
read Wittgenstein as treating ethical and metaphysical inquiry, as well as a bulk of the 
doctrines in the text, as nonsense.  To them, Wittgenstein did not intend to put forth any 
theses  in  the  the  text.   Instead  his  methodology  is  therapeutic,  similar  to  the  later 
philosophy.  It In this essay I explain each interpretation, and evaluate them in terms of 
textual and philosophical viability.  I conclude by arguing that the biases which exist in 
the tradition of analytic philosophy substantively temper the interpretation of historical 
texts,  which  ultimately  leads  to  the  fundamental  distinction  between  these  three 
interpretations.
iv
Wittgenstein and the History of Philosophy
§1 History and Analytic Philosophy
In 1916, Wittgenstein wrote: “[W]hat has history to do with me?  Mine is the first 
and only world.”1  Likewise, in the Preface to the  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he 
downplays any question of influence on his work by others.  “I do not wish to judge how 
far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers,” he tells us.  “Indeed, what I 
have written here makes no claim to novelty in detail,  and the reason why I give no 
sources is that it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that I have had 
have been anticipated by someone else.”2  Perhaps one can excuse him for his reluctance 
to  consider  his  philosophical  thought  as  being  influenced  by  his  philosophical 
predecessors—exempting,  of course,  the “great  works” of  Frege,  and his  teacher  and 
friend Bertrand Russell.3  For Wittgenstein, writing in what would become the tradition of 
analytic philosophy, he must have had the feeling of great beginnings, of starting to write 
an  entirely  new chapter  in  the  history  of  philosophy;  or  perhaps,  as  he  might  have 
thought, tolling the death knell of the tradition of philosophy as it has been known.  After 
all,  in the last paragraph of the Preface he does mention that within the pages of the 
Tractatus  he  had  found  “on  all  essential  points,  the  final  solution”  of  the  great 
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916, tr. and ed. G. E. M. Anscombe (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), 82.  Hereafter abbreviated NB
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. D. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (New York: 
Routledge,  1961).   Hereafter  cited  by  passage  number.   All  references  to  the  text  are  to  the 
Pears/McGuinness translation, unless otherwise noted.
3 See Preface to the TLP, p. 3.
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philosophical problems that proceeded him.  This was not an uncommon belief in the 
early  phases  of  analytic  philosophy,  as  it  was  shared  by  Russell,  and  many  of  the 
members of the Vienna Circle.  
While it might have been forgivable for Wittgenstein to express this sentiment, we 
have no such luxury.  Situated now over one hundred years past the linguistic turn, those 
of us writing in the analytic tradition have a long history already behind us.  And it is not 
only undeniable that  we owe a debt to this tradition which precedes us, but also that 
analytic philosophy does have a history—in fact, a quite interesting one, in which trends 
and movements have died several times over.  However, the twentieth century has also 
seen its share of anti-historical tendencies.  The logical positivists were so convinced that 
this  “new”  style  of  logical  analysis  was  so  far  beyond  the  metaphysics  of  past 
generations, that they eschewed as irrelevant the previous 2500 years of philosophical 
thought.   In  1936,  Ernest  Nagel  commented  on  the  philosophy  then  “professed  at 
Cambridge, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw and Lwow.”4  According to him, this new brand of 
analytical philosophy was defined by its utter break with the philosophical tradition that 
preceded it.  He notes that “students whose primary interest is in history of ideas will find 
that  .  .  .  they will  profit  little  from talking  with these men.   Neither  the  genesis  of 
doctrines  nor  the  sociological  settings  are  interests  cultivated  with  much ardor.”   To 
analytic philosophers, he continues, “the great figures in the history of philosophy and the 
traditional problems associated with them receive only negative attention.”5  What he 
means by 'negative attention' is that the history of ideas is not interesting to the early 
4 Ernest Nagel, "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe." Journal of Philosophy 
33, no 1 (1936): 6
5 Ibid., p. 6-7
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analytic  philosophers  due  to  its  successes,  but  rather  because  of  its  failures.   “[T]he 
approach taken is  that  the alleged problems not revealed as empirical  ones are to be 
dismissed  as  pseudo-questions  masquerading  as  genuine  ones  under  the  cloak  of 
grammar.”6  It should be noted here that Nagel specifies explicitly that he does not share 
this view; however this dismissive attitude toward historical matters is all too common, 
even today.  
As the influence of positivism increased in the Anglo-American world, a whole 
generation  of  philosophers  learned  that  to  do  philosophy  properly,  one  must  ignore 
history.  Similar doctrines popped up throughout America in different disciplines, such as 
the “new criticism” of the formalists in literary theory.  For the New Critics, a text must 
be understood on its own, without reference to any extra-textual influence on the work—
whether  biographical  or  contextual.   Wimsatt  and Beardsley even coined  a  term,  the 
“intentional fallacy,” to capture this exegetical prescription.  “[T]he design or intention of 
the author,” they argue, “is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the 
success of a work of literary art.”7  But this is by no means a dated phenomenon.  Still 
today, top-tier Ph.D. programs in philosophy focus disproportionately on current issues in 
metaphysics and epistemology,  and require little  knowledge of the historical  tradition 
prior to the Twentieth century.  The historian Anthony Grafton recalls that once there was 
at one point a sign posted in the philosophy department at Princeton which read, “Just say 
no to the history of ideas.”8
6 Ibid., p. 7
7 William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in Norton Anthology to Literary  
Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent Leitch (New York: Norton, 2001), 1374-5
8 Grafton, Anthony. 2004: “A Note from Inside the Teapot,” in Teaching New Histories of Philosophy, 
Princeton:  Princeton  University  Center  for  Human  Values.  Available  online  at 
http://www.pdcnet.org/tnhp.html. 
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While this anti-historical attitude is troublesome, it is not completely without its 
reasons.   In  reading  Aristotle's  Metaphysics,  or Descartes'  Passions  of  the  Soul,  one 
cannot take seriously the evocation of 'essences'  in the former or the function of the 
pineal gland in the latter, in the face of contemporary metaphysics or neuroscience.  Nor 
should we.  Clearly our contemporary vantage point allows us a better idea of how the 
world works than theirs did.   So, the argument goes, if we were to take these ideas to be 
on an equal footing with our own, we might run the risk of simultaneously denying any 
progress throughout  the history of  ideas.   This  might  lead one to  view philosophical 
theses as only true relative to a period of time—or worse (as a college freshman might 
put it) as 'mere opinion.'
As a result of this failure to take the history of philosophy seriously, it  should 
come  as  no  surprise  that  when  analytic  philosophers  write  about  historical  figures, 
usually tragedy results.  Ripping arguments from text and context, the primary goal is not 
to understand a given philosopher, but rather to see how these arguments might inform 
our current philosophical debates.  They tend to design 'rational reconstructions' of the 
mighty  dead,  modifying  and  updating  historical  figures  to  fit  neatly  within  our 
contemporary terms and distinctions.  Thus instead of just not reading Plato, the analytic 
'historian' might instead put Plato in conversation with the contemporary philosophy of 
language by, for example, superimposing upon the dialogues the semantic view that all 
words are names.  In viewing the historical Plato through contemporary spectacles, it is 
thought that one thereby makes his or her philosophy relevant to the 'real' philosophical 
issues—those  which  inform our  contemporary  debates.   Alternatively,  when  analytic 
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historians do acknowledge a given thinker's context, it is usually in the form of a tacked-
on 'historical introduction.'  This plop-and-point methodology9 remains a superficial nod 
to the influences upon, and the legacy of, a given thinkers' work when these themes do 
not inform the interpretation.
To the historian of philosophy, the main source of frustration with this type of 
historical work is its unapologetic anachronism.  To treat Plato or Locke as if either were 
a colleague down the the hall from us does damage, not only to our understanding of the 
text, but also to the place of a given thinker within the tradition.  That is not to say, 
however, that these poor historical methodologies have no function.  In a sense, rational 
reconstructions do serve to justify our current concerns as the 'right' ones, and thus are 
dialectically necessary.10  However  this  should not  be confused  with—and cannot  be 
replaced by—reflective methodology and genuine historical research.
Since  the  1970's,  there  has  been  a  resurgence  in  philosophers  who  have 
successfully  restored  the  esteem  to  the  idea  that  historical  work  can  be  genuine 
philosophy.  Daniel Garber and Michael Friedman, for instance, come to mind as two 
examples of those whose work I admire.  Specifically, analytic philosophy itself has also 
become a respectable object of historical study, through the work of Tom Ricketts, Hans 
Sluga, and others.  But historians of philosophy still are not taken seriously by many in 
the analytic fold.  Now situated over a century after the linguistic turn, we may now be in 
9 I  owe  this  expression  to  Thomas  Williams,  “Some  Reflections  on  Method  in  the  History  of 
Philosophy” (paper  presented at  the “Philosophy and its  History” conference at  the University of 
South Florida, Tampa, FL, 2007)
10 For a similar analysis see Richard Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres” in Truth 
and Progress (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 267
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a position to affirm that analytic philosophy does have a history; and indeed one worthy 
of philosophical attention.
§2 Three Wittgensteins
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is arguably the most enigmatic text 
in the analytic tradition.   Its sparse landscape is difficult  to navigate.   Turning to the 
voluminous  body  of  secondary  literature  to  understanding  the  text  is  often  just  as 
unhelpful.   One finds numerous commentaries on the text,  rarely consistent with one 
another, each of which think that they have finally discovered what Wittgenstein “really” 
meant.  But nonetheless, his importance cannot be overstated.  He remains to this day one 
of the most quoted and discussed thinkers in the analytic tradition—despite the fact that 
his own philosophy has often been appropriated and been used to argue for doctrines he 
did  not  hold,  even  some which  he  rejected  explicitly.  His  thought has  an  influence 
arguably surpassing any other  analytic  figure:11 several  generations  of  philosophers—
from the logical atomism of the early Russell, to the positivism of the Vienna Circle, and 
Oxford  ordinary  language  philosophy—are  all  indebted  to  different  phases  of 
Wittgenstein's groundbreaking work.
In particular, over the past twenty years, we have seen a resurgence in interest 
concerning the  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus—a work which has been neglected for 
years,  overshadowed  by  the  so-called  “later  philosophy”  exemplified  by  the 
Philosophical  Investigations.   This  is  despite  Wittgenstein's  direct  statement  in  the 
11 That is,  despite the influence on his philosophy by certain thinkers who would on no account be 
considered philosophical antecedents to this tradition (e.g., Schopenhauer).
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Preface of  the  Investigations that  “the latter  could be seen in  the right  light  only by 
contrast  with  and  against  the  background  of  my  old  way  of  thinking.”12  Some 
commentators,  James  Conant  for  example,  have  noted  that  the  interest  in  the  later 
philosophy has in fact done a disservice to a proper understanding of this text.  Too often 
Wittgenstein is read backwards, as it were; that is, commentators read the  Tractatus in 
direct opposition to the Investigations, thereby warping the understanding of both.  This 
tragic fate has led to a potted history of Wittgenstein's philosophy, whereby in his early 
years  he was a  type  of reluctant  metaphysician,  laying the ontological  grounding for 
language  and logic;  and  in  the  later  work he  sought  to  amend his  ways,  taking  (for 
example)  the  method  of  “language  games”  as  a  replacement  for  logical  analysis,  or 
“forms of life” as a successor to the simple “elementary propositions.”  Of course, since 
the Investigations is read as a renunciation of his early work, the Tractatus is interpreted 
in a question-begging way: those enthralled with the Investigations are lead to read the 
Tractatus as the complete opposite of what they take to be valuable in the later work.
The renewed interest  in  the  Tractatus  can be  traced  to  the  influence  of  Cora 
Diamond's  controversial  interpretation  of  Wittgenstein.   Her  work  is  polarizing,  and 
commentators  are  split  into  two  dominant  camps,  those  who  agree  and  those  who 
disagree with her work.  And each group of scholars is as rabid about the truth of their 
own views, and as hostile to the the other camp as could be.   This has led to a fertile 
ground to re-evaluate what is important about Wittgenstein's early work.  This essay is 
written  as  a  contribution  to,  and  perhaps  as  a  vindication  of,  the  importance  of 
Wittgenstein's early philosophy.
12 Preface to Philosophical Investigations, x.
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§3 The Argument
What follows is a second-order interpretation, so to speak; that is, this essay is an 
interpretation of the various ways that the  Tractatus  itself has been interpreted.  There 
are, as I see it, historically three discrete ways that the  Tractatus has historically been 
read.   The number of such readings is somewhat artificial for two reasons.  First, because 
commentators  disagree  as  to  the  exact  number  of  such  readings.   David  Stern,  for 
example,  cites  five discrete readings.13  Secondly,  the commentators on the  Tractatus 
differ so radically about how to read the text that care must be taken not to do damage to 
the variety and nuance of the interpretations themselves.   A complete survey of each 
interpretation would itself be a Herculean task—one far too large for the purposes of this 
essay.   Since my goal  will  be to  understand the influences that  lead to  the trends  in 
Wittgenstein scholarship, a quick survey of each of these will suffice for my purposes. 
Great attention has been paid,  not only to be sensitive to the differences between the 
different interpreters' positions, but also not to lose sight of the commonalities that inhere 
between them.  So for that reason, I will present a tripartite division of the secondary 
literature over the past century, hopefully capturing the essence of each without getting 
lost in the details.  
13 David  Stern,  “The  Methods  of  the Tractatus:  Beyond  Positivism  and  Metaphysics?”  in  Logical  
Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, eds. Parrini, Salmon and Salmon (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 126-7.  The differences between Stern's list and my own is that 
he  separates  off  what  he  calls  the  “logical  atomist”  reading  of  Russell  and  Ramsey  and  the 
“irrationalist reading” of Engelmann and Janik and Toumlin.  Since the logical atomist reading was 
inspirational to the way the logical positivists had read the text, I will deal with Russell and Ramsey in 
the context  of  my first  chapter,  on what  I  call  the “positivist  interpretation.”  Likewise since the 
“irrationalist reading” shares some core affinities to the “metaphysical” reading of Anscombe, Geach 
and Stenius, I will link the two in what I call “the standard reading,” in my second chapter.
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The  chronologically  earliest  of  the  three  readings  I  will  present  here  is  the 
interpretation offered by the Vienna Circle.  It is widely known that the philosophical 
programme of the logical empiricists had been inspired by a very specific understanding 
of Wittgenstein's  early philosophy.   They read Wittgenstein as engaged in a common 
project, that of using the method of logical analysis to reduce ordinary discourse down to 
the  language  of  immediate  sense  data  sentences—or,  as  they  interpret  the  term, 
“elementary  propositions.”   Likewise  they  read  Wittgenstein  as  arguing  that  neither 
metaphysical nor normative propositions have any cognitive meaning, and thus are to be 
considered  nonsense.  Wittgenstein's lesson in the text, they argue, is contained in the 
closing remarks of the text, where he tells us:
The  correct  method  in  philosophy  would  really  be  the  following:  to  say 
nothing  except  what  can  be  said,  i.e.  propositions  of  natural  science—i.e. 
something  that  has  nothing  to  do  with  philosophy—and  then,  whenever 
someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him 
that  he  had  failed  to  give  a  meaning  to  certain  signs  in  his  propositions. 
Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have 
the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the 
only strictly correct one . . . What we cannot speak about we must pass over in 
silence (TLP 6.53-7).
What is “passed over in silence” here is exactly the ethical and metaphysical pseudo-
propositions which philosophy has henceforth sought to express.  Elsewhere he describes 
the book as follows: “all of that which many others are babbling today, I have defined in 
my book by remaining silent about it.”14  The positivist interpretation treats Wittgenstein 
as a sort of modern-day Hume, who sought to set the limits of sense and to prescribe that 
nothing of substantive philosophical importance lies beyond that line.  Although certain 
14 Letter  to  Von Ficker,  November 1919.   Quoted in Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein:  The Duty of  
Genius (New York: Penguin, 1991), 178.
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passages in the Tractatus can certainly be read to support the positivists' interpretation of 
the text, it is now clear from a wealth of posthumous textual evidence—including the 
notebooks from which the  Tractatus was compiled,  and many published biographical 
works and memoirs of friends and colleagues—that this understanding of Wittgenstein's 
early work could not have been what he intended.
The second way of reading the Tractatus became popular in the 1950's and 60's, 
and  is  currently  the  dominant  interpretation  of  the  text.   It  is  the  way which  most 
specialists,  and  nearly  all  non-specialists,  currently  accept  as  the  early  Wittgenstein's 
view; for this reason I refer to it simply as the “standard reading.”  Initially put forth by 
such commentators as G. E. M. Anscombe, Peter Geach, and Max Black, it is currently 
espoused by a new generation of interpreters such as Brian McGuinness, David Pears, 
Peter Hacker and others.  The standard reading was initially developed as a response to 
the positivist interpretation, and gained prominence just as logical empiricism had fallen 
out  of  fashion.   According  to  these  commentators,  the  Vienna  Circle  completely 
misinterpreted  Wittgenstein.   His  intent  in  the  Tractatus  was  not  to  toss  ethics  and 
metaphysics into the Humean bonfire; rather, relying upon the distinction between saying 
and showing, he was laying the metaphysical foundation for language and logic.  The 
limits of language, it is true, are the limits of the effable; but these limits are outstripped 
by what is there in the world.  Wittgenstein, on this interpretation, meant to indicate in the 
Tractatus  that  there  is  greater  depth  to  our  existence  than  can  be  captured  by  the 
representational power of language.    Wittgenstein is clear in the  Tractatus that these 
ethical,  metaphysical  and existential  “truths” cannot  be expressed in  language,  so we 
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must remain silent about them.  But these insights, like the logical form of language, 
might  still  possibly be  shown by language.   The standard reading in this  way paints 
Wittgenstein as a sort of modern-day Kant, who sought to set the bounds of language in 
order to make room for the mystical.
The standard reading can perhaps be best understood in contrast with the third 
interpretation, dubbed the “resolute reading.”  Initially put forth in a series of papers in 
the 1980's and 1990's by James Conant and Cora Diamond, the resolute reading takes 
seriously Wittgenstein's remark at  6.54 that “[m]y propositions are elucidatory in this 
way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsense [unsinnig].”  According 
to the “New Wittgenstein” interpretation, Wittgenstein did not intend to advance a series 
of  philosophical  theses  in  the  Tractatus.   For them, to  shackle  Wittgenstein  with the 
contradiction of needing to express the inexpressible—to indicate  metaphysical  truths 
underlying language and logic—is to read Wittgenstein incorrectly.  Instead, the resolute 
readers understand the  Tractatus as having a  therapeutic methodology, characteristic of 
his  later  philosophy.   The  so-called  picture  theory  of  meaning,  his  analysis  of  the 
proposition, and the distinction between saying and showing—each of which are central 
to  the  standard  reading's  interpretation  of  Wittgenstein's  early  philosophy—are  all 
nothing more than an attempt to rid us of our misunderstandings concerning the relation 
between logic and the world.  According to these commentators, the supposed “doctrines” 
of the text are ironically self-destructive; when one reaches the closing lines of the text 
(in particular 6.54), one realizes that the supposed doctrines of the text were merely a 
'transitional' way of speaking, leading the reader to a larger point about the philosophical 
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temptation to present theories about language and logic.  This interpretation thus treats 
Wittgenstein  as  a  sort  of  modern-day  Kierkegaard,  denying  his  own  philosophical 
positions in the very act  of writing them.15  Rejecting the distinction characteristic of 
standard  readings,  between  'philosophically  illuminating'  senselessness  and  just  plain 
nonsense,  these  interpreters  read  Wittgenstein  as  treating  ethical  and  metaphysical 
inquiry, and also a great deal besides, as just plain nonsense.
My argument here divides into four parts.  In the first three chapters, I lay out the 
three interpretations outlined above, respectively.  Through most of this essay, I will let 
the interpretations speak for themselves.  This survey of the secondary literature is not 
intended to support one reading of Wittgenstein over another, but rather to come to terms 
with the various ways that Wittgenstein has been understood.  As I mention above, my 
goal  is  to  come  to  an  interpretation  of  the  historical  influences  on  these  three 
interpretations—not  to  conclusively  show  that  one  reading  will  trump  the  others.16 
Where criticisms will be leveled, I will let the internal faults of the reading itself shed 
light upon its own inadequacies.  The purpose of highlighting these problems will be to 
allow a healthy skepticism17 concerning the ability of any one reading to account for the 
text completely.  I hope to show a larger methodological point about methodology in the 
history of analytic philosophy in the conclusion.
15 James Conant  has  been the inspiration behind the connection between Kierkegaard  and the early 
Wittgenstein.  See Chapter 4, pp. 140-141.
16 Perhaps the only exception to this heuristic principle is the “positivist interpretation.”  Many years 
have passed since the philosophy of the Vienna Circle has reigned supreme, and there has now been 
enough textual and contextual evidence to show with some certainty that the positivist reading is in 
fact  a  misreading of  the text.   However,  this  is  not  to  say that  there  are  certain  features  of  this 
interpretation which are no longer in fashion.  In fact, the resolute reading shares a rather uncanny 
resemblance in some ways to the positivist interpretation.  
17 Here I mean the term in the classical  sense,  fostering a degree of  akatalepsia,  and hopefully also 
ataraxia.
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§4 Some Caveats about The Argument
I am confident that Wittgenstein would have hated this essay.  This should come 
as  no  surprise  to  many,  since  he  disliked  any  summary  of  his  thought.18  It  is  not 
coincidental  that  the  first  book-length  commentary  on  the  Tractatus,  Anscombe's 
Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, was first published five years after he died.19  But 
I hope that Wittgenstein would have hated this essay less fervently than other published 
accounts of his work.  Wittgenstein scholarship is tricky business.  Of course, working in 
the history of philosophy and doing it well is itself a difficult enough task.  Interpreting 
texts removed from our own context presupposes that one immerse themselves in the 
context of the thinker.  Even good historians of philosophy sometimes fall prey to the 
temptation  to  privilege  aspects  of  our  contemporary  philosophical  understanding  in 
diagnosing the mis-steps, or even positive contributions, of a given thinker.  But for the 
historian of analytic philosophy, this problem is exacerbated by the “nearness” of the text. 
In a recent introduction to the re-printing of “Existentialism and Analytical Philosophy,” 
Stanley Cavell notes that since the early 1980's “the inner history of the development of 
analytical  philosophy  is  only  now  being  composed,  as  if  only  now  is  analytical 
philosophy, in its late development, disposed to oppose its internal opposition to history, 
18 Consider his 1933 letter to the Editor of  Mind, where he disclaims all responsibility for the views 
which Richard Braithwaite  attributes to him
19 G.  E.  M.  Anscombe,  Introduction  to  Wittgenstein's  Tractatus: Themes  in  the  Philosophy  of  
Wittgenstein (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press, 1971).
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no doubt  a version of philosophy's  internal opposition to time, you might say logic's 
opposition to rhetoric.”20  
Some time has passed since that remark was initially penned, but yet we historians 
of analytic philosophy still we have room to progress.  We haven't yet had enough time to 
let analytic philosophy completely run its course—if, in fact, such a transition away from 
the  method  of  logical  analysis  is  inevitable.   Many still  believe  that  “the  history  of 
analytic philosophy” is in itself not a genuine field of scholarship—either from the anti-
historical  perspective  of  contemporary analytic  philosophers,  or  from the  perspective 
historians of philosophy as a genuine field into historical study.  The consequence of this 
is  that  many analytic  philosophers  have  not  taken  seriously methodological  concerns 
when doing the history of philosophy.  But this attitude is slowly waning, and I hope to 
hasten its demise by unmasking these temptations in interpreting philosophical texts.
If  getting  clear  on  any  thinker  is  troubling  enough,  this  goes  doubly  so  for 
Wittgenstein.  Due to his aphoristic writing style, commentators tend to privilege certain 
“crucial” passages over others, and reading the rest of the text around this focal point. 
Thus Wittgenstein scholars too often set their gaze so intently upon certain passages, that 
they let the rest of the text recede into the background.  I have been careful to avoid 
falling into exactly the problem which it  is my goal to diagnose.   James Conant has 
recently bemoaned the fact that “a good Rezeptionsgeschichte of the Tractatus has yet to 
be written.”21   This essay is the humble beginnings of one; whether it is a good one, I 
will let my reader determine.
20 Stanley Cavell,  Themes Out of School: Effects and Causes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1984), 197.
21 James Conant, “Mild Mono-Wittgensteinianism” in Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor 
of Cora Diamond ed. Alice Crary (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 125.
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  Attempting to make sense of the Tractatus is a lifelong project.  In this sense I feel 
that there is, of course, much more that could have been said than I have here.  I hope 
eventually to work more diligently in the coming years to get clearer on each of the 
interpretations discussed here, and how they relate both positively and negatively to an 
understanding  of  the  text  itself.   To  those  who  would  point  to  things  which  I  have 
characterized poorly or omitted entirely, I would respond in the words of Wittgenstein 
himself from the preface of the Tractatus, where it is put more directly and simply than I 
ever could have put it: “May others come and do it better!”  
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Wittgenstein's Alleged Positivism
§1 Introduction 
The first interpretation that I shall discuss here, historically the earliest of all the 
main trends in  the interpretation of the  Tractatus,  is  the one put forth by the Vienna 
Circle.  I shall refer to it simply as the  positivist reading.  It is widely known that the 
philosophical programme of the logical empiricists had been inspired by a very specific 
understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy.  Carnap, for instance, recalls that in meetings 
of the Circle, the Tractatus “was read aloud and discussed sentence by sentence.”  But he 
also cautions us that “it is not correct to say that the philosophy of the Vienna Circle was 
just Wittgenstein's philosophy.  We learned much by our discussions of the book, and 
accepted many views as far  as we could assimilate them to our basic conceptions.”22 
Despite the unquestionable influence Wittgenstein has on the philosophy of the members 
of  the  Vienna  Circle,  it  is  a  matter  of  some dispute  whether  the  doctrines  that  they 
assimilated  were  actually  Wittgenstein's.   In  this  chapter,  I  intend  to  argue  that  this 
interpretation is not faithful to the text.
The positivist  understanding of  Wittgenstein is  widely rejected today,  even by 
some of the logical empiricists themselves.23   But from the 1930's through the 1950's, it 
22 Rudolf  Carnap  “Intellectual  Autobiography,”  in  The Philosophy of  Rudolf  Carnap edited  by Paul 
Arthur Schlipp.  (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 1963),  24-5.
23 Ayer admits that  “the outlook of the  Tractatus was misunderstood by the members of the Vienna 
Circle and the young English philosophers, including myself, who were strongly influenced by it.” 
Carnap,  in a  similar sentiment,  tells  us that  he “had erroneously believed that  his attitude toward 
metaphysics was similar to ours,” and that he “had not paid enough attention to statements in his book 
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was the dominant interpretation of the text.  Since that time, two whole new generation of 
philosophers have reacted to it, spending a great deal of time attempting to disrupt this 
then monolithic understanding of the text.24  Indeed they were successful,  but it  is of 
immense historical importance that previous generation of philosophers have been trained 
to view Wittgenstein in this quirky way.   And as I will show, this is an important first 
step towards a full understanding of the changing attitudes towards Wittgenstein's early 
philosophy.
Although  Carnap  distances  himself  from  Wittgenstein  in  the  passage  quoted 
above, even a cursory look at his philosophy reveals that the influence of the Tractatus 
ran deep, and was heavily influential to a number of other members of the Vienna Circle
—most notably Schlick and Waismann.25  In Carnap's infamous essay “Elimination of 
Metaphysics  through  Logical  Analysis  of  Language,”  he  credits  Wittgenstein  with 
developing “the logical and epistemological conception which underlies” the verification 
principle.26  This  influence  is  also  directly  noted  elsewhere  in  connection  with  the 
development  of  his  'logic  of  science,'  in  The  Logical  Syntax  of  Language.  “It  was 
Wittgenstein,” he tells us, “who first exhibited the close connection between the logic of 
about the mystical.”  See A. J. Ayer Wittgenstein (New  York: Random House, 1985), 31 and Carnap 
“Intellectual Autobiography,” op. cit., 27.
24 The counter-interpretation mentioned here will be discussed at length in Chapter 3, below.
25 Carnap has several distinct phases in his philosophy, the most notable being his early 'verificationist' 
phase in  The Logical  Structure of  the World  and in “The Elimination of Metaphysics,”  following 
which he stopped talking about verification and began talking about testability.  Likewise, his earlier 
work on logical syntax, best exemplified by his Logical Syntax of Language later gave way to a period 
where he took semantics more seriously, as a result of Tarski's influence.  I shall limit my remarks to 
this earlier period, ignoring his work on semantics in such important works as Meaning and Necessity.  
See Rudolf Carnap, Logical Structure of the World, trans. Rolf A. George (La Salle, IL: Open Court 
Press,  1967);  “Testability and Meaning,”  Philosophy of  Science 3,  no.  4 (1936):  419-71;  Logical  
Syntax of Language, trans. Amethe Smeaton (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 2002); “The Elimination 
of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language” in  Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer (New 
York: Free Press, 1959), 60-81; Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947).
26 Carnap, Logical Syntax of Language, 65.
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science (or simply 'philosophy,' as he calls it) and syntax.”  He also directly mentions that 
Wittgenstein and Russell's shared view of philosophy—that philosophy is not a body of 
doctrines, but rather an activity, the primary function of which is as a critique of language 
(4.0031).  This led Carnap and the Vienna Circle to the view that the sole function of 
philosophy is “the logical clarification of ideas . . . [that is,] of the sentences and concepts 
of science . . .”27  Nor was Wittgenstein's influence particular to Carnap.  For instance A. 
J.  Ayer,  in  his  “Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics,” stresses that  the 
views  expressed  in  his  paper  are  “not  original,”  and  that  it  was  “inspired”  by 
Wittgenstein.28  
In  this  chapter  I  intend  to  evaluate  the  benefits  and  drawbacks,  both 
philosophically and textually, of the positivist reading of Wittgenstein.  In the first three 
sections,  I  will  explain  Wittgenstein's  somewhat  rocky  relationship  with  the  Vienna 
Circle, the philosophical position of logical empiricism, and the textual evidence that may 
indicate similarities between their philosophical positions.  Following that, I present a 
critique  of  this  reading,  relying  heavily  upon  his  posthumously  published  notes  and 
manuscripts,  as  well  as  biographical  information  from  Wittgenstein's  friends  and 
colleagues.  I  intend  to  show  that,  although  there  are  places  in  the  Tractatus that 
Wittgenstein sounds like he is putting forth a position very similar to the Positivists, the 
wealth of current evidence is inconsistent with this reading of the text.  
Since I am committed to the premise that the understanding of a philosophical 
work cannot be isolated from such contextual details—both of the life of a given thinker, 
27 Carnap, Logical Syntax of Language, 282.
28 A. J. Ayer “Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics” Mind 43, no. 171. (July 1934): 335.
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and the intellectual milieu in which the work was composed.  I hope to draw a lesson 
from this analysis about the way that philosophical texts should be read.  The idea that 
context is important for the interpretation of historical texts is relatively uncontroversial 
for understanding thinkers several hundred years removed.  However, for more recent 
philosophical texts, such as those within the analytic tradition, the context in which the 
text emerged is largely taken for granted.  I hope to show that the insufficiencies of the 
Positivist interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy points to a larger problem of 
ignoring context, and will itself provide a standard by which any interpretation of the 
Tractatus must be faithful.
§2 Wittgenstein's Relation to the Vienna Circle
The  intellectual  relationship  between  Wittgenstein  and  the  positivists was 
complex,  and  certainly  not  without  its  conflicts.   Wittgenstein  was  a  very  peculiar 
individual, and loathed others interpreting or adapting parts of his philosophical work. 
The story of the interaction between Wittgenstein and the positivists is a fascinating one, 
which has been discussed many times, and has developed its own historical mythology. 
For  example,  Wittgenstein  never  actually  met  with  the  Circle  in  its  entirety,  as  is 
commonly believed.29  Rather he did meet with a small group of them, including Schlick, 
Waismann  and Carnap  in  late  1920's  and  early  1930's—in his  infamous  'transitional' 
phase, when he had begun re-evaluating the consequences of the Tractatus.  Likewise, it 
is not true that that the influence of the  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus spread evenly 
29 Carl Menger “Memories of Moritz Schlick” in Rationality and Science, ed. E. T. Gadol (New York, 
Springer-Verlag: 1982) p. 86n3.
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across all of the members of the Circle.  For instance Otto Neurath, one of the founders 
and intellectual cornerstones of the group, remained skeptical of Wittgenstein's views. 
Often  in  the  meetings  of  the  Circle,  Waismann  alone  remained  his  most  adamant 
supporter.   However,  Wittgenstein's  influence on many of the most prominent logical 
positivists—including Schlick, Carnap and Ayer—is unmistakable.
By  the  time  that  Wittgenstein  had  met  with  Schlick  and  his  colleagues, 
Wittgenstein had already returned to Vienna after teaching grade school for several years 
in Lower Austria.  The Tractatus, having been published five years earlier, was already 
receiving much attention, specially in the philosophical circles of Vienna.  Hans Hahn 
taught a seminar on recent developments in the philosophy of mathematics in 1922, in 
which  Wittgenstein's  work  had  been  included.   From  this,  Wittgenstein  had  gained 
admirers  such  as  the  mathematician  Kurt  Reidemeister,  and  the  philosopher  Moritz 
Schlick.30  At  the  time,  Schlick  was  one  of  the  head  members  of  a  small  group  of 
philosophers, scientists and mathematicians who met on alternate Thursdays to discuss 
the philosophy of science.  Over the next few years, 'Der Schlick-Kreis' would eventually 
crystallize  into  a  shared  philosophical  position,  which  would  in  turn  become  an 
influential philosophical methodology in the English speaking world.31  
The Circle  devoted nearly a  whole  academic  year  to  the  Tractatus,  reading it 
aloud,  sentence by sentence.32  This would prove to have a particular  and significant 
influence  on the discussions  in  the  Circle.   As Karl  Menger,  who was at  the  time a 
mathematics  student  at  Vienna,  reports:  “[a]  new kind  of  jargon had  developed.   In 
30 Friedrich  Waismann,  Wittgenstein  and  the  Vienna  Circle,  ed.  Brian  McGuinness  and  trans.  Brian 
McGuinness and Joachim Schulte (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979), 13.
31 Menger, “Memories,” 85.
32 Ibid., 86.
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particular, two terms, new in the 1920's, had been completely integrated in the vocabulary 
Schlick and all other members of the Circle and were freely and perpetually used by the 
Circle: elementary propositions and tautologies.”33  
Schlick initially wrote to Wittgenstein in late 1924, to invite him to the meetings:
As an admirer of your Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus I have long intended to 
get in touch with you . . . Every winter semester I have regular meetings with 
colleagues and gifted students who are interested in the foundations of logic 
and  mathematics  and  your  name has  often  been  mentioned  in  this  group, 
particularly since my mathematical colleague Professor Reidemeister reported 
on your work in a lecture which made a great impression on us all.  So there 
are a number of people here—I am one myself—who are convinced of the 
importance and correctness of your fundamental ideas and who feel a strong 
desire to play some part in making your views more widely known.34
Schlick would eventually travel  with a  small  group of  students  to  Otterthal  in  1926, 
where Wittgenstein was teaching school.  The trip was likened by Schlick's wife to “a 
holy pilgrimage” to  meet  what  he had described as “one of  the greatest  geniuses  on 
earth.”   However  when  Schlick  arrived,  he  had  found  that  Wittgenstein  had  already 
resigned his post in scandal and left town.35  The two would finally meet in 1927, when 
Wittgenstein returned to Vienna to help design and build a house with Paul Engelmann 
for his sister.  His conversations with Schlick would continue over the next few years, 
and would come to include Frederick Waismann, Herbert Feigl, and a young philosopher 
named Rudolf Carnap—who would eventually become the most famous member of the 
Circle.  Of course, these meetings were not always constructive.  Often Wittgenstein's 
preoccupation  with  his  architectural  work  would  leave  him  in  no  mood  to  discuss 
33 Ibid., 86-7.
34 Waismann, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, p. 13.
35 Ray Monk, Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Penguin, 1990), 241-2.
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philosophy.  In one infamous instance, he read the poetry of Rabindranath Tagore to the 
positivists while sitting with his back to them.36
Wittgenstein would return to Cambridge in 1929.  That same year the Vienna 
Circle  would  officially  be  formed—christened,  as  it  were,  by the  publication  of  Die 
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, a sort of 'positivist manifesto.'37  Soon to follow would 
be the journal  Annalen der Philosophie, which would later be renamed  Erkenntnis: the 
main journal for the logical empiricists.38  By 1930 the Vienna Circle had ceased being a 
casual  meeting  on  Thursday nights,  to  become  a  proper  philosophical  movement  of 
international influence.  
Wittgenstein, however, did not approve of the philosophy he had inspired.  In a 
letter to Waismann in 1929, he wrote:
Because Schlick is no ordinary man, people owe it to him to take care not to 
let  their  'good intentions'  make him and the Vienna school which he leads 
ridiculous by boastfulness.  When I say 'boastfulness' I mean any kind of self-
satisfying  posturing.   'Renunciation  of  metaphysics!'  As  if  that were 
something new! (WVC 18)
36 Peter French argues that his concern here is indeed philosophical.  Arguing from a series of comments 
from On Certainty and Philosophical Remarks, French concludes that “Wittgenstein must be counted 
among Rorty's pragmatists [presumably from Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature], standing against 
the dominant  Western epistemological  tradition as well  as  the poetic interpretation of the aims of 
philosophy.  He was tempted during those days in Vienna, it may be supposed, to make a kind of 
Heideggerian turn to the poetic, possibly accounting for his reading of Tagore to the Circle.” see Peter 
French, “Why Did Wittgenstein Read Tagore to the Vienna Circle?” in  Protosoziologie im Kontext:  
'Lebenswelt'  und  'System'  in  Philosophie  und  Soziologie, ed.  Gerhard  Preyer,  Georg  Peter,  and 
Alexander Ulfig. (Wurzburg: Verlag, 1996), 249.
37 Collaboratively written by Neurath,  Carnap and Hahn.  It  has been published in English as  “The 
Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle” in Otto Neurath,  Empiricism and Sociology, 
ed. Robert Cohen and Marie Neurath (Boston: D. Reidel, 1973), 299-318.  This work will be discussed 
in greater length below in §3.
38 Waismann, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, ed. Brian McGuinness and tr. Brian McGuinness and 
Joachim Schulte (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979), 17-18.  Hereafter abbreviated WVC.
22
Although Wittgenstein had lost patience with the Circle, they would remain his major 
supporters  for  years  to  come.   And  as  the  political  climate  in  the  1930's  became 
increasingly inhospitable, the logical empiricists spread their brand of philosophy abroad, 
emigrating  to  Britain  and the  United  States.39  Positivism was  gaining  momentum—
especially in the English speaking world—and Wittgenstein would come to play a role 
not unlike an 'estranged father' to his philosophical progeny.
§3 The Positivist Programme
It should be somewhat suspicious to generalize a philosophical position from an 
entire philosophical movement; one runs the risk of painting with too coarse a brush-
stroke.40  Too  often  commentators  tend  to  reify  the  philosophical  positions  of  the 
members, ignoring the spirited disagreements within the Circle between phenomenalism 
and physicalism, coherence and correspondence, and verification and testability.  To add 
to  this  confusion,  the  members  were  themselves  scientists  of  all  types,  from 
mathematicians to sociologists.   But despite these drastic differences in approach and 
interest, there  is remarkable  agreement that lies at the core of their respective systems. 
Thus it is not hard to unify this motley group of thinkers into a single position, at the risk 
of abstracting a bit.   Perhaps the most ideal text from which to get a synoptic view of 
39 Carnap would hold a position at the University of Chicago, and later at UCLA, where he would join 
Reichenbach on faculty.  Feigl would go to Minnesota, and Frank to Harvard.  In England, Waismann 
would move to  Cambridge,  and later  to  Oxford.   Karl  Popper  fled  for  New Zealand.  See Susan 
Sterrett,  Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and Models of the World (New York: 
Penguin, 2005),  xx.
40 Due to the problems associated with summarizing the views of this diverse group of thinkers, I shall 
limit  my  focus  to  the  more  prominent  members  of  the  Circle,  who  were  actively  engaged  in 
philosophical  (not  overtly  mathematical  or  scientific)  work,  viz.,  Schlick,  Carnap,  Neurath  and 
Waismann.
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their  philosophical  aims  would  be  the  programmatic  statement,  “The  Scientific 
Conception of the World.”   Dedicated to the work of Mortiz Schlick, and presented to 
him “as a token of gratitude and joy at his remaining in Vienna,”41 this pamphlet sought 
to propagate the philosophical aims and goals of the Vienna Circle abroad.  It is thus the 
most direct source for their central aims.  
The goal of the Circle can accurately, although somewhat vaguely, be described as 
the  development  of  a  unified  science:  “to  link  and  harmonize  the  achievements  of 
individual investigators in their various fields of science.”42   Any such project seems to 
face an immediate problem: how to generalize from seemingly distinct fields of inquiry—
both  Naturwissenschaft and  Geisteswissenschaft—without  losing  explanatory  power. 
This  was  achieved  by  paying  close  attention,  not  to  the  content  of  these  respective 
sciences,  but  rather to the  methodology of  scientific  inquiry.  But still  they needed a 
universal  scientific  method—an  abstract  way  to  represent  various  elements  of  these 
scientific methodologies,  or  “a neutral  system of formulae.”   Such an  Einheitsprache 
would need a universal vocabulary and syntax, and would need to be “freed from the 
slang of  historical  language” to  have “a total  system of  concepts.”43  In  Russell  and 
Whitehead's Principia Mathematica they found just that.
Gottlob Frege, although neglected in his own lifetime, had become an inspiration 
to the fledgling program of analytic philosophy.  Carnap had attended Frege's lectures in 
Jena as early as 1910, but he admits he was not aware of the philosophical significance of 
41 Preface, “The Scientific Conception of the World,” op. cit, 299  Schlick had an attractive offer from 
the University of Bonn—and declined—opting to return to Vienna after a  visiting appointment  at 
Stanford University in 1928-9.
42 Carnap, Hahn and Neurath, “The Scientific Conception of the World,” 306.
43 Ibid., 306.
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his  logic  until  after  Russell  had  devised  a  similar  logical  system  based  on  Peano's 
notation.44  Following the publication of  Principia Mathematica,  the “new logic” had 
proven itself to be a very powerful tool for the clarification and analysis of the sentences 
of natural language.  It is this powerful new philosophical methodology which prompted 
Wittgenstein to come to Cambridge in order to study with Russell in 1912.
The new method of logical analysis revealed that the ordinary language that we 
use to  express  ourselves  often seduces  philosophers  into untenable  positions,  through 
what amount to linguistic confusions.  Russell's major contribution to this end had been 
his  “Theory  of  Descriptions,”  which  takes  as  its  basis  that  the  logical  form  of  the 
proposition  is  not identical  with  its  grammatical  form in  natural  language.   It  is  by 
attending to the 'surface grammar' of language, the words themselves—rather than  the 
true logical form of a given piece of language—that leads to these confusions.
In “On Denoting,” he puzzles about how a proposition can be meaningful when 
the referent  of the grammatical  subject,  the thing it  is  about,  does not  exist.   To use 
Russell's own example, consider the sentence:
(1) The Present King of France is bald
This  sentence  seems  to  harbor  an  inconsistency,  since  through  the  law  of  excluded 
middle, either the proposition (1) must be true, or its negation:
(2) The present King of France is not bald. 
44 Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 6.  Carnap's notes from 1910-14 have been published as Frege's 
Lectures on Logic ed. Rech and Awodey (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2004).
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However, to establish the meaning of either (1) or (2), it seems that there must be 
something  these  propositions  are  about in  order  to  establish  their  respective  truth  or 
falsity.   The fact that there is no 'present King of France,' no existing object to be the 
truth-maker of the proposition, tempts us to say that such a proposition not meaningful. 
The inelegant solution of Meinong45 allows for all subjects—whether they exist or not—
to subsist nevertheless, and to have a sort of outside-being [Aussersein].  Thus although 
there is no such thing as a golden mountain, such an object does have a kind of quasi-
existence; and indeed for Meinong, this complex is just as 'golden' and 'mountainous' as 
any  peak,  or  brick  of  gold.   This  theory  of  complexes  bloats  one's  ontology  to  an 
intolerable size.  
Famously,  Russell  propounded  a  version  of  Occam's  Razor  in  dealing  with 
philosophical  problems,  “wherever  possible,  substitute  [logical]  constructions  out  of 
known entities for inferences to unknown entities.”46  To allow for ontological economy, 
Russell's solution was to attend to the logical form of such denoting expressions, rather 
than the words themselves; the supposed problem is merely a confusion that results from 
assuming that the logic of the proposition should follow the grammar of the sentence, the 
subject-predicate form.  This conflation of the subject-predicate form of grammar and the 
true logical structure of a given sentence is one of the main things that the new logic of 
Principia sought to revolutionize.  Russell thought that we should instead interpret this as 
an existentially quantified expression, for which there either is, or is not, an object x that 
45 A version of which was adopted earlier by Russell in his theory of denoting phrases in Principles of  
Mathematics (New York: Norton, 1996), Chapter V.
46 Bertrand Russell, Philosophy of Logical Atomism (Chicago: Open Court Classics, 1985), 161
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satisfies the predicates 'is bald,' 'is the present King of France,' and an identity constraint 
to specify that there is only one such entity.  If there is such an existing object that can 
satisfy the conjunction of these conditions, then the sentence is true; otherwise, we can 
merely call the proposition false, instead of meaningless.  The existentially quantified 
proposition then always has a truth value whether the subject term exists or not, thus 
sidestepping the possible meaninglessness of such expressions.  What Russell had shown, 
above all else, is that certain philosophical perplexities are shown to result from a failure 
to attend closely to the logical features implicit in, and obscured by, ordinary grammar.  
Wittgenstein, having been trained in logic by Russell, agreed with much of this 
characterization of philosophy.  Indicating his debt to Russell, Wittgenstein says in the 
Tractatus that “[a]ll philosophy is a 'critique of language.'”  He adds that “[i]t was Russell 
who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition 
need not be its real one” (4.0031).  A bit earlier, talks about the misleading character of 
natural language:
It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from [natural language] what 
the logic of language is.  Language disguises thought. So much so, that from 
the outward form of the clothing it  is  impossible  to  infer  the form of  the 
thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to 
reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes (4.002).
The  a  priori methods  of  logic,  and  the  universal  philosophical  methodology  that  it 
represented, seemed to provide an indubitably certain place from which to start; and in 
addition, the method of analysis that it provided—a discovery of the true logical form 
underlying  the  natural  language  statements  we  use  to  philosophize—provided  to  the 
Vienna Circle a powerful critique of the speculative metaphysics dominant in Europe 
throughout the Nineteenth Century.
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Another  prominent  influence  on  the  logical  positivists  was  the  empiricist 
epistemology of the British tradition, through the influence of the epistemological work 
of Ernst Mach.  Mach was a physicist and philosopher who held the Chair of Inductive 
Sciences  at  the University of Vienna from 1895 onwards.47  His  epistemology was a 
phenomenalist empiricism, which borrowed heavily from the British empiricism of David 
Hume and John Stuart Mill.48  According to a phenomenalist epistemology, the only thing 
truly present to the mind are sensations.  If sensations are the only thing to which the 
mind has direct  access,  then objects  as we know them are really nothing but mental 
constructions built out of these sensations.  That is, the mind cannot access the world 
itself, but rather only grasps the qualities of these objects which are given to the mind. 
This  type  of  empiricism  lends  itself  to  a  deep  epistemological  anti-realism  and  a 
suspicion of metaphysics, just as with Hume.  Although not all of the positivists accepted 
this Machean phenomenalism—most notably the physicalist Neurath—Mach's influence 
of this empiricist methodology would shape the philosophical position of Schlick, as well 
that of Carnap in his mighty Der Logische Aufbau der Welt.49
The positivism of the Vienna Circle would unite the method of logical analysis 
characteristic of Frege and Russell, with the empiricism of Mach.50   Frege and Russell's 
a priori science of logic provided a model for correct reasoning, by which one can reform 
philosophy to a degree of mathematical  certainty.   So long as one reasoned correctly 
according to wholly empirical premises, an entire model of the world and all that could 
47  This is a title which later Moritz Schlick would also hold.
48 Or, in the case of Ayer, to David Hume.
49 Carnap, Logical Structure of the World, op. cit.
50 With Russell,  there  was  an  influence  on  both  of  these  major  themes,  himself  an  empiricist  with 
phenomenalist tendencies.
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possibly be known could in  turn be constituted.   This is  exactly what  they found in 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 
As  mentioned  above,  the  positivists  rejected  a  great  deal  of  19th Century 
metaphysics,  including primarily the idealism of the Hegelian tradition,  and the more 
moderate forms of idealism resident in the two major schools of Neo-Kantianism.  To 
Carnap, for example, from the 'new logic' “follows the impossibility of any metaphysics 
which tries  to draw inferences from experience to something transcendent which lies 
beyond experience and not in itself experiencable.”51  To Carnap, “[l]ogic is no longer 
merely one philosophical discipline amongst others, but we are able to say it outright: 
Logic is the method of philosophizing.”52  Instead of relying upon philosophy as a tool to 
gain access to that which transcends experience it should rather be viewed as a scientific 
enterprise, going “hand in hand with empirical science . . . no longer viewed as a domain 
of knowledge in its own right, on par with, or superior to, the empirical sciences.”53  The 
proper function of philosophy then is, in some sense, solely negative; philosophy is “a 
critique of language.”  The problem as they saw it, is that a great deal of metaphysics is 
generated by a naïve assumption that the logic of language is identical with the grammar 
of the sentences of ordinary discourse; thus this type of speculative metaphysics does not 
provide genuine philosophical insights, but rather confusions that result from a misuse of  
language.
The  major  thesis  that  the  positivists  borrowed  from  Wittgenstein's  early 
philosophy is  his  theory of  nonsense.   According  to  their  understanding,  nonsense is 
51 Carnap, “Elimination of Metaphysics” 145.
52 Carnap, “The Old and the New Logic,” in Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer (New York, Free Press, 
1959),133.
53 Ibid., 133.
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created in one of two ways.  First, if a term is used which does not have a legitimate 
meaning,  usually  defined  in  terms  of  direct  sensory 'verification'  through  the  world. 
Questions of “God” and “ethics” model this first type of nonsense for the Vienna Circle. 
To the positivists words like “substance,” “being,” “God,” etc., should be revealed for 
what they really are—devoid of meaning. To see that this is the case, one merely needs to 
examine  the  way  philosophy  relies  upon  the  constructions  in  ordinary  language. 
Grammatically speaking, nouns can be used simultaneously for substantives like 'table' 
and 'water,' but also for intangible relational qualities like 'friendship' and 'love'; and in 
even more egregious cases, nouns can be made substantive by being derived from verbs, 
like 'being.'   In such an accidental  grammatical  slip,  certain philosophical terms have 
been torn from their original meanings, have become reified and abstracted, and serve 
only as a type of high-brow 'slang.'  And although these terms are circulated, often they 
have no actual value.  Carnap's critique of Heidegger in “Elimination of Metaphysics,” 
for example, might be seen in just this light
The second way a sentence can be denied cognitive meaning is when, through 
ignoring  the  true  logical  role  of  a  given  term,  the  sentence  combines  words  in  an 
illegitimate way.  This can be seen in cases of cross-category equivocation.  An example 
that might illustrate this is the expression “Caesar is a prime number.”  This says nothing 
since the predicate can only apply to numbers, not people. Perhaps the best example of 
this is Carnap's infamous critique of Heidegger's statement “The Nothing itself nothings.” 
What Heidegger was misled by “employing the word 'nothing' as a noun,” since 'nothing' 
is  “not  a  particular  name,  but  a  certain  logical  form  of  the  sentence  that  serves  this 
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purpose,” viz., a negated existential quantifier.  By using a word which has a defined 
grammatical role.  It is the goal of a properly scientific  Weltanschauung to reveal the 
inappropriateness of these uses of terms, and to eliminate them from their philosophical 
usage.
To more  properly establish  philosophy as  a  scientific  endeavor,  and  in  direct 
opposition to  the “metaphysical  concept poetry”54 of  their  philosophical  predecessors, 
they espoused the infamous 'verification' theory of meaning.  According to this, cognitive 
meaning  is  denied  to  any  non-tautological  statement  which  cannot  be  in  principle 
'verified'  through  the  empirically  given.55 For  example,  metaphysical  and  normative 
utterances, because they are neither tautological nor verifiable through experience, are 
considered cognitively meaningless, and should be eliminated from philosophy.56
To  this  end  of  creating  a  unified  science,  Carnap  advocated  altering  natural 
language reports of scientific claims by reducing them from the material mode of speech
—a high level 'slang' which contains philosophical conclusions put in ordinary language
—down  to  the  physical  language  of  protocol-sentences.   These  phenomenalistic  or 
physicalistic statements57 should be those that “refer to the given, and describe directly 
54 Ibid., 133.
55 That a given statement must be “in principle” verifiable is important.  That is, although that “A planet 
revolving around Alpha Centauri can support human life” is unverifiable given the present state of 
technology, it is not impossible to verify this.  But, as Ayer tells us, “I do know what observations 
would decide it for me, if, as it is theoretically conceivable, I were once in a position to make them.” 
A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952), 36.   See also Schlick, “Postivism 
and Realism” in Ayer, Logical Positivism, 88-89.
56 There is a confusion lingering here, which the positivists were not aware of until much later.  It is one 
thing to be true logically, by virtue of its form (ex., if p, then p), and quite another to be semantically 
true by meanings alone (ex., a 'bachelor' is an unmarried man).  For the latter, they can be shown to be 
logically true by the addition of a meaning postulate, whereby a semantic truth can be transformed into 
a logical truth.  See Carnap,  Meaning and Necessity  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 
222-6.
57 Carnap of the  Aufbau sought to reduce natural language down to phenomenalist sense-date reports. 
Later,  in  The  Unity  of  Science (mostly  due  to  the  influence  of  Neurath)  he  advocated  a  more 
physicalist position in regard to protocol sentences.  Carnap,  The Unity of Science, tr.  Max Black 
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given experience  or  phenomena,  i.e.,  the  simplest  states  of  which  knowledge can  be 
had.”58  Through such a reduction, what follows is a direct series of reports which can 
then be universalized between all sciences.  By analysis of scientific statements back to 
the language of immediate sense-experience, Carnap and those influenced by him sought 
to  reduce  all  sciences  to  their  core:  what  the  experimenter  experiences.   Sense-
verification as a criterion of meaning 'revealed' to them that certain timeless philosophical 
truths, “[t]he suppositions of sentences of metaphysics, of the philosophy of values, of 
ethics,”  reveal  themselves  not  to  be  real  problems  at  all,  but  rather  are  “pseudo-
problems.”  Carnap writes that:
 .  .  .  there is  a sharp boundary between two kinds of statements.   To one 
belong the statements as they are made by empirical science; their meaning 
can be determined by logical analysis or, more precisely, through reduction to 
the simplest statements about the empirically given.  The other statements, to 
which belong those cited above, reveal themselves as empty of meaning if one 
takes them in the way that metaphysicians intend . . . If a metaphysician or 
theologian  wants  to  retain  the  usual  medium  of  language,  then  he  must 
himself realize and bring about clearly that he is giving not description but 
expression,  not  theory  or  communication  of  knowledge,  but  poetry  and 
myth.59
Through this clarification of statements, “pseudo-questions are automatically eliminated.” 
A given proposition in the material  mode of  speech,  which employs  macro-slang for 
concepts and processes, would through analysis be restated in terms of the observations 
involved in the sentence; these sense-data statements can be verified by being compared 
with the world one-by-one.  
(Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1995).
58 Carnap, Unity of Science,  45.
59 Carnap, Hahn and Neurath, “The Scientific Conception of the World,” 307.
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As a consequence, even philosophical discourse concerning such areas as politics 
and art, is likewise vilified.  As to ethical statements—which seem prima facie not nearly 
as suspicious as their metaphysical counterparts—the only type of meaning that they can 
have  is  purely  “emotive.”   That  is,  “[t]hey  have  no  logical  content,  but  are  only 
expressions of feeling which in their turn simulate feelings and volitional tendencies on 
the part  of the hearer.”60  The only possible role of an ethical  statement is merely to 
express approval or disapproval of specific actions, or to persuade others to adopt similar 
attitudes.  But morality, as an autonomous field of philosophical inquiry, is vacuous.  The 
Vienna  Circle  read  the  Tractatus in  harmony  with  the  views  to  which  they  were 
committed.   Carnap  confirms  this  understanding,  telling  us  that  Wittgenstein's  great 
inspiration  to  the  positivists  was  to  have  “shown  that  the  so  called  sentences  of 
metaphysics and of ethics are pseudo-sentences.”61  And, indeed, there are remarks that 
seem to support this. 
§4 Russell's Wittgenstein
One of the first published misunderstandings of the  Tractatus, which helped to 
support the positivists' reading, is Russell's Introduction to the text.  Russell had benefited 
from his conversations with his protege, and had integrated a great deal of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy into his own work.  In the series of lectures published as the Philosophy of  
Logical Atomism,  for eaxmple,  Russell  mentions that the ideas contained therein “are 
very largely concerned with explaining certain ideas which I learned from my friend and 
60 Carnap, Logical Syntax of Language, 278.
61 Ibid., 282.
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former  pupil  Ludwig  Wittgenstein.”62  References  to  Wittgenstein's  influence  are 
generously sprinkled throughout the lectures.63  Such allusions to Russell's debt can also 
be found in the influential set of lectures published as  Our Knowledge of the External  
World.64  It is noteworthy that Carnap adopts his position from a careful scrutiny of Our 
Knowledge  of  the  External  World,  in  which  Wittgenstein  is  explicitly  mentioned  as 
having  an  influence.   Carnap specifically cites  this  set  of  lectures  as  instrumental  to 
developing his philosophical methodology.  “Some passages made an especially vivid 
impression on me,” Carnap writes, “because they formulated clearly and explicitly a view 
of the aim of philosophy which I had implicitly held for some time . . . I felt as if his 
appeal had been directed at me personally.  To work in this spirit would be my task from 
now on!”65
After  having  approached  several  publishing  houses  leading  up  to  1921,  the 
Tractatus had been rejected several times.  Wittgenstein had asked Russell to compose 
the Introduction to the book, hoping that it would make it easier to be published.  The 
endorsement of the world famous Cambridge logician certainly did help it eventually get 
published;  however,  it  would  be  mistaken  to  say  that  Russell's  interpretation  is  an 
accurate  presentation  of  the  ideas  in  the  Tractatus.   In  a  letter  dated  April  9,  1920, 
Wittgenstein indicates his disapproval of the Introduction: “There's so much of it that I'm 
not quite in agreement with,” he writes, “both where you're critical of me and also where 
you're simply trying to elucidate my point of view” (WC 118).
62 Russell, Philosophy of Logical Atomism, 35.
63 Ibid., 46, 67, 91.
64 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (New York: Routledge, 1996), 12, 213n.  
65 Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 13.
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Russell's  Introduction  begins  by  stating  that  the  Tractatus concerns  “the 
conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language.”66  Such a 
language,  as  expounded  in  Russell's  lectures  on  logical  atomism,  would  have  very 
specific features. 
In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would correspond 
one by one with the components of the corresponding fact, with the exception 
of such words as 'or,' 'not,' 'if,' 'then,' which have a different function.  In a 
logically perfect language there would be one word and and no more for every 
simple  object,  and  everything  that  is  not  simple  will  be  expressed  by  a 
combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words 
which simple things can enter in, one word for each simple component . . . 
Actual  languages  are  not  logically  perfect  in  this  sense,  and  they  cannot 
possibly be, if they are to serve the purposes of daily life.  A logically perfect 
language, if it could be constructed, would not be intolerably prolix, but, as 
regards its vocabulary, would be very largely private to one speaker.  That is to 
say, all the names that it would use would be private to that speaker and could 
not enter into the language of another speaker.67
Here the two primary reasons that Russell gives for “ordinary language” being modified 
are  first,  that  it  allows  for  nonsensical  combinations  of  symbols,  that  some  such 
combination of symbols are impermissible; or secondly, there is no meaning attached to a 
given  term,  because  it  does  not  have  a  unique  referent.68  In  Wittgenstein's  own 
terminology,  natural  language  often  contains  several  'symbols'  for  the  same  'sign.' 
However, there is textual evidence that Wittgenstein's philosophical method was not so 
much concerned with revising ordinary language in favor of such an ideal language of 
logic.  In the Tractatus, he tell us that: “[a]ll propositions of our colloquial language are 
actually,  just  as  they are,  logically  completely  in  order”  (5.5563).   The  Tractatus is 
concerned with the essential aspects of representation as such, which corresponds just as 
66 Russell, Introduction to TLP, 7.
67 Russell, Philosophy of Logical Atomism, 58-9.
68 Russell, Introduction, 8.
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much to ordinary language as it does to logical symbolism.  Logic, for Wittgenstein, is 
the  form of  representation—“a reflexion  of  the world”—and not  a  language in  itself 
(6.13).  For Wittgenstein, the reduction of ordinary language to the ideal language of 
logic, through a Russellian “hierarchy of languages,” is improper.  While Russell was 
concerned primarily with amending the defects that result from philosophizing in natural 
language by translating it into the ideal language of logic, as I will show below no such 
commitment is appropriate to Wittgenstein.
Perhaps the most obvious place where one can get a clear view of the problems of 
Russell's exposition are his criticisms of the Tractatus.  Aside from some rather technical 
points, such as the ability of Wittgenstein's definition of number to account for transfinite 
quantities, Russell's main points of contention are with Wittgenstein's discussion of “the 
mystical,” and Wittgenstein's distinction between saying [sagen] and showing [zeigen]. 
Russell rightfully points out that, for Wittgenstein, the logic of representation in language 
is itself ineffable—since it is a precondition for the use of language.  That is, one must 
use the form of representation of language to represent itself in speaking about it.  After 
which,  Russell  here  first  puts  forth  a  very common criticism of  Wittgenstein's  early 
thought  when he  accuses  his  former  pupil  of  standing  in  performative  contradiction. 
“What causes hesitation [to accept this point] is the fact that, after all, Mr. Wittgenstein 
manages to say a good deal about what cannot be spoken. . .  . The whole subject of 
ethics, for example, is placed by Mr. Wittgenstein in the mystical, inexpressible region. 
Nevertheless he is capable of conveying his ethical opinions.”69
69 Ibid., p. 22.
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This suggests to Russell a “loophole” for Wittgenstein, that if he were to postulate 
through the existence of “a hierarchy of languages,” that one can express on the meta-
level  features  of  the  object  language  in  question—and  in  this  way,  Russell  thinks, 
Wittgenstein  intended  to  express  the  inexpressible.   Russell  commits  himself  to  the 
existence of  “levels” of  language in his  ramified theory of types,  the solution to  the 
infamous contradiction in Frege's Grundgesetze concerning a class which contains all and 
only the classes which are not members of itself.  But as mentioned earlier, the idea of 
such  a  hierarchy  of  languages,  and  the  ability  for  one  language  to  be  completely 
described  from a  meta-language,  is  antithetical  to  Wittgenstein's  project.70  Russell's 
ramified theory of types in Principia—perhaps the most compelling reason for accepting 
such a hierarchy of  languages—was robustly criticized in  the  Tractatus;  Wittgenstein 
refers to it  as an “error” (3.331), and which he thinks “vanishes” (3.333) in a proper 
logical  symbolism.   Russell's  “intellectual  discomfort”  at  this  point  leads  to  a 
misunderstanding, not only for Russell, but also for the Vienna Circle.  
§5 The Positivist Wittgenstein
The positivists read Wittgenstein as saying that only non-tautological propositions 
which are fact stating—or, more precisely, those that are capable of modeling the world 
as  it  is—are meaningful.   Those which are  not,  including the pseudo-propositions  of 
ethics and metaphysics,  should be considered  nonsense.   In this  way,  as I  mentioned 
earlier,  the  positivist  interpretation  of  the  Tractatus  paints  Wittgenstein  as  a  sort  of 
70 For more on this point, see above pp. 91-2.
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modern-day Hume—who sought to set the limits of thought, and prescribed that nothing 
of substantive philosophical importance can lie beyond that line.  A good deal of evidence 
which supports the continuity between the Tractatus and the project of the Vienna Circle 
concerns a shared view of the nature of philosophy.  Both Wittgenstein and the positivists 
viewed the function of philosophy as primarily negative—the method of philosophy is 
that  of  logical  analysis.71  “Logic  is  no  longer  merely  one  philosophical  discipline 
amongst others,” Carnap tells us, “but we are able to say it outright: Logic is the method 
of philosophizing.”72  In the spirit of Russell's logic and the explanatory successes that 
resulted from his theory of descriptions, which Ramsey once praised as a “paradigm of 
philosophy,”73 the  method  of  logical  analysis  seemed  to  promise  the  solution  to  all 
outstanding philosophical puzzles.
In a series of remarks from TLP 4.111 -  4.115, Wittgenstein offers us a more 
robust view of his conception of philosophy.  He tells us here that philosophy is not a 
body of doctrines, but rather an “activity,” the function of which is the  clarification of 
thoughts.  “Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is 
to  make  them  clear  and  to  give  them  sharp  boundaries”  (4.112).   He  denies  that 
philosophy is itself a science, but rather its role is to “set limits to the much disputed 
sphere  of  natural  sciences”  (4.111,  4.113).   “The  correct  method  in  philosophy,” 
Wittgenstein tells us in 6.53, “would really be the following: to say nothing except what 
can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science . . .”  Recall that this is nearly identical to 
the  positivists'  view of  philosophy,  for  whom its  function  was  to  limit  the  range  of 
71 See above, §3.
72 Carnap, “The Old and New Logic,” 133.
73 F. P. Ramsey, “Philosophy” in  Philosophical Papers ed. D. H. Mellor (New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1990), 1n.
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meaningful contingent statements to those which can be established on the basis of the 
empirically given, and those statements which follow deductively from these empirically 
verified statements.  Of course, Carnap and Wittgenstein both were deeply influenced by 
Russell's  work in logical theory—so it should not be surprising that they would have 
similar  views on the nature of philosophy.    Both are,  after  all,  two members of the 
budding analytic tradition. 
More  interesting,  however,  are  the  remarks  which  seem  to  indicate  that 
Wittgenstein,  like  the  positivists,  thought  that  philosophy  should  be  concerned  with 
nothing propositions capable of verification.  In the Preface to the text, Wittgenstein tells 
us that his book “will . . . draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to thinking, but to the 
expression of thought.”  Such a limit, he continues, can “only be drawn in language and 
what  lies  on  the  other  side  of  the  limit  will  be  simply  nonsense.”74  Also  at  4.003, 
Wittgenstein says that “[m]ost propositions and questions, that have been written about 
philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions 
of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness.  Most questions and propositions of 
the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language.” 
Following this, he adds a cryptic example: “They are of the same kind as the question 
whether the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful.”  It seems telling that his 
example  of  such  'senselessness'  is  a  proposition  which  contains  the  normative  terms 
'good' and 'beautiful.'  Further, in the concluding remarks 6.52-3, he tells us that “[w]e 
feel that even if  all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have 
still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the 
74 Preface to TLP, emphasis mine.
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answer.”  Adjoining this: “And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems 
are really no problems.”  That is, the problems of life are not 'real' questions, and so the 
proper answer would be a denial of the question.  6.53 continues: 
The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can 
be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing 
to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say 
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning 
to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the 
other—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—
but it would be the only strictly correct method.
Some  additional  passages  which  also  support  the  positivist  interpretation  include 
6.4-6.421, where Wittgenstein addresses value judgments.  He writes:
All propositions are of equal value.
The  sense  of  the  world  must  lie  outside  the  world.  In  the  world 
everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value 
exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole 
sphere of what happens and is the case.  For all that happens and is the case is 
accidental.
        What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within  the world, since if it 
did it would itself be accidental.  It must lie outside the world.
Hence also  it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.) 
These passages seem to indicate that Wittgenstein intended to disassociate the sphere of 
fact from that of value.  It is Wittgenstein's clearly stated position that for a  proposition 
to have meaning, it must say something about the world; only a proposition which can be 
decomposed  through  analysis  into  a  truth-functional  combination  of  elementary 
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propositions  has  sense  and  is  expressible.75  A value-laden  expression  does  not  say 
anything about how the world is.  Although it might indicate how the world ought to be or 
that it ought to be that way—in either case it is not genuine proposition for Wittgenstein. 
This is because the essence of language is to represent the world, so fact stating claims 
are the only ones which can be truly meaningful—the only ones which can be spoken; the 
solution for those who may wish to utter normative or metaphysical claims is to remain 
silent.  And famously, Wittgenstein's last word in the text is “Whereof one cannot speak, 
thereof one must be silent” (7).76  Throughout all of these passages, Wittgenstein seems to 
sound remarkably similar to the Vienna Circle.  However just because Wittgenstein, like 
the positivists, may have sought to create a gulf between statements of fact and value, it 
still remains an open question whether he assigns the same significance (or lack thereof) 
that the positivists did to them.  This relies upon understanding the relationship between 
these two spheres, not merely the demarcation of each to their respective sides.
The  remarks  thus  far  surveyed,  if  taken  alone,  would  seem  to  indicate  that 
Wittgenstein shared roughly the same philosophical outlook as the positivists.  As to the 
nature of philosophy, the ability to express the factual, and the inability to express all else
—all of this is consistent with the position of the Vienna Circle.  In this respect, it is not 
surprising  that  this  simple  understanding  of  Wittgenstein's  position  was embraced by 
them.   As  his  long  time  friend  Paul  Engelmann  remarks,  “[a]  whole  generation  of 
disciples  was  able  to  take Wittgenstein for a  positivist,  because he has  something of 
enormous importance in common with the positivists: he draws the line between what we 
75  This will be analyzed at length above in Chapter 3.
76 TLP, Ogden translation used for emphasis.
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can speak about and what we must be silent about just as they do.”77   Certainly it is one 
of the main contentions of Wittgenstein's early thought that  that  of which one cannot 
speak,  one  must  remain  silent  (7).   Wittgenstein  refers  to  this  in  the  Preface  to  the 
Tractatus as  “the  whole  meaning”  of  the  book.   However,  as  I  will  next  show,  the 
significance of this final remark is taken wrongly by the positivists—perhaps due to their 
reading a very British empiricism into the  Tractatus,  a work otherwise conspicuously 
silent  on epistemological  concerns.   As Engelmann continues,  the difference between 
Wittgenstein and the positivists is that the positivists “have nothing to be silent about.” 
He explains:
Positivism holds—and this is its essence—that what we can speak about is all 
that matters in life.  Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that  
really matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent  
about.  When he nevertheless takes immense pains to delimit the unimportant, 
it is not the coastline of that island which he is bent on surveying with such 
meticulous accuracy, but the boundary of the ocean.78
§6 Elementary Propositions and Verification
Wittgenstein  was  committed  to  the  Russellian  notion  that  the  clarification  of 
propositions is garnered through the process of analysis.  We find Wittgenstein saying at 
3.25 that “A proposition has one and only one complete analysis.”  A complete analysis, 
he tells us earlier, is when “in a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that 
elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought” (3.2).79  And 
77 Paul Engelmann,  Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir, trans. L Furtmüler and ed. Brian 
McGuinness (New York: Horizon Press, 1967), 97.
78 Ibid., p. 97.  Emphasis in original.
79 It is important not to be mislead by the epistemological language of this quote.  Wittgenstein never 
provides an answer to how these elements correspond to thoughts.  When pressed by Russell on this 
point, Wittgenstein replies: “I don't know what the constituents of thought are but I know that it must 
have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language.  Again the kind of relation of the 
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elsewhere  he  tells  us  that  “the  analysis  of  propositions  must  bring  us  to  elementary 
propositions”  (4.221).   Elementary  propositions  [Elementarsätze]  are  “names  in 
immediate combination,” and are the last residue of analysis—since names “cannot be 
dissected any further” (3.26).80  We are also told that an elementary proposition “asserts 
the  existence  of  a  state  of  affairs  [Sachverhalte]”  (4.21).81  A proposition,  he further 
specifies, is “[a] truth function of elementary propositions” (5).  That is, a proposition is 
true just in case all of its component elementary propositions are true.  But what of these 
elementary  propositions?   And  what  determines  their  truth  or  falsity?   The  term 
“Elementary proposition” is somewhat enigmatic in the text, since Wittgenstein never 
adequately explains what  it  means.   But  in the empiricist  gaze of  the Vienna Circle, 
elementary propositions were interpreted by them to mean simple observation statements, 
or “protocol sentences.”
Recall that for the logical empiricists, committed to the phenomenalism or Mach 
and the logic of Russell, philosophy's true role was on par with that of science.  The only 
legitimate  contingent  propositions  are  those  which  satisfy  the  verification  criteria  of 
meaning.   All  other philosophical statements are merely “pseudo-statements” and can 
have no value in philosophy.  Reading elementary propositions as sense-data statements 
brought  Wittgenstein's  position  in  line  with  their  own.   On  this  interpretation, 
Wittgenstein's commitment to clarification of philosophical statements by analysis—that 
constituents of thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant.  It would be a matter for psychology to 
find out” (WC 98-9).
80 cf. TLP 4.22: “An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names.”
81 Ogden and Ramsey, in the original translation of the TLP, renders Wittgenstein's term Sachverhalte as 
“atomic fact.”  Pears and McGuinness, however, translate it “state of affairs.”  To avoid confusion, I 
will henceforth use the German term throughout.
43
is,  supposedly  reducing  them  down  to  the  language  of  sense-impressions—seems 
perfectly catered to verificationism.   
Ayer  tells  us  that  the  Vienna  Circle  “took  it  for  granted  that  the  elementary 
statements which yielded this criteria of meaning [viz., the verification principle] were 
reports of observations.”82  Also Karl Popper, in his discussion of Wittgenstein's position, 
makes the same conflation between elementary propositions and observations statements: 
All  genuine  (or  meaningful)  propositions  were  truth-functions  of  the 
elementary or atomic propositions which described “atomic facts,” i.e., facts 
which can in principle be ascertained by observation . . . If we call a statement 
an “observation statement” not only if it states an actual observation but also 
if it  states anything that may be observed, we shall have to say that  every 
genuine proposition must be a truth-function of, and therefore deducible from,  
observation  statements.  All  other  apparent  propositions  will  be,  in  fact, 
nonsense; they will be meaningless pseudo-propositions.83
In addition, Karl Menger reports that members of the Circle, when questioned, provided 
'this is red' as an example of an elementary proposition.84  
However,  the  equation  of  sense-data  statements  to  Wittgenstein's  elementary 
propositions  cannot  be textually maintained in the  Tractatus.   We find him saying at 
6.3751, “the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology 
nor a contradiction. The assertion that a point in the visual field has two different colours 
at the same time, is a contradiction.”  If a specific color report, such as 'this point on 
object A is simultaneously red and blue' is a contradiction, then it cannot be logically 
simple since Sachverhalte “are independent of one another” (2.061).  From the existence 
or non-existence of a Sachverhalt, he tells us, “it is impossible to infer the existence or 
82 A. J. Ayer “Editor's Introduction” to Logical Positivism, p. 12.
83 Karl Popper, quoted in Anscombe, Introduction, 25.  Emphasis mine.
84 Menger, “Memories,” 87.
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non-existence of another”  (2.062).  However, the assertion that 'this is red' does exclude 
other color attributions to that same point.  “For two colors e.g., to be at one place in the 
visual field, is impossible, logically impossible, for it is excluded by the logical structure 
of colour” (6.3751).85  Also, since Wittgenstein asserts that a  Sachverhalt exists if and 
only if  the  corresponding  elementary  proposition  is  true  (4.25),  it  follows  that  if  an 
elementary proposition were to come into contradiction with another, then it would be 
false that both Sachvertalte could exist, again contra 2.062.   If this is due to “the logical 
structure of colour” as he puts it  in 6.3751, then it follows that colors are  not logical 
simples,  and  thus  cannot  be  constituents  of  an  elementary proposition—for  if  it  has 
logical structure, then it cannot be simple.  However  Sachverhalten are simple, and as 
such they cannot contradict one another.  Elementary propositions, according to the text, 
are  the “simplest”  kind and consist  only of  “a concatenation of names” (4.21,  4.22). 
Since names uniquely stand for objects in the fully analyzed proposition, it follows that 
colors  are  not  objects,  but  rather  “forms  of  objects”  (2.0251).86  Thus  the  logical 
empiricists'  interpretation of elementary propositions as simple observation statements 
cannot be what Wittgenstein meant by this term. 
Interpreting elementary propositions as sense-data statements is a crucial step for 
the positivist interpretation of Wittgenstein since, according to the verification principle, 
a contingent statement is meaningful if and only if it corresponds to sense experience. 
However,  this  is  certainly not  the  last  word on Wittgenstein's  alleged verificationism 
85 This argument is adapted from Anscombe, Introduction, 27.
86 It might be objected that at 4.123 Wittgenstein does speak of colors as objects.  He describes internal 
properties as ones in which “it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it.”  The example he 
provides to illustrate this is “This shade of blue and that one stand, eo ipso, in the internal relation of 
lighter to darker. It is unthinkable that these two objects should not stand in this relation.”  However, 
one must not be too hasty to overlook that he qualifies this as a “shifting use of the word 'object'.”
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because, as it is widely known, a great deal of how the positivists read Wittgenstein was 
gained directly from Wittgenstein in his conversations with the Vienna Circle.  From the 
notes of these meetings, there is textual evidence which seems to support that he did 
indeed  hold  a  verificationist  theory  of  meaning.   There  are  a  great  many  places 
throughout the Waismann notes of Wittgenstein's meetings with the Circle,87 as well as in 
Philosophical Remarks,88 where he discusses verification.   He refers to the sense of a 
proposition as “its method of verification,” and adds that “[i]n order to understand the 
proposition, you need to know its verification.  To specify it is to specify the sense of the 
proposition” (WVC 227).
There are many problems, both historically and textually,  when we try to read 
what  Wittgenstein  means  here  by  “verification”  in  exactly  the  same  sense  as  the 
positivists.   Anscombe  reports  that  Wittgenstein  reacted  in  outrage  when,  during  a 
meeting of the Moral Science Club at Cambridge, a member attributed the verification 
principle to him.  “Who?  Me?”  he exclaimed.89  First, even if Wittgenstein did hold a 
position where the only criterion of the meaning of a proposition was by its experiential 
verification in the late 1920's and early 1930's, this does not necessarily reflect a position 
that he held leading up to the initial publication of the Tractatus in 1921.  Secondly, and I 
think more importantly, the word 'verification' meant different things for Wittgenstein and 
the  positivists.   There  are  three  main  points  of  contrast  between  the  meaning  that 
Wittgenstein seems to give 'verification' and that of the Vienna Circle.  For Wittgenstein, 
verification can be read as a sufficient condition for the meaningfulness of a term or 
87 See WVC 47-8, 53, 70-1, 79, 97-8, 126, 158, 186, 204, 211, 221, 226-7, 232.
88 See  Philosophical Remarks, ed. Rush Rhees and tr. Raymond Hargraves and Roger  White (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1975), 62, 66, 174, 200, 282, 287, 289.  Hereafter abbreviated PR.
89 Anscombe, “Ludwig Wittgenstein” Philosophy 70 (1995): 405-6.
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proposition, whereas for the positivists it is both a necessary and sufficient condition.  In 
addition,  for  the  logical  empiricists,  verification  was  a  single  method  of  testing  all 
propositions, and is garnered specifically through appeal to immediate sense data.  Lastly, 
Wittgenstein clearly differs with the positivists on the question of conclusive verification. 
In the remainder of this section, I shall endeavor to illustrate these three points.
For  the  Positivists,  the  verification  principle  was  a  single  criterion  for 
meaningfulness, which was used as a test  for the meaning of all propositions.  In its 
earliest form, the Positivists held that verification is at least a necessary condition, but 
more often both a necessary and sufficient condition, for a statement to have meaning.90 
As Schlick put it,  “a proposition has a statable meaning only if  it  makes a verifiable 
difference whether it is true or false.  A proposition which is such that the world remains 
the same whether it is true or false simply says nothing about the world; it is empty and 
communicates nothing; I can give it no meaning.”91  It is important to the Vienna Circle 
that  verification  be  at  least  a  necessary condition  for  the  sense  of  a  proposition,  for 
otherwise they would be unable to claim that the absence of verification implies that a 
proposition  has  no  meaning.   However,  it  should  be  noted  that  “verification”  as  the 
Vienna Circle uses the term—that is, as a condition for the possibility of the meaning—is 
not the same as what Wittgenstein means by the term.  Wittgenstein often says that a 
given method of verification determines the sense of a proposition; or put differently, 
verification is a sufficient condition for its sense. 
90 This “strong” version of the verification principle late gave way to a “weaker” version under criticism 
that  it  cannot  account  for  general  laws,  sometimes  called  the  verification  “criteria.”   See  Ayer, 
Language, Truth and Logic, 36-8
91 Schlick  “Positivism  and  Realism,”  88.   The  reader  should  note  that  Schlick  does  not  exclude 
tautological propositions from verification here.
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It  was in his  Cambridge lectures in the early 1930's,  he infamously remarked, 
“The sense of statement is the way in which it is verified.”  However he went on to 
clarify,  seemingly aware  of  this  ambiguity,  that  “this  is  necessarily  merely a  rule  of 
thumb,  because  'verification'  means  different  things,  and  because  in  some  cases  the 
question 'How is it verified?' makes no sense.”92  G. E. Moore, who recorded this remark, 
concluded that Wittgenstein meant that verification is a heueristic device by which one 
can  clarify  meanings  when  there  is  ambiguity,  and  not  as  an  absolute  criterion  for 
meaningfulness as such.93   Likewise in the recorded notes of his lectures, Wittgenstein 
makes an important distinction between verification being the meaning of a proposition, 
and determining the meaning of a proposition.  “My reply,” he tells us, “is to deny that 
the verification gives the meaning.  It merely determines the meaning, i.e., determines its 
use, or grammar.”94
The Positivists, on the other hand, often talked of verification as  a criterion of  
meaningfulness—as a conclusive test which gives meaning to a proposition, not as a tool 
for clarification.  Waismann in his  Theses,  for instance,  talks of verification as both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the meaningfulness of a proposition.  “If I cannot 
specify under what conditions the proposition is to count as being verified, I have not 
given  the  proposition  a  sense”  (WVC 245).   It  does  not  follow from Wittgenstein's 
92 G. E. Moore, “Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33” Mind 63 (Jan. 1954): 14.
93 It is important to take these remarks in the 1930's in connection with Wittgenstein's Satzsystem view of 
language, where language is not a monolithic entity with one standard grammar (viz., logic), but rather 
consists  of  several  integrated  systems  with  differing  grammars,  and  thus  differing  methods  of 
verification.  Wittgenstein's so-called verificationism can be read in this way as a tool for clarification 
in his broadly inferentialist view of language.  See Jose Medina, “Verificationism and Inferentialism in 
Wittgenstein's Philosophy” Philosophical Investigations 24 (Oct. 2001): 304-313
94 Wittgenstein's  Lectures,  Cambridge  1932-5 ed.  A.  Ambrose  (Oxford:  Blackwell,  1979),  28-9. 
Hereafter abbreviated 'LAM.'
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insistence  that  verification  determines  sense,  that  if  there  is  no  verification  then  the 
proposition has no sense—that would be to deny the antecedent.  Here we find a rather 
significant difference between Wittgenstein's use of “verification” and that of the logical 
empiricists; and on this point, Wittgenstein can only be made to appear in harmony with 
the Positivists' version by equivocating on the word.
Secondly, nowhere in the relevant remarks does he specify that this process of 
verification must be  experiential verification,  let alone by appeal to immediate sense-
data.  Rather,  Wittgenstein often talks  about  verification in  the  plural—of  methods of  
verification.  In the Waismann notes, for instance, he says: 
Sometimes verification is very difficult, for example 'Seitz has been elected 
mayor [of  Vienna].'  How should I set about verifying this proposition?  Is the 
correct method to go and make inquiries about it?  Or ask the people who 
were present?  But one [witness] was watching from the front and the other 
one from behind.  Or should I read about it in the newspapers? (WVC 48)
What he seems to be revealing here is that  the differences between these methods of 
verification for any given proposition are irrelevant, and any would seem to satisfy the 
condition of meaningfulness.  However, he denies that all of them must be necessary 
together, rejecting the conception of verification whereby the proposition “always keeps a 
back-door open.”  That is, no matter how one sets out to verify the proposition “we are 
never sure that we were not mistaken.”95   Put simply, Wittgenstein never accepted sense-
verification as a sole criterion for the meaningfulness of a proposition.
It  should  also  not  escape  the  reader  that  in  the  above  quote,  Wittgenstein's 
examples of verification are not direct observations, but instead are secondhand reports. 
Of course, one can see an individual—but how is it possible to see that he is a 'mayor?'96 
95 Ibid., p. 47
96 That is, excluding the cliché appearance of a sash on the person which labels him 'Mayor.' 
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Such  methods  are  not  to  be  reified  and  conglomerated  into  a  single  method  of 
verification, as the Vienna Circle thought—much less a method which relies exclusively 
upon  non-inferential  sense  reports.   As  Wittgenstein  tells  us  in  the  Philosophical  
Remarks, “between the proposition and its verification there is no go-between negotiating 
this verification” (PR 87).
Not  only  did  the  positivists  err  by  assigning  a  specifically  phenomenalist 
epistemology to the Tractatus, and by equating Wittgenstein's elementary propositions to 
their protocol sentences, but the introduction of any specific epistemological presence in 
the  Tractatus is  highly  suspect.   Wittgenstein  rejected  epistemological  concerns,97 
referring  polemically  to  theories  of  knowledge  as  mere  “philosophy  of  psychology” 
(4.1121).  “Psychology,” he tells us, “is no nearer to philosophy than natural science.”98 
He continues:
Does  not  my  study  of  sign-language  correspond  to  the  study  of  thought 
processes  which  philosophers  held  to  be  so  essential  to  the  philosophy of 
logic?  Only they got entangled for the most part in unessential psychological  
investigations, and there is an analogous danger for my method.  (4.1121, 
emphasis mine)
It  seems  that  the  positivist  reading  of  Wittgenstein  succumbs  to  just  this  “danger.” 
Committed to the empiricism of Ernst Mach, they allowed substantive epistemological 
biases to temper their reading of the Tractatus.  It should be clear from the reasons here 
97 It might be objected that Wittgenstein  did investigate into epistemological matters.  While it is true 
that in the last few years of his life, especially 1949-51 has provided important insight into the nature 
of  doubt  and  knowledge  in  On Certainty,  perception  in  Remarks  on  Colour and  (of  course)  the 
analysis  of  “inner”  and  “outer”  in  the  Philosophical  Investigations and  Last  Remarks  on  the  
Philosophy of Psychology, this is irrelevant for the discussion of his Tractarian position.
98 recall  4.11,  quoted  above,  where  he  distances  the  role  that  natural  science  plays  in  philosophy. 
“Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.  (The word 'philosophy' must mean something which 
stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences).”
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outlined  that  Wittgenstein  did think  there  was  some  relation  between  the  mind  and 
elementary propositions,  as  he says  that  a  completely analyzed  proposition is  one in 
which “a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign 
correspond to the objects of the thought” (3.2).  But nowhere does he state exactly what 
exactly  that  connection  is.   A 1919 letter  to  Russell,  when  asked  directly  about  the 
relation between a fact  and a thought,  Wittgenstein specifies:  “I  don't  know  what the 
constituents  of  thought  are  but  I  know  that it  must  have  such  constituents  which 
correspond to the words of Language.  Again the kind or relation of the constituents of 
thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant.  It would be a matter for psychology to find 
out” (WC 98-9).  By superimposing an epistemology on the text, the Positivists were able 
to read Wittgenstein as agreeing with their own philosophical predilections. 
Lastly, it should be noted that Wittgenstein in certain places seems to suggest that 
there is no such thing as 'conclusive' verification.  According to the “strong” version of 
the  verification  principle  characteristic  of  the  early view of  the logical  empiricists,  a 
statement  must  be  capable  of  being  conclusively  verified as  a  condition  for  its 
meaningfulness.  As Schlick tells us, “a genuine statement must be capable of conclusive 
verification.”99   If  it  is  true that  a  method of verification determines  its  meaning,  it 
follows that different methods of verification signal different meanings of the word.  An 
example that Wittgenstein uses in the Waismann notes is the word 'time' (WVC 53, 98). 
This word can be used in two different ways, in the sense of objective 'clock time,' and 
additionally as the phenomenological consciousness of temporality.  The latter is verified 
99 Moritz Schlick “Dis Kausalität in der gegenwärtingen Physik,” p. 150 quoted in Popper, “The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery” (New York: Basic Books, 1959), 40
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by looking inward, as it were, whereas the former would be verified by looking outward. 
During my wait in line at the DMV, for example, it may seem like an hour has passed. 
However, a quick glance at the clock might reveal that instead I have been waiting only 
fifteen  minutes.   Throughout  his  discussion  of  verification,  Wittgenstein  continually 
states that if a proposition has more than one method of verification, then that signals that 
the  statements  have  different  senses.   This  also  indicates  that  Wittgenstein  meant 
verification as a way to determine the sense when the threat of ambiguity looms.  “In 
order to obtain a clear notion of the meaning of a word,” he tells us, “it is necessary to 
attend to the sense of the propositions in which it occurs, to the way they are verified” 
(WVC 227).  Again Wittgenstein is claiming that verification serves to determine  the 
sense of a given proposition rather than, as the Positivists' thought, that it is precondition 
for  meaning;  “[t]he  verification  is  not  one  token  of  truth,  it  is  the sense  of  the 
proposition”  (PR  200).   As  he  would  say  later  in  the  Philosophical  Investigations, 
“Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking 
'How d'you mean?'  The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition” (PI 
353).
In summary, even if it is objected that Wittgenstein had a verificationist theory of 
meaning—perhaps in a much looser connotation than the sense-verification of the logical 
empiricists—it is not the same as what the Positivists intended.  First, verification for 
Wittgenstein was not a necessary condition for meaningfulness, but rather a sufficient 
condition.  Its goal was not to be a conclusive test for the proposition, such that without 
verification  a  statement  is  meaningless.   Rather  it  was  used  as  a  tool  to  clarify  the 
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proposition, to decide between different meanings of a term in ordinary language, not to 
serve as a prerequisite for meaning.  Secondly, Wittgenstein seems to indicate that there 
are not one but many possible methods of verification, and relies upon other methods 
besides  sense-data  to  determine  its  meaning.   In  fact,  superimposing  any  specific 
epistemology  on  the  Tractatus—whether  phenomenalist  or  otherwise—seems  to  be 
antithetical to Wittgenstein's stated aims in the text.  And finally, he seems to indicate that 
there is no such thing as 'conclusive verification,' as did the logical empiricists in the later 
1920's and early 1930's.  For each of these reasons, although Wittgenstein uses the same 
word as the Positivists did, it is an error to understand that Wittgenstein meant the same 
thing as they did by verification.  And even if everything I argued here were false, the 
first appearance of this talk of verification is in 1927—so it is at best implausible, and at 
worst flatly anachronistic, to ascribe these views to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus.
§7 Evaluating the Positivist Wittgenstein: Ethics
  Interpreting a text, when taken in isolation from the contextual background in 
which the text was written, leads to hasty and spurious interpretations.  Likewise,  when 
reading  the  sparse  passages  of  the  Tractatus independently  of  an  understanding  of 
Wittgenstein's  life  and  the  influences  upon  his  work,  may  easily  lead  to 
misunderstanding.   For years following the publication of the text,  it  was taken as a 
dogma that Wittgenstein held exactly the same view of philosophy as the Vienna Circle. 
However in our present time, we are now in a much better position to understand the text, 
having access to  many posthumous publications  which provided contrary evidence to 
53
Wittgenstein's  alleged  positivism.   One  must  remember  that  the  great  wealth  of 
unpublished manuscripts and notes, and also what we now know about Wittgenstein's life 
was not available in the 1930's.  Indeed, the first book-length treatment of the Tractatus—
Anscombe's Introduction—was published in 1959.  Thus it is not merely bad scholarship 
that led the Positivists to conclude that Wittgenstein shared their views, but rather an 
incomplete picture of the man who Wittgenstein was.  In the next two sections, I hope to 
provide some of this recent evidence which indicates the inconsistency of Wittgenstein's 
philosophical aims and those of the Vienna Circle.  In this section I will deal specifically 
with the question of ethics in Wittgenstein's  Tractatus;  and in the next section, I will 
compare the views of the positivists and Wittgenstein on metaphysics.
One important feature of Wittgenstein's work that the positivists tend to interpret 
incorrectly is the relation between fact stating and normative discourse.  Above, we saw 
that part of the temptation to read Wittgenstein as a positivist may be due to the fact that 
he  makes  a  rigid demarcation  between the role  of  language to  express  facts,  and its 
inability  to  express  value.   From this,  I  believe,  the  members  of  the  Vienna  Circle 
assumed that because the function of language is to represent the world, that normative 
propositions  cannot  be  expressed—therefore  they must  be  committed  to  the  Humean 
bonfire.100  But as to the status of ethics in the Tractatus, again the positivists misinterpret 
the text.   One of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence to this effect comes from a 
letter Wittgenstein wrote in 1919 to Ludwig Ficker, a potential publisher of the work. 
Here Wittgenstein tells us that “the point of the [Tractatus] is ethical.”  He goes on to 
inform him that his work consists of two parts, “the one which is here, and of everything 
100 It should be noted here that even Hume did not think that moral discourse is meaningless.
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which I have not written.  And precisely this second part is the important one.  For the 
Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book.”101  Thus, although Wittgenstein 
never presents an account of how ethics is possible, this does not imply that he had no 
such intent.
Wittgenstein addresses the place of value judgments leading up to the 'conclusion' 
of  the  book—perhaps  as  a  segue  to  the  second,  unwritten  part  of  the  book—from 
proposition  6.4  through  7.   This  section  of  the  book  is  fraught  with  peculiarities, 
including  the  invocation  of  mysticism and  passages  on  solipsism.   On  the  status  of 
ethical  propositions,  proposition  6.4  and  its  surrounding  passages  deserve  careful 
attention.  He writes:
All propositions are of equal value.
The  sense  of  the  world  must  lie  outside  the  world.  In  the  world 
everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value 
exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole 
sphere of what happens and is the case.  For all that happens and is the case is 
accidental.
        What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it 
did it would itself be accidental.  It must lie outside the world.
Hence also it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)   (6.4-6.421)
This is often taken as conclusive evidence that Wittgenstein thought that the propositions 
of ethics are pseudo-propositions, and outside the proper bounds of philosophy.  
It is not clear from this alone exactly what the relationship is between the world of 
fact and the world of value, but elsewhere he makes it a bit clearer.  In a lecture given to 
101 Letter to Ludwig Ficker, November 1919.  Quoted in Monk, op. cit., 178.
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the Heretics Society at Cambridge in late 1929, published as “A Lecture on Ethics,”102 he 
clarifies his position on the question of value.  He distinguishes between two senses of 
ethics, what he calls the “trivial or relative sense” and “the ethical or absolute sense” (LE 
5).  The word 'good,' for instance, is used in the relative sense when it “means coming up 
to a certain standard.”   It is in just this sense that one might talk of a 'good chair' as one 
that meets up to a given standard of comfort, or a 'good guitarist' as one who can play 
with proficiency.  The latter, absolute sense of value is what we generally understand as 
an 'ethical statement.'  Wittgenstein makes clear the difference between the two is that 
“every judgment of relative value is a mere statement of facts and can therefore be put in 
such a form that it loses all the appearance of a judgment of value.”  The 'right' route to a 
given destination, for example, might be re-stated as a series of directions which allows 
one to arrive at that destination in the shortest amount of time; in this and similar ways, 
such a proposition can be restated—removing all normative language—as a set of fact-
stating propositions, without loss of meaning.  He concludes that while “all judgments of 
relative value can be shown to be mere statements of facts, no statement of fact can ever 
be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value” (LE 5-6).
Wittgenstein has us imagine a completely omniscient being, who knows “all the 
movements of all the bodies in the world dead or alive and . . . all the states of mind of all 
human beings that ever lived” (LE 6).  If he were to write down all the facts in the world 
in a substantial tome of all that is, Wittgenstein says that there would not contain a single 
normative  judgment  in  this  hypothetical  'book  of  all  things.'   Nor  would  any  given 
102 Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Lecture on Ethics,” The Philosophical Review 74 (Jan. 1965): 3-12.  Hereafter 
abbreviated 'LE'
56
collection of facts there logically imply a given value judgment.  “Our words used as we 
use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and 
sense, natural meaning and sense.  Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words 
will only express facts” (LE 7).
One of Wittgenstein's deepest commitments, dating all the way back as early as 
his war notebooks, is that the bivalence of a proposition is a necessary condition for it to 
have  sense.   To  know  what  a  given  statement  means  is  to  know  under  which 
circumstances it would be true, and which circumstances it would be false.  Having this 
clarification in mind, let us return to TLP 6.4.  “All propositions are of equal value” (6.4); 
that is, as Rush Rhees puts it, none “occupies an 'exceptional position.'”103  Statements of 
fact are those that can in principle be evaluated either as true or false, essentially so: fact 
stating propositions are contingently true, only given the existence of a given set of state 
of  affairs  which obtains  in  the world.   Tautologies  and contradictions  are  themselves 
limiting  cases,  since  tautologies  are  always  true  and  contradictions  always  false 
regardless of the state that the world is in.  This means that they do not represent anything 
about the world—their content “cancels one another,” (6.462) since neither delimits the 
range  of  possibilities  in  logical  space (4.023).   Tautologies  are  consistent  with every 
possible state-of-affairs of the world, while contradictions are consistent with none.  Facts 
are, accordingly, contingent.  
Wittgenstein uses two words to describe propositions which do not accord with 
the world:  sinnlos  and unsinnlich.  The former is perhaps best translated in English as 
103 Rush Rhees, “Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics” in Discussions of Wittgenstein p. 
94.
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'senseless,'  the latter  as 'nonsense.'104  Tautologies and contradictions,  he believes,  are 
senseless (4.461)—that is to say, they do not express anything about the world.  But he is 
careful to point out that they are not nonsense (4.4611).  The way the world is could be 
different, since there is no a priori reason to conclude there must be a way the world is or 
is not;  “all that happens and is the case is accidental,” (6.41) it  is not subject to any 
necessity that it must be that way.  “There is no a priori order of things” (5.634).  Thus 
normative statements (and by this I mean value-laden statements in the absolute sense—
or a “value that does have value”) cannot be reduced to factual statements; since the 
world is a collection of facts (1.1), and since value-statements are non-factual, then they 
“must lie outside the world.”  Thus, ethics, which is something “higher” than the world, 
and “cannot be put into words” (6.421).
But  just  as  Wittgenstein  did  not  say  that  tautologies  and  contradictions,  as 
statements of logical necessity, were “not nonsense” (4.4611), it is likewise too hasty to 
think that for Wittgenstein normative statements are nonsense in the strict sense.  He tells 
us that “[i]t is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics,” (6.42) since propositions 
must be bivalent, and necessary truths cannot be. “The only necessity that exists is logical 
necessity” (6.37).  But ethics is not merely expressed propositionally, rather they often 
may come  in  the  form or  optatives,  commands,  or  prescriptions.   Or,  as  is  directly 
relevant to Wittgenstein—in poetry and literature.  It is clear that there is an aspect  of 
showing in aesthetic works which was important to Wittgenstein.  Consider, for example, 
an exchange between him and Engelmann in 1917, “When Wittgenstein was working on 
104 Much more will be said of this in the next chapter.
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the completion of the Tractatus.”105  Engelmann had sent him a poem by Uhland, called 
“Count Eberhard's Hawthorn.”106  Wittgenstein says in reply: “The poem by Uhland is 
really  magnificent.   And  this  is  how  it  is:  if  only  you  do  not  try  to  utter  what  is 
unutterable then nothing gets lost.  But the unutterable will be—unutterably—contained 
in  what  has  been  uttered!”107  This  provides  us  important  insight  into  Wittgenstein's 
position  in  the  Tractatus.   That  genuine  propositions  must  be  fact-stating  is  clearly 
Wittgenstein's  position.   But  there  is  an  element  of  language  which  can  “contain” 
unsayable insights.  The poem, which talks about the growth of a sprig on a hawthorn 
bush, contained both for Engelmann and for Wittgenstein, some ineffable truth about life. 
It is in this capacity that language can show us ethical insights, although they cannot be 
directly  said.   Just  as  his  theory  of  logical  necessity  requires  that  these  special 
propositions do not say anything but only show (4.461), so too one “cannot express” the 
ethical.   However,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  role  of  ethics  is  purely  emotive  for 
Wittgenstein;  and  just  as  with  Wittgenstein's  recognition  of  tautologies  and 
contradictions, ethical statements do not say anything about the world, but are not to be 
considered nonsense.
It is the Vienna Circle's failure to identify the two categories of non-fact stating 
propositions—the category of senslessness, and the category of nonsense—that led them 
to the conclusion that Wittgenstein meant that ethics must be nonsense because it is not 
fact-stating.   It  seems to have escaped the positivists  that,  despite  their  denial  of  the 
cognitive power of prescriptions, they illicitly put forth a position about how one ought to 
105 Engelmann, Letters to Wittgenstein, p. 82
106 Engelmann quotes Karl Krauss, who once said that this poem is “so clear that no one understands it.” 
Ibid., p. 82.  
107 Ibid., p. 7
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ought to philosophize, in accordance with the verification principle.  Again, it is in light 
of the unpublished manuscripts and letters that Wittgenstein reveals a position that the 
point of the Tractatus is ethical.  The book can be viewed, in a performative way, entirely 
as a prescriptive account of how one ought to philosophize.  Thus for Wittgenstein to 
deny meaning to ethics is to deny, perhaps, the intent of the book itself.  After all, as he 
directly tell us, “the point of the book is ethical.”
§8 Evaluating the Positivist Wittgenstein: Metaphysics
Another aspect of Wittgenstein's thought that the positivists had neglected is his 
attitude toward metaphysics.  We saw above that the temptation to read Wittgenstein as 
conforming to the positivists' position derives from their agreement that, although fact-
stating propositions have sense, the expression of ethical or metaphysical claims—being 
non-fact  stating,  and  thus  “outside  the  world”  (6.41)—are  relegated  to  the  class  of 
nonsense.  Again there are passages that seem to support this.  For example, in 6.53, he 
tells us that:
The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can 
be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing 
to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say 
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning 
to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the 
other—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—
but it would be the only strictly correct method.
But with the biographical and contextual evidence that we currently have access to, it is 
difficult  to  make Wittgenstein's  Tractarian view consistent  with the Positivists  on the 
question of metaphysics.  Even textually, to do so requires that one ignore Wittgenstein's 
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invocation of “the mystical” [das Mystische].  Its very existence in the text is itself seems 
to be a challenge to the positivist reading of Wittgenstein.  Even  Carnap, in retrospect, 
tells us that he “had erroneously believed that his attitude toward metaphysics was similar 
to  ours,”  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Vienna  Circle  “had  not  paid  enough  attention  to 
statements in his book about the mystical.”108  The word appears in three places at the end 
of  the  Tractatus.   The  passages  surrounding  this  damning  statement  on  “the  proper 
method of philosophy” (6.53) are surrounded by talk of the mystical (6.44, 6.45, 6.522). 
What exactly the mystical is, and how it relates to Wittgenstein's early philosophy is a 
difficult question.  
  At 6.44 he tells us that it is “not how the world is . . . but that it is” which is the 
mystical.   6.522 reads: “There is indeed the inexpressible. This  shows itself;  it  is the 
mystical.”  This line is a comment on the remark 6.52, which reads “[w]e feel as if all 
possible scientific questions are answered our problem is  still  not touched at  all.   Of 
course in that case there are no questions any more; and that is the answer.”  Additionally, 
and more helpful for our purposes, he tells us that the feeling of the mystical is “the 
contemplation of the world as a limited whole” (6.45)  The German word here rendered 
'limited' is 'begrenztes' which I believe is important, since it corresponds to an important 
philosophical distinction in the legacy of German language philosophy.  
Immanuel Kant, at the end of the  Prolegomena makes a distinction between the 
terms Grenze and Schranke.  The former word may be rendered in English as 'bounds,' 
and  the  latter  as  'limits.'  Bounds,  Kant  tells  us,  “always  presuppose a  space  existing 
outside a certain definite place and enclosing it.”  By contrast, “limits do not require this, 
108 Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 27.
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but are mere negations which affect a quantity so far as it is not absolutely complete.”109 
Kant wants to specify that our knowledge of mathematics and natural science are limited
—that there is knowledge beyond our current state of mathematics and physics, but that 
we cannot pass a certain point because of obstacles with respect to the current level of 
development of these sciences.  However, this means for Kant that in principle, there are 
no insoluble questions in either domain.  Bounds, on the other hand, do imply that there 
is something beyond the line itself.110  As I want to understand this crucial passage, the 
word  should  be  translated  as  'bounded,'  and  not  'limited.'    But  acknowledging  that 
Wittgenstein meant “the world as a bounded whole” has important consequences for how 
we understand “the mystical.”  
If the mystical is viewing the world as bounded whole, then that would imply that 
there is something beyond this  world of facts—or, more precisely,  a “feeling” to that 
effect. This squares nicely with Kant's intent in drawing this distinction; indeed for Kant, 
there  is  something  beyond  the  bounds  of  knowledge,  that  is  the  noumenal  world  of 
things-in-themselves.  In Kant's transcendental idealism, we cannot know what things are 
like beyond our representational capacities—but Kant makes it clear that we do know 
that there is something beyond:
We cannot indeed, beyond all possible experience, form a definite notion of 
what things in themselves may be.  Yet we are not at liberty to abstain entirely 
from inquiring into them; for experience never satisfies reason fully but, in 
answering questions,  refers us  further  back and leaves  us  dissatisfied with 
regard to their complete solution.111  
109 Immanuel  Kant,  Prolegomena  to  Any  Future  Metaphysics  tr.  Paul  Carus  (Indianapoilis:  Hackett, 
1977),  86.
110 Ibid., 88.
111 Ibid., 86.
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The same term with the same connotation was used by the Kantian Schopenhauer, who 
we know Wittgenstein read and enjoyed greatly when he was young.  He tells us: 
But what now prompts us to make enquiries [about that which lies beyond our 
representations]  is  that  we  are  not  satisfied  with  knowing  that  we  have 
representations . . . We want to know the significance of these representations; 
we ask whether this world is nothing more than representation.  In that case, it 
would inevitably pass us  by like an empty dream, or  a  ghostly vision not 
worth our consideration . . . This much is certain, namely that this something 
about which we are enquiring must be by its whole nature completely and 
fundamentally different from the representation; and so the forms and laws of 
the representation must be wholly foreign to it.  We cannot, then, reach it from 
the representation under guidance of those laws that merely combine objects, 
representations, with one another . . . [W]e can never get at the inner nature of 
things from without.112
And  this  distinction  also  illustrates  the  basic  feeling  Wittgenstein  had  toward  the 
mystical.  Although we cannot  speak about what is beyond the limits of the world for 
Wittgenstein, it is clear that there is something beyond the bounds of language, by the 
very fact of it being bounded.  “There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is 
the mystical.”  In Wittgenstein's system the mystical shows itself, although the insights 
that are provided by it are beyond the bounds of language.  This parallels another remark 
about  the  mystical  in  the  Notebooks,  where  he  tells  us  that  “The  urge  towards  the 
mystical comes of the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science” (NB 51).  Although this 
part was deleted from the final version, this is the first sentence of an early version of 
6.52: “We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, 
and this itself is the answer.”  Even if one could compose a complete picture of the world 
112 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation Vol. 1, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: 
Dover, 1969), 98-9.
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by writing down every fact, as in the example he provides in the “Lecture on Ethics,” 
then  all  scientific  questions  would  be  answered;  but  there  would  still  be  something 
missing:  why these  things  exist  at  all.   In  this  sense,  the  question  is:  why is  there 
something rather than nothing?  That,  for Wittgenstein,  is  the mystical:  “not  how the 
world is . . . but that it is” (6.44).  
It is not clear that Wittgenstein equates metaphysics with mysticism.  However, 
there is some relationship between them.  Russell tells us in “Mysticism and Logic” that 
metaphysics is “the union and conflict of two very different impulses, the one urging men 
towards mysticism, the other urging them towards science.”113  This is consistent with the 
analysis here, that the urge toward mysticism begins with a dissatisfaction with the world 
of science.  Science tells us what is, it does not explore the meanings underlying these 
facts.  This project is not left to the philosopher, however, since the insights that  are 
provided transcend the bounds of language.  The mystic is committed to silence.  
According to this Kantian interpretation of Wittgenstein's mysticism, metaphysics 
is  not something to be “overcome,” as Carnap and his  brethren thought,  so much as 
relegated to a position outside language.  In an early typescript he gave to Russell, he 
says that “[p]hilosophy consists in logic and metaphysics: the former is its basis” (NL 
106).    Although the logical analysis of language is the basis of philosophy, that does not 
negate any value that metaphysics might have from Wittgenstein's perspective.   
This  reading  of  the  final  sections  is  confirmed  by  some  other  biographical 
considerations.  First, one must remember that Wittgenstein was a deeply spiritual man, 
113 Bertrand  Russell,  “Mysticism and  Logic”  in  Mysticism and Logic  and Other  Essays  (New York: 
Barnes and Noble, 1917), 1.
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and this indeed found its way into his philosophical work.  He was fond of unorthodox 
religious figures, such as Kirkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy and Tagore.  Often he would 
say that he was “not a religious man” but could not help “seeing every problem from a 
religious point of view.”114  The exact significance of this remark, as is often the case with 
Wittgenstein, remains somewhat obscure.  However, this at least gives us an indication 
that  he  did  not  share  the  positivists'  view  with  regard  to  religion,  and  moreover 
metaphysics  in  general.   Despite  the  fact  that  he  admits  not  being  religious,  is  not 
evidence that he had no respect for religion.  In fact, there are numerous sources which 
tend to show that he did see his thought as analogous to theological thought.  Norman 
Malcolm, in his Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? goes to great length mining and 
evaluating  the  evidence  from  which  it  might  be  said  that  Wittgenstein  was deeply 
spiritual, even if not religious.115
Elsewhere, Malcolm reports on Wittgenstein's change in attitude towards religion, 
long before the publication of the Tractatus.  He tells us:
He told me that in his youth he had been contemptuous of it, but that at about 
the age of twenty-one something had caused a change in him.  In Vienna he 
saw  a  play  that  was  a  mediocre  drama,  but  in  it  one  of  the  characters 
expressed the thought that no matter what happened in the world, nothing bad 
could  happen  to  him—he was  independent  of  fate  and  circumstances. 
Wittgenstein was struck by this stoic thought; for the first time he saw the 
possibility of religion.116
114 Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995).
115 A great deal of the evidence presented here by Malcolm regards his later work, not in the Tractatus. 
However similar comparisons can be found in the Tractatus, as I have shown.
116 Malcolm, Norman.  Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 58. 
The play has  been identified by McGuinness as Ludwig Anzengruber's  Die Kreuzelschrieber. See 
Brain McGuinness,  Young Ludwig: Wittgenstein's Life 1889-1921 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1988), 94.  The line in question is "Mir kann nichts geschehen,” or rendered into English, “Nothing 
can happen to you.”
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Malcolm says this had a significant impact on his thought.  However, one need look no 
further than his “Lecture of Ethics” to find a very similar sentiment.  In  his discussion, 
he attempts to formulate some examples of statements of absolute or ethical value.  
I believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I have [such an 
experience] I wonder at the existence of the world.  And I am then inclined to 
use such phrases as “how extraordinary that anything should exist” or “how 
extraordinary that the world should exist.”  I shall mention another experience 
straight away which I believe you might be acquainted with: it is, what one 
might call, the experience of feeling absolutely safe.  I mean the state of mind 
in which one is inclined to say “I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever 
happens” (LE 8).
This  “experience of  feeling  absolutely safe” and that  “nothing can  happen to  me” is 
parallel to several remarks in the Notebooks and elsewhere.  Wittgenstein immediately 
connects these experiences with spirituality, “the first of them is, I believe, exactly what 
people  were  referring  to  when  they  said  that  God  had  created  the  world;  and  the 
experience of absolute safety has been described by saying that we feel safe in the hands 
of God” (LE 10).
Russell also informs us of how important the mystical was for Wittgenstein.  In a 
1919 letter,  he  tells  us  “I  had  felt  in  [the  Tractatus]  a  flavor  of  mysticism,  but  was 
astonished when I found out he has become a complete mystic.  He reads people like 
Kierkegaard and Angelus Silensius, and he seriously contemplates becoming a monk” 
(WC 112).117
Granted for Wittgenstein metaphysical insights can never be adequately captured 
by  fact-stating  propositions.   However,  these  anecdotes  allow  us  to  connect  these 
scattered quotes in the text, by giving insight into the type of person Wittgenstein was. 
117 Letter from Russell to Ottoline Morrell, Dec. 20, 1919.
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One cannot  discount  this  evidence  when  interpreting  the  text,  especially  when  one's 
interpretation denies the spirit of these important insights.
§9 Conclusion
No  one  really  accepts  the  view  any  more  that  Wittgenstein,  in  his  early 
philosophy, shared his philosophical position with the Vienna Circle.  Even some of the 
positivists themselves have since concluded that their interpretation of the Tractatus was 
flawed.   Ayer  admits  that  “the  outlook  of  the  Tractatus was  misunderstood  by  the 
members of the Vienna Circle and the young English philosophers, including myself, 
who were strongly influenced by it.”118   Much of the evidence cited above has been used 
repeatedly by commentators against this type of interpretation.  However, it was against 
this  background  that  the  Tractatus  was  initially  read,  so  it  serves  as  a  basis  for  the 
discussion to come.  Although the Vienna Circle missed the boat on their interpretation of 
the Tractatus, we are currently in a somewhat better position to understand the text given 
the  wealth  of  posthumously  published  notes  and  manuscripts,  including  extensive 
biographical materials and memoirs of Wittgenstein's friends and colleagues.  All of this 
dates to much more recently, and would not have been available to the Vienna Circle in 
the late 1920's and early 1930's.  The unavoidable conclusion that one is led to is that the 
text cannot be read apart from the context in which it is initially written.  Indeed, it is 
only by ignoring the biographical details of Wittgenstein's life and the background of his 
work, and the uncritical acceptance of similarity between certain views of Wittgenstein 
118 Ayer, Wittgenstein, p. 31
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and those of the logical positivists,  that the Vienna Circle were led to read their own 
philosophy  into  the  text.    Although  Wittgenstein  was  neither  an  empiricist  nor  a 
verificationist, certain passages could be interpreted in just this way.  This became the 
dominant  interpretation  for  many  years,  contrary  to  Wittgenstein's  stated  objections. 
Although given the positivists' dismissal of historical method in philosophy, one might 
wonder if such material would have informed the text if it had been available.  
I  would  be remiss  were I  not  to  point  out  that  the  Vienna  Circle  themselves, 
interestingly enough,  were  themselves  lead to  an anti-historical  and  anti-contextualist 
position due to the historical  period in which they were writing.  In the aftermath of 
World War I, and the increasingly hostile economic, political and social climate of the 
Vienna at the time (following the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), they sought a 
way to free themselves from it.  Many of the members of the Circle were themselves 
Jewish, and with the rampant anti-semitism at that time119—culminating in Hitler's rise to 
chancellor  in  1933—they  found  themselves  in  a  position  where  the  dismissal  of 
normativity was itself a rebellion against the existing order.  In a sense, it is the context in 
which the Positivists were writing that shaped their own philosophical positions.
Above in our discussion, we were given a hint about how to read Wittgenstein on 
these matters.  “There is indeed the inexpressible. This  shows itself; it is the mystical” 
(6.52).    Although the proper object of philosophy might be seen solely as the application 
of logic to empirical premises, metaphysics for Wittgenstein is not unreal or illicit, but 
rather  is  a  domain  which  transcends  the  proper  bounds  of  language.   The  question 
remains: what do we make of these insights that cannot be spoken, but show themselves? 
119 Karl Luger, the mayor of Vienna until 1910, was openly anti-semitic.
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One is reminded here of Heidegger's phrase,  “it is one thing to report  narratively about 
beings and another to grasp beings in their being.  For the latter task not only most of the 
words  are  lacking but  above all  the  ‘grammar.’”120 And,  indeed,  that  leads  us  to  our 
second interpretation.
120 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time tr. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1996), 38-9
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Saying, Showing, Modeling
§1 Introduction 
By the  late  1960's,  the influence of  logical  positivism in the Anglo-American 
world  had  effectively  died.   By that  time  the  Philosophical  Investigations had  been 
posthumously  published,  and  it  had  become  widely  known  that  Wittgenstein  had 
developed  an  entirely  new way of  thinking  about  language,  focusing  not  on  logical 
analysis,  but  instead  on  the  contextual  use  of  language  for  his  theory  of  linguistic 
meaning.   And just  as  with  Russell's  atomism and  Carnap's  positivism,  Wittgenstein 
would come to  inspire  yet  another  major  movement  in  the analytic  tradition:  Oxford 
“ordinary language” philosophy.  But most importantly for our purposes here, the waning 
of  positivism  in  the  Anglo-American  world  also  became  the  impetus  for  a  gradual 
whittling away of the positivist reading of Wittgenstein.  The “standard reading,” as I will 
call it, was developed as an alternative to the interpretation of the text put forth by the 
Vienna Circle.  
Some of the interpreters who constitute the standard reading include G. E. M. 
Anscombe, Erik Stenius, Peter Hacker, Max Black, Brian McGuinness and David Pears, 
to name just  a few.  This is the interpretation of the text which most specialists,  and 
nearly all non-specialists,  consider to be Wittgenstein's view in the  Tractatus.  In this 
chapter, I wish to explain some of the core doctrines of the standard reading.  I should 
note here that my terminology might be somewhat misleading.  There is no such thing as 
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the standard reading, as if there were a single doctrinal image.  Rather I use this term to 
refer  to  a  motley collection  of  varying  interpretations  that  carry,  if  I  may,  a  'family 
resemblance'  to  one  another.   Some  of  the  'standard'  readings  are  even  prima  facie 
inconsistent  with one another.   For example,  Pears and Black read Wittgenstein as a 
semantic realist, who espouses a very specific set of theses about the world in the opening 
remarks,  upon which  his  theory of  language  is  then  generated.   From this  model  of 
language, the meaning of linguistic expressions are not dependent upon our linguistic 
capacities;  rather  language's  ability  to  represent  the  world,  according  to  this 
interpretation, is grounded upon these the links forged between names and simple objects. 
Other  interpreters,  such  as  McGuinness,  Ishiguro  and  Rhees  read  Wittgenstein  as  a 
linguistic anti-realist, who believed that the structure of the world only shows up through 
language.  To them, the postulation of simple objects in the opening passages merely 
follows from the structure of our language.  In more radical cases, Wittgenstein has been 
even labeled a linguistic idealist.121  The dispute here is a matter of the direction of the 
causal arrow: is our awareness of the world as it shows up to us dependent upon the way 
that language works, or is the structure of language derived from the nature of the world? 
Which side Wittgenstein falls on this issue is still an open question, and evidence can be 
garnered for both sides. 
As  I  hope  this  brief—but  by no  means  unique—example  shows,  individually 
addressing each version of the standard reading in this chapter would not be prudent; an 
analysis of the fine-grained details between the different interpretations would itself take 
121 G. E. M. Anscombe, “The Question of Linguistic Idealism,” in Essays in Honor of G. H. von Wright,  
ed. Jakko Hintikka, Acta Philosophica Fennica  28 (1975).
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volumes.  So for my present purposes I will narrow my focus to what I see as a few 
central conceptions of standard interpretations, and treat differences between the different 
versions of the standard reading as of relatively minor significance.
What I take as characteristic of the standard readings as a whole is that they take 
Wittgenstein  to  be  engaged  in  a  roughly  Kantian  project:  specifying  the  necessary 
conditions for,  and setting the proper bounds of,  language—without casting judgment 
upon that which does not lie within its domain.  Although the proper object of what can 
be  articulated  in  philosophy is,  as  Wittgenstein  says  in  6.53,  fact-stating  discourse—
excluding speculative metaphysical and normative claims—that does not mean that they 
are 'nonsense' in the way that we would want to say 'pointless,' as the members of the 
Vienna Circle sometimes seem to sound.  Nor is it the case for the standard readers that 
propositions which are not fact-stating are necessarily empty of content, as it was for the 
positivists; to these commentators, Wittgenstein's position is instead much more nuanced. 
They  ascribe  to  Wittgenstein  two  distinct  types  of  nonsense  in  the  Tractatus:  first 
substantive,  philosophically  illuminating  nonsense,  and  then  secondly  just  plain 
nonsense.122  
The former class of nonsense is denoted by the term 'sinnlos,' or as it is perhaps 
better  termed,  'senselessness.'   This  category  is  linked  to  Wittgenstein's  distinction 
between saying and showing.  Senseless propositions are neither “pseudo-truths,” nor 
“cognitively meaningless,” but are genuine insights which just happen to transcend the 
expressive  power  of  language;  they  cannot  be  spoken  of,  but  rather  can  only  show 
themselves.   Echoes of this point are found in 6.522, “[t]here are,  indeed, things that 
122 I shall discuss this in greater detail in § 7 below
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cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.” 
However there is also a second class of propositions Wittgenstein calls  unsinnig, which 
are  just  plain  nonsense.   As  we  shall  see,  the  question  of  whether  a  proposition  is 
nonsense in the strict sense [unsinnig] is based upon the logical form of the proposition 
itself, not from the representational relation by which a proposition stands to reality.  To 
get a few miles more out of the Kant analogy: standard readers understand Wittgenstein 
as seeking to annul language in order to make room for the mystical.123  
§2 The Bild Theory
One of Wittgenstein's most unique and important innovations in the Tractatus is 
his 'picture' theory of meaning.  It is central to his theory of language and perhaps, as we 
shall see, central to the standard readers' interpretation of the book.  Von Wright dates the 
picture theory to 1914, which is relatively late in the development of the thoughts in the 
Tractatus.124  He recounts that it was inspired by a magazine article about a lawsuit in 
Paris involving an automobile accident.  The report stipulated that in the ensuing trial, a 
scale model of the accident scene was devised so as to recreate the events: miniature cars 
and  people  standing  for  the  objects  at  the  scene,  in  their  respective  spatio-temporal 
123 This is a reference, of course, to Kant's claim that he “had to annul knowledge in order to make room 
for faith” (B xxx).  I take issue with some overzealous comparisons between Wittgenstein and Kant.  It 
is clear that his particular version of transcendental idealism is derived from Schopenhauer's particular 
take on Kant, not on the Kantian philosophy itself. It is not true however that, as McGuinness says, 
“one wanted to abolish reason to make way for faith, the other to remove the whole of ethics and 
religion from the area of speculation into that which is inexpressible”  Kant did not want to 'abolish' 
reason, nor did Wittgenstein seek to 'remove' inquiries into ethics and religion. McGuinness,  Young 
Ludwig, 253.
124 Much of his views on logic were formulated much earlier, as early as 1912-13.  There are two pre-
Tractatus manuscripts,  “Notes  on  Logic”  and  “Notes  Dictated  to  Moore,”  which  pre-date  this 
development.  This may indicate that the Bild theory originated as an outgrowth of his views on logic, 
not the other way around.
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ordering.  As the story goes, it occurred to him at this time that just as the model could 
serve  as  a  representation  of  the  accident—insofar  as  the  parts  of  the  model  (these 
miniature automobiles, houses, people, etc.) stand for the objects in the world (the real 
life automobiles, houses, etc.).  So too, he thought, this might also bear some insight into 
the  nature  of  the  proposition.125  In  his  Notebooks,  dated  29  September,  1914, 
Wittgenstein wrote one of earliest known passages concerning the picture theory: “In the 
proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally.  (As when in the law-court 
in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc.)” (NB 7).   This is 
often  ascribed  as  the  beginning  stages  of  the  Tractarian  theory  of  meaning,  that  “a 
proposition is a picture of reality” (4.01).  Von Wright explains: 
The picture [in court] served as a proposition; that is, as a description of a 
possible state of affairs.   It  had this  function owing to the correspondence 
between the parts  of the picture and things in  reality.   It  now occurred to 
Wittgenstein that one might reverse the analogy and say that a  proposition 
serves as a picture, by virtue of a similar correspondence between its parts and 
the world.  The way in which the parts of the the proposition are combined—
the structure of the proposition—depicts a possible combination of elements 
in reality, a possible state of affairs.126
There is no reason to believe that Von Wright's story is false.   However it  should be 
pointed out  that  there  are  some other  important  influences  on the  Bild  theory,  which 
might prevent one from falling into confusion due to the usual translation of the term 
“picture.”  One should be careful not to understand Wittgenstein as talking about literal 
'pictures.'  A prominent  influence  upon  Wittgenstein's  theory  of  meaning  which  is 
frequently cited in the literature was Heinrich Hertz.127  Hertz is mentioned by name twice 
125 The story was first recounted by von Wright in “Ludwig Wittgenstein,  A Biographical Sketch” in 
Philosophical Review 64, no. 4 (1955): p. 532-3
126 Von Wright, “Biographical Sketch,” 533  Emphasis in original
127 He is  now famous for  the discovery of  radio waves.   His  name has  been immortalized as  an SI 
74
in the Tractatus, which is rather a lot considering Wittgenstein's sparse use of citations.128 
When Wittgenstein arrived in England in 1908, it was not to study logic in Cambridge, 
but  rather  to  study engineering  in  Manchester.   Wittgenstein  had been  trained  at  the 
Oberrealschule in Linz, following which he received certification in engineering from 
“the  MIT  of  imperial  Germany,”  the  Technische  Hochschule  at  Charlottenberg  in 
Berlin.129 The training of engineers relies heavily upon physics, and at least by the time he 
got to Manchester to study engineering, Wittgenstein in his study likely would have come 
across  Hertz's  1899  book  Principles  of  Mechanics.  The  parallel  between Hertz's 
philosophy of physics  and Wittgenstein's  Tractatus is  so gripping because Hertz  uses 
“pictures” or mental “models” as a way of understanding the physical processes of the 
world—which  shows  a  remarkable  similarity  to  Wittgenstein's  Tractarian  theory  of 
meaning.  They both use the same German word 'Bild,' however Hertz' word is usually 
rendered in English as “model,” and not “picture.”  
“We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects,”  Hertz says in his 
Introduction to Principles of Mechanics.  A correct picture of the world would be given a 
form “such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images 
of the necessary consequences in nature of the things pictured .  .  .  there  is  a certain 
conformity between nature and our thought.”130  Later Hertz says:
measurement of frequency in electromagnetic waves.
128 4.04 and 6.371.  Hertz is tied with Whitehead for third, behind Frege and Russell, in the number of 
times mentioned.    And Whitehead's name appears, each and every time, with Russell's.  I do not 
count the references to Newton in this figure, for since he only talks about “Newtonian mechanics” it 
is not a proper citation. 
129 Kelly Hamilton, “Wittgenstein and the Mind's Eye” in  Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Biography  ed. 
James Klagge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 55.
130 Heinrich Hertz,  The Principles of Mechanics Presented in New Form,  trans. D. E. Jones and J. T. 
Walley (New York: Dover, 1956),  1
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But we have accumulated around the terms “force” and “electricity”  more 
relations than can be completely reconciled amongst themselves.  We have an 
obscure feeling of this and want to have things cleared up.  Our confused wish 
finds  expression  in  the  confused  question  as  to  the  nature  of  force  and 
electricity.   But the answer which we want is  not really an answer to this 
question.  It is not by finding out more and fresh relations and connections 
that it can be answered; but by removing the contradictions existing between 
those already known, and thus perhaps by reducing their number.  When these 
painful contradictions are removed, the question as to the nature of force will 
not have been answered; but our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to ask 
illegitimate questions.131
This is reported to have been frequently quoted by Wittgenstein, and part of the above 
quoted passage was even considered as a motto for the  Philosophical Investigations.132 
Likewise,  in  the  Big  Typescript Wittgenstein  wrote,  in  a  similar  spirit  “[a]s  I  do 
philosophy,  its  entire  task  consists  in  expressing  myself  in  such  a  way as  to  make 
problems  disappear”  (PO 181).   In  the  manuscript,  Hertz'  name follows  this  line  in 
parentheses.   “Philosophy unravels the knots in our thinking,” he continues, “hence its 
results must be simple, but its activity is as complicated as the knots it unravels.” (PO 
183).
In addition,  there  is  a  recent  and growing body of  research that  attributes  the 
development of the 'picture' theory as related specifically to Wittgenstein's engineering 
training.   His courses in Berlin, and later in Manchester, relied heavily upon descriptive 
geometry;  likewise,  many have  hypothesized  that  Wittgenstein's  use  of  the  notion  of 
modeling  might  be  a  consequence  of  this  engineer's  training  in  mentally  visualizing 
experiments,133 or even developed through his work on aerodynamics at Manchester in 
131 Ibid., p. 8
132 Alfred Nordmann, Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005),  30.  See also McGuinness, Young Ludwig, 39
133 Kelly Oliver, “Wittgenstein and the Mind's Eye,” 56-60
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which  scale-models  were  used  in  wind  tunnels  to  demonstrate  various  properties  of 
propellers, etc.134  Wittgenstein himself confirms this, telling the Vienna Circle that “I 
have inherited this concept of a picture from two sides: first from a drawn picture, second 
from  the  model  of  a  mathematician,  which  already  is  a  general  concept.   For  the 
mathematician talks of picturing where a painter would no longer use this expression” 
(WVC 185).
These points of disagreement reflect what is misleading about von Wright's story, 
which surrounds the terminology in ambiguity, and threatens to lead the reader astray. 
Wittgenstein's technical notion of picture is  not meant to be a literal picture, which he 
refers to specifically in the  Tractatus  as a “spacial picture.”  In fact,  the term 'picture 
theory,' is itself a misnomer.  In the Tractatus he explicitly notes that pictures are merely 
one of many possible means of representation: “[t]he gramophone record, the musical 
thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal 
relation,  which  holds  between  language  and  the  world.   To  all  of  them the  logical 
structure is common” (4.014).135
David Stern has roundly criticized this translation of the term, opting for the use 
of the original German term rather than translating it all.  He says:
Wittgenstein used the German word 'Bild'  to  talk  about  the model,  a  term 
usually translated as “picture”; as a result, the theory of meaning it inspired is 
generally known as the picture theory.  While both words cover such things as 
images, film, frames, drawings, and paintings, the idea of a three-dimensional 
model is more readily conveyed by the German word 'Bild' than the English 
“picture.”  . . . [T]he theory invokes generalizing from what models, pictures, 
134 Susan Sterrett, Wittgenstein Flies a Kite, passim.
135 Ogden translation for emphasis.
77
and the like are  supposed to  have in  common,  and treats  two-dimensional 
pictures as just one kind of Bild.136
I agree with his assessment, and for this reason I prefer to discuss Wittgenstein's theory 
by translating Bild as “model” rather than “picture.”   
So what is this  Bild theory and why is it so important?  It is initially explicated 
very early in the text within the second proposition, but important elucidations are also 
given  within  the  fourth  proposition.   It  is  often  thought  that  Wittgenstein's  entire 
representational theory of linguistic meaning is based upon it, and so understanding what 
it  is  will  be central  to  our concerns here.   “We model  facts  to ourselves,”  he begins 
(2.1).137  The world for Wittgenstein, as with Russell during his logical atomist period, is 
composed of “facts” [Tatasche] (1.1), which he describes as “the existence of states of 
affairs” [Sachverhalten] (2).138  Elsewhere he defines a fact as “what corresponds to the 
logical  product  of  elementary  propositions  when  this  product  is  true”  (WC  98). 
Sachverhalten are logically simple, and cannot be further analyzed or reduced to more 
simple facts (thus Ogden's rendering 'atomic fact').  As a consequence, Sachverhalten are 
logically independent of one another (2.061-2); the existence or non-existence of one 
does not determine the existence of any other.  They are composed of a concatenation of 
objects, which stand in relation to one another (2.01).  By “objects,” he does not mean 
spacial objects like tables, chairs and bunnies, but rather 'logical' objects.  These logical 
136 David Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 35-6
137 I will modify the English translation, replacing “picture” with “model” for the German term  Bild 
throughout.
138 The most substantive point of disagreement between the Ogden-Ramsey translation and the Pears-
McGuinness translation is the term Sachverhalt.  While the Ogden renders the term “atomic fact,” the 
opts for the more literal “state of affairs.”  In order to avoid this controversy entirely, I shall use the 
German term throughout.
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objects,  we  are  told,  “hang  together  like  links  in  a  chain”  (2.03)   When  a  set  of 
Sachverhalten (a Sachlage) exist, the fact also exists.   That is, if objects exist in the way 
shown by the proposition, then it is expressed by the existent fact which corresponds to it. 
Facts therefore are collections of Sachverhalten which obtain in the world.139   
A proposition, in its fully analyzed logical form, consists of a concatenation of 
names which stand in relations to one another (4.221).  Propositions also stand externally 
in a representational relation of modeling, each name stands for an object in the world.  
The  proposition  is  true  just  in  case  there  is  an  isomorphic  relation  between  the 
proposition and the world—that is, if there is a one-to-one correspondence between each 
name and object, and correctly maps the logical relations that hold between them.  The 
proposition is false when there is no such isomorphism.  Wittgenstein explains:
In  the  proposition,  each  word  corresponds  to  a  simple  object,  and  should 
model the relations that inhere in 'logical space' just as the picture does in 
physical space and time: the elements of the model stand, in the model, for the 
objects . . . That the elements of the model are combined with one another in a 
definite  way,  represents  that  the  things  are  so combined with  one  another 
(2.14-2.15).
The model serves roughly the same relation between proposition and referent as does 
Frege's term Sinn.140   That is, it picks out the reference of a proposition.  The proposition, 
as a model, provides the sense of the proposition—it tells us what it would be like for the 
proposition to be true.  In expressing the proposition's sense, it aids us in judging whether 
the proposition is true or false.
139 This reading been criticized by what Wittgenstein says in TLP 2.0124.  If a state of affairs is a possible 
fact, then how can there be a “possible state of affairs”?  Either this is redundant or absurd.
140 I say “roughly” because there are two points of disagreement.  First, Bedeutung for Frege is the truth-
value of  the proposition,  whereas  for  Wittgenstein it  is  not.   Secondly,  a  sentence for  Frege  is  a 
complex name for its truth value.  Proposition are not themselves names for Wittgenstein, but rather 
are composed of names.
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It is important to remember here that models need not be true.  There are as many 
possible models as possible configurations of the world.  A given fact-stating proposition 
carves  up  reality  into  two  halves,  as  it  were:  those  which  may contain  the  existing 
Sachlage that corresponds to the proposition,  and those that do not.  In this way, the 
model is what allows one to discriminate between possible configurations of the world, 
but also to distinguish between the proposition's truth or falsity.  For any given model, its 
logical objects may or may not obtain in the world—put differently, there may or may not 
be  an  existing  fact  to  make it  true.   This  is  especially  important  for  his  account  of 
modeling to be an accurate theory of linguistic representation.  In order to know what the 
proposition  means,  we  must  know  what  the  world  must  be  like  in  order  for  the 
proposition to be true.  
But  some  absolutely  essential  features  of  language,  however,  is  never  quite 
represented in the model.  As mentioned above,  the proposition is a concatenation of 
simple names  in  definite  relation to  one  another.   The proposition  is  true  when it  is 
isomorphic with the world—that is, when the simple objects in the world stand in the 
same relations to one another as the names do in the proposition.  Although each word 
corresponds to a simple object in the world, the truth-functional relations between the 
names themselves do not represent anything in the world.  He explicitly tells us at 4.0312 
that “the logical constants do not represent,” what he refers to as his “fundamental idea” 
or Grundgedanke.  
But further the representing relation itself, between the names in the proposition 
and the objects in the world, is also itself not represented.  For Wittgenstein, language has 
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an inherent capacity to represent the world, which is internal to the representation itself. 
Looking back at some of the the earliest extant scripts, for example Egyptian hieroglyphs, 
one can see this capacity to represent most clearly.  Although modern languages have 
significantly  evolved  and  become  more  complex,  they  have  not  lost  their  inherent 
representational capacity—although Wittgenstein says that this fact is often obfuscated by 
the appearance of words in more evolved languages.  “In order to understand the essential 
nature of a proposition, we should consider hieroglyphic script, which depicts facts that it 
describes. An alphabetic script developed out of it without losing what was essential to 
depiction” (4.016).  But there is always something vital to the depiction itself which is 
not itself depicted, and that is the mode of projection between the proposition and the 
world.  That is, the representational relationship itself.  A proposition or model does not 
say how it is to be interpreted as a representational model of the world, but rather shows 
it.  This is key to understanding why the primary function of language is to say something 
about  the  world,  although  not  every  aspect  of  the  proposition  needs  to  contain  this 
function. 
§3 Correspondence without Confrontation
One should  resist  the  urge  to  over-interpret  the  possible  methods  by which  a 
proposition is compared to extra-linguistic reality.  This path can be a tenuous one, for 
with certain presuppositions it can lead—as it did with the Vienna Circle—to the view 
that a specific criterion of verification is necessary to establish the meaningfulness of  a 
proposition.   In  the last  chapter,  I  surveyed some reasons  to  conclude  that,  although 
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Wittgenstein maintains a version of the correspondence theory of truth,  that  does not 
mean he is a sense-verificationist.141  And indeed the question of how, and to what in the 
world the proposition is to be compared, is not clear from the text.
Wittgenstein addresses how to understand  the connection between language and 
the world in a series of highly metaphorical passages from 2.1511 to 2.1515.  The model, 
he tells us, “reaches right out to” the world, like “feelers.”  This is, admittedly, a rather 
enigmatic  statement;  but  in  the  1929  paper  “Some  Remarks  on  Logical  Form,”  he 
explains that what he meant by the proposition reaching out to reality is that “the forms of 
entities are contained in the form of the proposition which is  about these entities.”142 
These  remarks  also contain  a  useful  analogy  which  I  believe  sheds  light  on  what 
Wittgenstein meant here.  He compares the representational relationship between model 
and the world to measuring length: “it is laid against reality like a measure” (2.1512).  On 
this he comments, “[o]nly the end-points of the graduating lines actually touch the object 
that is to be measured.”  Not only here, but also later in Philosophical Remarks, he uses 
this analogy of measurement to describe the agreement of a proposition with reality.  The 
world,  in  a sense,  is  the “yardstick” by which the truth or falsity of a proposition is 
judged.  What I take Wittgenstein to mean by this comparison is two-fold.  First, only 
certain forms of representation are necessary to determine the truth of the proposition. 
Later  in  the  Tractatus,  Wittgenstein  distances  himself  from  a  single  method  of 
comparison  between  the  proposition  and  the  world,  where  he  tells  us  that  “[a] 
gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes and the sound waves, all stand to 
141 See above Chapter 1, §6
142 “Some Remarks on Logical Form,” 169; reprinted in PO 34
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one another in same the internal relationship of depicting that holds between language 
and the world.  They are all constructed according to the same logical pattern” (4.014). 
That is to say, not every possible method of representation is relevant to establish the 
correspondence between the model and the world.  For example, to determine the weight 
of an object a ruler would not help—since a measurement of its spacial dimensions would 
tell me nothing about its weight.  “A model, conceived in this way, also includes the 
pictorial  relationship,  which makes  it  into  a  model” (2.1513).   That  is,  what  in  non-
linguistic reality the proposition is intended to determine is itself determined by aspects 
of the model; the proposition shows its specific relationship to the world, just as asking 
for the weight of an object prescribes a background understanding of a specific system of 
measure and certain measurement tools.  In less metaphorical terms, I believe that this 
confirms a point established in the last chapter—that Wittgenstein did not think that there 
was a single universal “method” of verification, as the positivists read him as saying.  
Likewise,  in  a  similar  discussion  in  Philosophical  Remarks, one  finds 
confirmation  of  this  point.  “I  should  like  to  say:  for  any question  there  is  always  a 
corresponding  method of finding.  Or you might say, a question  denotes a method of 
searching . . . You cannot compare a picture with reality, unless you can set it against it as 
a  yardstick.   You  must  be  able  to  fit  the  proposition  on  to  reality”  (PR  43).  The 
comparison  between  model  and  world  is  internally  determined  by  its  method  of 
depicting,  as  it  were;  what  one  is  looking  for  in  the  correspondence  relationship 
determines the relevant method of projection onto the world.  
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The second and more important point that I believe is maintained by this analogy 
is that, just like the ruler laid against the object, “only the end-points of the graduating 
lines actually touch the object that is to be measured.”  In the act of measuring, one need 
not consult each and every line between the two ends of the object—for the size of the 
object  does  in  a  very specific  way determine the  measurement.   Let's  say I  were to 
measure a sample of fabric.  Although it is clear that every line literally touches the edge 
of the fabric, the only relevant gradation lines are the ones that touch the two edges of the 
sample.  I would not count up each and every centimeter, but rather I would look where 
the object touched the ruler to determine its length.  It is not the measuring instrument 
that determines the relationship of depicting, but that demand is determined by what is 
modeled.  Again from the Philosophical Remarks, “The method of taking measurements, 
e.g. spatial measurements, is related to a particular measurement in precisely the same 
way as the sense of a proposition is to its truth or falsity.  The use, the application, of a 
yardstick doesn't presuppose any particular length for the object to be measured . . . All 
that I need is: I must be able to be certain I can apply my yardstick” (PR 44).143
As mentioned earlier the representational capacity of language, although perhaps 
obfuscated in the advanced languages we know, is an essential feature of language.  The 
way that a proposition 'connects' with reality is made explicit by the process of logical 
analysis.  A proposition has “one and only one complete analysis” (3.25).  Wittgenstein 
accepted Russell's theory of descriptions as a method of analysis, by which he suggests 
that the process of analysis is made by repeatedly inserting definite descriptions in place 
143 See also NB 37, where he says “[a] yardstick does not say that an object that is to be measured is one 
yard long.”
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of complexes until all terms are replaced by simple names (3.26).  In the proposition, the 
last residue of analysis are “simple signs” which are not capable of further analysis.  A 
completely analyzed proposition reaches 'ground-level' at elementary propositions, which 
in turn are composed of names in relations to one another.   These “elements” of the 
propositional sign each correspond to objects (3.2, 3.22).  A name refers to [bedeutet] an 
object.  Objects can only be referred to, “I cannot speak about them: I cannot put them 
into  words”  (3.22).   The  existence  of  simple  signs  as  the  end  result  of  analysis  is 
necessary for a proposition to be able to express sense (3.23).144  When we end up with 
nothing but names, we have reached ground-level since “a name cannot be dissected any 
further.” A name is “a primitive sign,” not capable of further analysis (3.26).
§4 Saying and Showing
There is  an important  contrast  that  runs through the entirety of  the  Tractatus, 
which the standard reading takes as central to a proper understanding of the text.  This is 
the  distinction  between  what  can  be  said  [gesagt]  and  what  can  only  be  shown 
[gezeigt].145  In a 1919 letter to Russell, Wittgenstein refers to this distinction as his “main 
contention,”  and  declares  it  to  be  “the  cardinal  problem of  philosophy”—a point  he 
accuses Russell of missing (WC 98).  One of the most obvious places to look for clarity 
on this point is the “conclusion” of the text, the seventh proposition.  It specifies that 
“[w]hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent.”146  In the Preface, he refers 
144 A similar argument is given for simple objects in 2.02-2.0212
145 It is important to note that Wittgenstein sees these as exclusive categories.  While there is a reading of 
“showing”  that  includes  saying—perhaps  where  showing  makes  saying  evident—Wittgenstein 
distances himself from this reading at 4.1212, where he says “[w]hat can be shown cannot be said.” 
Thus the contrapositive, what can be said cannot be shown, must also hold.
146 The Ogden translation is used here for effect
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to this final remark   as “the whole meaning [of the book].”  If a proposition can be 
expressed, then one of the lessons of the Tractatus is how to render it with clarity, without 
ambiguity or constructions which violate the logical syntax of our language.  But, what 
about those other non-propositional 'truths,' those that cannot be uttered?  
On the positivist reading, the proper bounds of linguistic expression are limited to 
what can be spoken of; anything else is relegated to the periphery, and is not considered 
cognitively meaningful.  That is, either a proposition can be expressed or it is nonsense. 
Since  those  propositions  which  are  constituted  by  truth-functions  of  elementary 
propositions are those which can be spoken, what is the status of the other non-truth 
stating propositions such as those of ethics and metaphysics?  How can the distinction 
between what  can  be  said and what  can  only be shown allow us  to  redeemed these 
insights,  without  lapsing  into  positivism?   These  are  important  questions,  and  the 
standard reading has a distinctive answer which is grounded in the distinction between 
showing and saying.
It  has been suggested by P.  T.  Geach147 that  Wittgenstein's distinction between 
what can be said and what can only be shown was borrowed from Frege.  Geach cites 
Frege's argument in “Concept and Object”148 as the single most important influence on 
Wittgenstein's distinction; thus, he argues, it is by looking to Frege that we can attain a 
clear view of this distinction.  Frege's article is a response to an attack on his Grundlagen 
der Arithmetik by Benno Kerry, but also contains important insights into Frege's formula 
language of Begriffsschrift itself.  Kerry attacks Frege's sharp separation of concepts and 
147 Peter Geach, “Saying and Showing in Frege and Wittgenstein” in  Essays  in Honor of  G. H. von 
Wright, ed. Jakko Hintikka, Acta Philosophica Fennica  28 (1975): 54-70
148 Frege “On Concept and Object” in The Frege Reader ed. Michael Beaney (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
1997), 181-193.
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objects by arguing that sentences such as “The concept 'horse' is easily obtained,” show 
that concepts can also serve the function of objects in sentences.149  Kerry was, of course, 
missing  Frege's  point.   But  it  is  instructive  to  understand  why Kerry's  criticism is  a 
misunderstanding of Frege's point.  
In the Introduction to the Grundlagen, Frege lays out three principles to which he 
would adhere in the text:
[1.] There must be a sharp separation of the psychological from the logical, 
the subjective from the objective; 
[2.] The meaning of word must be asked for in the context of a proposition, 
not in isolation; 
[3.] The distinction between concept and object must be kept in mind.150
He comments on this third principle, that “it is an mere illusion to suppose that a concept 
can be made into an object without altering it.”151  Adding the words 'the concept' in front 
of an concept term does not somehow perform some sort of semantic magic trick, which 
changes a concept term into an object term.  To the contrary, it is not the way the words 
are  compounded that  is  important,  but  instead  the  logical  role of  the  term  in  a 
Begriffsschrift formula that determines whether it is a concept or object.152   For Frege, 
the role of a concept term is different than a concept,  since objects or arguments are 
149 Frege in fact allows for a given word to serve both as a concept and as an object in differing contexts. 
The example that he provides in the Grundlagen is the word “moon.”  In the sentence 'The moon is 
bright tonight,' it is used as an object word; in the sentence 'Titan is a moon,' it is used as a concept 
word.  See Gottlob Frege,  Foundations of Arithmetic trans. J. L.  Austin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1980), §64.
150 Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, x.  See also The Frege Reader, op. cit., 90
151 Ibid.
152 As Kwasi Wiredu has pointed out, there may be a deeper, ontological distinction that Frege may have 
omitted between concept and object.  On this reading, 'the concept “horse”' is indeed a concept.  But 
further, this would also imply that concepts (or 'senses,' as in his “On Sense and Reference”) also must 
be objects for Frege. 
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saturated, whereas concepts or functions are not—the latter cannot stand on their own, 
but only have meaning when an object or argument gives it a truth-value.    
The expression “x is a man” is considered 'unsaturated,' and will take an object in 
the variable place of the function.  By substituting objects, the completed formula then 
points (or refers) to the True when, e.g., 'Martin Heidegger' is plugged in for the variable; 
likewise it would point to the False when 'Hannah Arendt' is.  Although in “Concept and 
Object” Frege explicitly refuses to define what concepts or object are, he does indicate 
that these roles each become perspicuous through its  Begriffsschrift formulation.  The 
proper logical role of an unsaturated predicate term, as a concept, is to take an object in 
its variable place; the proper logical role of an object is to fill that variable place in the 
concept  term.   Although concepts  can  sometimes  serve  as  argument  places  for  other 
concepts,  this  amounts  to  nothing  more  than  confusing  a  first-order  predicate  under 
which objects fall, and a second-level concept under which first-level objects fall.153  
The resulting confusion of Kerry is due largely due to failing to pay attention to 
Frege's foundational third principle, the distinction between concept and object.  Kerry 
not only transgresses Frege's third principle, but in his confusion he also sins against the 
second.  This is because Kerry attempted to set the role of “the concept 'horse'” outside 
the context  of  a  proposition,  and then smuggled it  back into the proposition with its 
logical role as a concept and not an object pre-determined—a violation of the context 
principle.   And as Frege points  out,  a transgression of  the second principle  is  also a 
violation of the first. “If the second principle is not observed,” he tells us, “then one is 
almost forced to take as the meaning of words mental images or acts of individual mind, 
153 Beaney, A Frege Reader, 189
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and thereby to offend against the first as well.”  So Kerry can be interpreted as rejecting 
the distinction between concept and object, by simultaneously violating the holophrastic 
principle and lapsing into psychologism. 
Thus Frege concludes, with a seemingly paradoxical air, that “The concept 'horse' 
is not a concept.”154  To Frege, this is not paradoxical at all, but merely a consequence of 
the 'grammar' of these terms.  It is not a concept at all,  but rather a name—since the 
logical role of this term is to name an object, and only objects can be named.  Frege 
shows  that  Kerry's  alleged  counterexample  amounts  to  nothing  more  than  “an 
awkwardness of language,”155 which shows the insufficiencies of ordinary language and 
the necessity of the clarity generated by the Begriffsschrift notation.  Of Kerry's criticism 
of Frege's alleged 'definition' of concepts and objects, Frege says that it was not intended 
to be a definition at all:
 . . . my explanation is not meant as a proper definition,  One cannot require 
that everything be defined, any more than one cannot require that a chemist 
decompose every substance.  What is simple cannot be decomposed, and what 
is logically simple cannot have a proper definition . . . On the introduction of a 
name for something logically simple, a definition is not possible.156
Although such a distinction can be drawn perspicuously in an adequate  Begriffsschrift  
sentence, it cannot be adequately drawn in language; indeed, such a notation should allow 
one to see that Kerry's example is no example at all: it illicitly uses a certain type of word 
in  a  logically  inappropriate  role,  because  he  mistakes  the  role  taken  by 'the  concept 
“horse”' to be that of a concept.157  In an adequate formula language of logic, no such 
154 Ibid., 185.
155 Ibid., 185.
156 Ibid., 182.
157 Frege says in a 1902 letter to Russell: “[T]he words 'function' and 'concept' should properly speaking 
be rejected.  Logically, they should be names of second-level functions; but they present themselves 
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confusions could be possible, since it can be  shown that such sentences contain logical 
infelicities, even if one is unable to  say so in any precise way.  Put differently, logical 
analysis  will  clarify  semantic  confusions,  or  reveal  certain  constructions  as  outright 
nonsensical in ordinary discourse.  
But Frege's distinction between concepts and objects is not merely a linguistic 
doctrine, but rather it is “founded deep in the nature of things.”158  What Geach attempts 
to argue is that, both for Frege and for Wittgenstein, there are aspects of language which 
inform us about the nature of the world.  Reading Frege this way—just as Geach attempts 
to show—we can see the obvious overlap with the doctrine of the Tractatus.  Wittgenstein 
not  only incorporated  Frege's  context  principle  into  the  Tractatus  (3.3),  but  also  the 
notion of an ineffable logical form that cannot be stated in language.159  Frege did not 
attempt to define the logical roles of concepts and objects, but instead relied upon the 
Begriffsschrift to show the distinction.  But even if Wittgenstein's distinction is influenced 
by Frege, it is certainly not identical to it.  For Frege, to talk of concepts or objects one 
must move to a meta-level in which the second-level function “( ) is an object” can be 
satisfied by a first-order object.  But this is not an option for Wittgenstein.  One of his 
deepest held conviction, throughout both the early and later work, is that there are no 
meta-languages.
Wittgenstein never explicitly denies the existence of meta-languages—for to do so 
would  put  him  in  contradiction.   But  there  are  passages  which  support  this. 
linguistically  as  names  of  first-level  functions.   It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  we  run  into 
difficulties in using them.”  See Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence (Chicago: Chicago 
Univ. Press, 1980), 141
158 Frege, “Function and Concept” in The Frege Reader, 148
159 As will be discussed below, in the final version of the Tractatus the holophrasic principle was moved 
from 3.202 in the Prototractatus to 3.3.  This may be evidence for its importance.  See below §7.
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Wittgenstein's denial of Russell's theory of types (3.331-332), amongst other things, can 
be seen as a rejection of this hierarchy of languages.  Also as mentioned above, the fact 
that  the  mode  of  projection  between  the  proposition  and  the  world  cannot  be  itself 
represented is  also indicative of this point (2.172, 2.174).  For if  the representational 
relationship needed able to be represented (say in a meta-language), we run into a regress 
problem.  “You can't  get  behind the rules,”  he tells  us later,  “because there isn't  any 
behind”  (PG  244).    As  he  puts  it  later  in  the  Lectures  on  the  Foundations  of  
Mathematics: “I will be talking about the word 'foundation' in the phrase 'foundation of 
mathematics.' . . . This does not lead to an infinite hierarchy.  Compare the fact that when 
we learn spelling, we learn the spelling of the word 'spelling'  but we do not call that 
'spelling of the second order.'”160  Note that even the thought of surmounting to a meta-
level immediately brought to mind fear of an infinite heirarchy.
His solution for anything which requires ascending or descending a level from 
language—whether it is to a meta-language, or to the world—is to cast this relationship 
in terms of  showing.  In the  Tractatus  there are many things besides the logical role of 
expressions  that  are  ineffable.   These  include  the  “form of  representation”  which  is 
common  to  model  and  modeled  (2.172-174);  the  sense  of  a  proposition  (4.022); 
propositions of logic (4.461); logical constants (4.0312); the “logic of facts” (4.0312), or 
any “internal properties” of a proposition (4.124); the existence of the soul (5.5421); the 
truth of solipsism (5.62); that there are laws of nature (6.36); the ethical and anything 
160 Lectures  on  the  Foundations  of  Mathematics:  Cambridge  1939, ed.  Cora  Diamond  (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), 14.
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“higher” (6.42); the mystical (6.52); and perhaps even the lessons of the Tractatus itself 
(6.54).
For  Wittgenstein,  only  fact-stating  propositions  have  meaning.   That  is,  any 
statement which specifies a fact—a set of simple objects in determinate relations to one 
another—can be made into a model.  Those propositions which are not fact-stating do not 
have pictures, and thus cannot be given sense according to the theory of the  Tractatus. 
But then does it follow that these are meaningless, or rather merely cannot be modeled? 
While the positivist reading opts for the former, the standard reading argues that the latter 
disjunct is true.  This is the standard reading's distinctive answer to the positivists: just 
because something has no meaning does not mean that it is nonsense.
§5 Sense and Senselessness
According to the Tractatus, any proposition which cannot stand in an isomorphic 
modeling relationship to the world has no sense.  It is for this reason that Wittgenstein 
tells  us  that tautologies  and  contradictions  “are  without  sense”  (4.461).   But  in  the 
following 'comment'  paragraph,  he clarifies:  “[t]autologies  and contradictions  are  not, 
however, nonsensical” (4.4611).  This underlies an important point—that Wittgenstein in 
the Tractatus discerns between two different categories of propositions which do not have 
sense.  Indeed, he consistently uses two different words. In the previous context the word 
used is 'sinnloss,' perhaps best rendered in English as 'without sense' or 'senseless'; the 
latter word 'unsinnig,' is the more appropriate German equivalent to 'nonsense.'   
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To make this criterion clear, recall that for Wittgenstein, a necessary condition for 
meaning is that a proposition is bivalent: there are cases under which it may be true, or it 
may be false.  This is not merely a consequence of the  Bild theory, but rather is more 
fundamental to his thinking—appearing prior to the earliest discussion of modeling.161 
Necessary propositions,  and those  that  do not  “carve  up”  logical  space,  cannot  have 
meaning.  What is distinctive about the truth-functions of tautologies and contradictions 
is their lack of contingency.  The tautology “if p, then p” is true no matter what is plugged 
in for the variable 'p,' due to the nature of material implication.162  Since the same variable 
sits in both the antecedent and consequent phrase of the conditional, it is impossible for 
this statement above to have a true antecedent while having a false consequent, the only 
case  in  which  the  material  conditional  is  false.   Likewise  consider  the  contradictory 
statement “both p and not-p are true.”  By the truth-functional nature of the conjunction, 
both conjuncts must be true for the entire statement to be true; but this is impossible since 
whatever truth value 'p' has, 'not-p' will have the opposite value.  
For Wittgenstein, the bivalence of a proposition is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of meaning.  Since a given tautology would be consistent with every state of 
affairs  and a  contradiction is  always  incompatible  with every state  of  affairs,  neither 
tautologies nor contradictions have unique models.  And since by the Bild theory meaning 
is reserved for those propositions that assert the existence or non-existence of a state-of-
affairs, these limiting cases do not properly speaking have a sense at all.  “There is no 
161 Cf: “Notes on Logic”
162 Here I mean “material implication” in Russell's sense—not as Sellars uses it.  For Russell “material 
implication” is defined the horseshoe operator (e.g., 'p ⊃ q') in Principia Mathematica to mean '~p v 
q'.  This is what Sellars calls “logical inference,” which is to be distinguished by “material inference,” 
in which the conceptual content of the conditional statement plays a role in its validity.  
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model which is a priori true,” Wittgenstein tells us (2.225), which would need to be the 
case if tautologies were able to be modeled.
Neither  tautologies  nor  contradictions  have  sense,  because  neither  have 
determinate content.  “The propositions of logic are tautologies,” Wittgenstein tells us. 
“[They]  therefore  say nothing”  (6.1-11).   However,  it  would  be  a  very  uncharitable 
reading of Wittgenstein to shackle him with the position that logic is nonsense—after all, 
what then is the  Tractatus about other than the necessary conditions to which logic is 
committed?   This  lesson  informs  the  standard  readings.   Although  tautologies  and 
contradictions do not say anything—are “without meaning”—it does not follow that they 
are “nonsense” in the narrower way.  Standard readers interpret these propositions and 
their  ilk  as  philosophically  illuminating  nonetheless,  since  they  show something—
although they are not capable of representing a state of affairs about the world.  But 
Wittgenstein also asserts that certain expressions are just plain nonsense—which he calls 
Ein Unsinn or  unsinnig—and which can contain no substantive philosophical insight. 
Russell's classic example “Quadruplicity drinks procrastination,”163 might be an instance 
of the latter.  It is true that the items which fall into either category have no sense, since 
there is no way for these expressions to be models.  Peter Hacker is one of the main 
proponents of such a distinction: 
Illuminating nonsense will  guide the attentive reader to apprehend what  is 
shown by other propositions which do not turn purport to be philosophical; 
moreover  it  will  intimate,  to  those  who  grasp  what  is  meant,  its  own 
illegitimacy.  The task of philosophy in this respect then is twofold, to bring 
one to see what shows itself, and to prevent one from the futile endeavor to 
163 Bertrand Russell, Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (New York: Routledge, 1992), 166.
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say  it  by  teaching  one  'to  pass  from  a  piece  of  disguised  nonsense  to 
something that is patent nonsense.'”164
Although one may be convinced that there are two types of senseless propositions, 
it still remains an open question how this new category is to be populated.  Consider, for 
example, those propositions which contain normative or metaphysical terms.  These non-
fact stating propositions on the Positivists' reading are not cognitively meaningful, and 
thus  are  relegated  into  the  realm  of  unqualified  nonsense.   But  are  they  so  for 
Wittgenstein?  Standard readers say no.   They argue that many types of propositions 
considered nonsense may, in fact, still be philosophically illuminating.
Anscombe suggests what she calls a “rather trivial” example that seems not have 
sense, but which can nevertheless be illuminating in this way: the proposition “'Someone' 
is the name of someone.”
This is obviously true.  But it does not have the bi-polarity of Wittgenstein's 
'significant  propositions.'   For  what  is  it  that  it  denies  to  be  the  case? 
Evidently, that 'someone' to be the name of someone.  But what would it be 
for 'someone' to be the name of someone?  Someone might christen his child 
'Someone.'  But when we say “'Someone' is the name of someone,” we are not 
intending to deny that anyone in the world has the odd name 'Someone.' . . . 
Here a statement which appears quite correct is not a statement with true-false 
poles.  Its contradictory, when examined, peter out into nothingness . . . [N]or, 
of course, is this a logical truth in any sharp sense of 'logical truth.'   It  is, 
rather,  an  insight;  the  opposite  of  it  is  only  confusion  and  muddle  (not 
contradiction).165
164 Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 18-9.  His quote is from  PI  §464
165 Anscombe, Introduction, p. 85
95
She  ventures  to  guess,  on  Wittgenstein's  behalf,  that  he  would  have  considered  this 
example “something which  shewed—stared you in the face, at any rate once you had 
taken a good look—but what could not be said.”166
Due to the isomorphic relation between language and logic, it follows that on the 
standard reading,  the form of the world can be 'read off'  from the form of language. 
Thus, perhaps language is able to show things which cannot be said.  There are parallels 
here amongst the standard readings on this point.  For instance, Janik and Toumlin say:
Much  of  the  difficulty  that  people  have  experienced  in  interpreting  the 
Tractatus revolves around the fact that both ethics and logic relate to what can 
be “shown” but not “said”; consequently,  “the mystical” is ambiguous.  In the 
first place, it refers to what the world has in common with its representation, it 
mirror, that is, language.  Secondly, it refers to the poetic power of language to 
convey the “meaning of life.”  . . . Language can thus represent facts by means 
of propositions, not alternatively convey emotions in poems.  The aim of the 
Tractatus is  to  distinguish  the  two,  and  thereby  protect  them  from 
confusion.167
Thus it seems that the question of how to 'save' ethical and metaphysical propositions 
from Wittgenstein's own theory may be based upon a misunderstanding.  The standard 
readers charge that the positivists conflate the two separate notions of not having sense 
within the  Tractatus.  Although propositions concerning ethics and metaphysics are not 
truth-functions of elementary propositions, this does not imply that they are nonsense. 
Recall the example of showing in the literary work, as mentioned above.168  In the poem 
there were ethical and existential truths conveyed by the poem, but not directly.  They 
were  not  said,  but  rather  shown.   The  standard  readers  will  instead  claim that  these 
166 Ibid., p. 86.
167 Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 193
168 See above p. 59
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propositions  belong to  the  category of  philosophically illuminating senselessness,  not 
nonsense.
§6 Nonsense
Perhaps some further  light  might  be shed upon this  distinction by considering 
some other things that Wittgenstein thought were nonsense in the stricter way, unsinnig. 
Here are three key passages:
"1 is a number,” "there is only one [number] zero,” and all similar expressions 
are nonsensical [unsinnig].
(It is just as nonsensical [unsinnig] to say, "There is only one 1" as it would be 
to say, “2 + 2 is at 3 o'clock equal to 4.”)  (4.1272)
The  reason why "Socrates  is  identical,"  means  nothing  is  that  there  is  no 
property called "identical." The proposition is nonsensical [unsinnig] because 
we  have  failed  to  make  an  arbitrary  determination,  and  not  because  the 
symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate (5.473).
Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense [Ein 
Unsinn], and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing 
at all (5.5303).
In  each  of  the  above  remarks,  Wittgenstein  uses  the  stronger  word  for  nonsense: 
'unsinnig.'  The first is a relatively straightforward passage, speaking of 'formal concepts' 
such  as  “the  words  'Complex,'  'Fact,'  'Number,'  etc.”    It  is  nonsense  to  use  formal 
concepts in propositions, such as “'1' is a number,” “'a' is an object” or “'φ' is a predicate.” 
Formal  concepts  for  Wittgenstein  are  not  linguistic  items,  but  rather  are  properly 
“presented in logical symbolism by variables” (4.1272).  “When something falls under a 
formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition. 
Instead it is shown in the very sign for this object” (4.126).  These are “pseudo-concepts” 
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for  Wittgenstein,  since  they  are  features  of  logical  form being  used  perniciously  as 
concept terms.   Just  as with Frege's  “concept” and “object,” formal  concepts are not 
themselves predicates for Wittgenstein, but characteristics of logical form in symbolism; 
and likewise for both Frege and Wittgenstein,  they cannot be spoken about,  but only 
shown in an adequate symbolism.  Such logical items show their function, but do not say. 
So to use them as predicates generates nonsense.  The function 'φa' says that “a has the 
property φ,” but the variable letter 'a' and function 'φ' both do not say anything on their 
own, but rather show their function in a logical language.  
Likewise, consider the third passage, where he is responding to Russell's use of 
the  symbol  '='  to  indicate  identity.   For  Wittgenstein,  if  a  piece  of  symbolism  is 
superfluous, then it does not belong to a proper Begriffsschrift.  Wittgenstein thought that 
the identity sign was “not an essential constituent” of logic (5.533).  He demonstrates that 
it is superfluous by developing a way to express identity and difference without using the 
sign; rather identity claims can be simply expressed symbolically by “identity of sign,” 
the use of the same variable occurrence twice in the proposition.169  Likewise difference 
between two objects can be expressed by “difference of signs,” or using two different 
signs for objects (5.53).  In both cases, nothing is necessarily signified by the sign for 
identity.  There is no need to say, for example:
(∃x,y).ƒ(x,y).x = y
169 Landini has recently suggested that Wittgenstein meant to employ the use of exclusive quantifiers to 
symbolize identity claims.  See Gregory Landini,  Wittgenstein's  Apprenticeship with Russell (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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The proposition 'there is only one thing x which satisfies the property ƒ( ),' since that says 
the same thing as merely repeating the same variable within the proposition, as follows:
(∃x).ƒ(x,x)
The same can be said for the difference notation ~(x=y), such as in: 
(∃x,y).ƒ(x,y).~x = y
Wittgenstein would re-write this: 
(∃x,y).ƒ(x,y) 
Since the same logical formula can then be re-written omitting the identity sign without 
loss of meaning, Wittgenstein thinks that this shows the identity symbol is nonsense.
“Logic must take care of itself,” he writes at  the head of the second passage. 
Wittgenstein heads the second remark by stating “If a sign is  possible, then it is also 
capable of signifying” (5.473).  And in the second case, we have an instance of nonsense, 
not because the symbol is itself impermissible or redundant, but because there has been 
no meaning given to the sign 'identical' as a predicate term (5.4733).  
What is common to all three of these passages is that nonsense [Unsinn] is created 
by failure  to  give signification to  a sign in  the role  that  it  appears.   He clarifies  his 
position  on  this  at  5.4733.   Wittgenstein  tells  us  “Frege  says  that  any  legitimately 
constructed proposition must  have sense.   And I  say that  any possible  proposition is 
legitimately constructed, and, if it has no sense, that can only be because we have failed 
to give meaning to some of its constituents.”  In the first example the error is the usage of 
strictly  logical  items  'up'  a  level  in  vernacular  English;  the  second is  trying  to  fit  a 
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specific term in a place where it does not belong, while the third is because a superfluous 
symbol is introduced.  On the standard reading, it is important to discern this strict usage 
of the term 'nonsense' from the weaker term, 'senseless.'  A proposition is without sense 
just in case the external relation of representation with the world is not possible—that is, 
it is not fact-stating.  However those propositions are  nonsense (in the stronger sense) 
because they use terms in ways that are not meaningful, defying the internal aspects of 
logical syntax.
The sensible statement, 'the cat is on the mat' makes sense to us due to semantic 
considerations (that the proposition is well-formed) and syntactic considerations (that we 
understand the  signification  for  each  of  the  signs).   Consider  the  difference  between 
James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake and Lewis Carroll's poem “Jabberwocky” from Through 
the  Looking  Glass as  two  possible  candidates  of  nonsense.   The  former  may  be 
considered nonsense due to  Joyce's  literary use of  portamento.    Finnegan's  Wake is 
simultaneously written in several different languages, often collapsing several meanings 
into each word.  Joyce's concern here is to express in multiple ways, giving more than 
one signification to each sign.  In fact,  Joyce is so concerned with multiple semantic 
expression, that many of the sentences violate the considerations of syntax.   No better 
example can be given than the fact that the book is circular: the beginning of the first 
sentence is contained on the last page of the book.  Joyce's method of writing is that each 
sign signifies several ways at once, too much so for the constraints of syntax.  
In Carroll's poem by contrast, although all the lines of the poem are written in a 
“grammatical” style, few lines actually contain meaning for us.  In many cases, even 
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though we can identify the part of speech of each of the words in the poem, the meaning 
is lost on us.  The reason is largely due to the fact that, although perfectly composed 
iambic  pentameter,  the  meanings  of  most  words  are  largely unknown.   Both  Joyce's 
“novel” and Carroll's “poem,” may in one way or another be considered 'nonsense.'   But 
are they nonsense, or merely senseless?  Both texts can be read, and 'understood' in a way
—we can imagine the narratives of Carroll's hero slaying the beast, vorpal sword in hand; 
or imagine a plot within Joyce's shifting, dream-like narrative.  But both also might be 
considered nonsense to the first-time reader, yet sense can be made out of the supposed 
nonsense (so to speak).  In this way, they can be considered revelatory even if literally 
meaningless.  This is largely due to the context of how the nonsense appears.  However, a 
nonsense utterance, when ripped from context, may be that—just plain nonsense.  The 
sudden exclamation “Kree jaffa!” would be nonsense to many of us.  This is 'nonsense' in 
the more general connotation of the term.  
While the standard readers will take such instances of words appearing without 
defined roles to be nonsense, they still think that one may make sense of senselessness, as 
it were—that these ineffable 'truths' can be contentful and philosophically illuminating. 
There are 'truths'  for Wittgenstein, which cannot be represented by language and thus 
cannot be spoken about—but that does not imply that they are entirely meaningless, as I 
believe my example above has shown.
The  senselessness  of  certain  propositions  is  a  consequence  of  his  theory  of 
meaning; they are themselves taken, not to be 'nonsensical,' but instead to inform us of 
what our bounds are.  But, as Wittgenstein rightfully points out, one cannot draw this 
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limit in thought, “for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find 
both sides of the limit  thinkable.”170  Therefore he instead seeks to draw the limit  in 
language.  Here he seems to presuppose that there are things which can be the object of 
thought—be they elucidations on the form of language, the nature of the world, ethical or 
aesthetic  insights—all  of  which  fall  outside  the  proper  bounds  of  language.   As  an 
unfortunate consequence of this, Wittgenstein must speak about the ineffable.
§7 Self-Defeating Text?
Perhaps the most puzzling of philosophical moves made in any philosophical text 
is when Wittgenstein asserts the following:
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me 
finally  recognizes  them as  senseless  [unsinnig], when  he  has  climbed  out 
through them, on them, over  them. (He must  so to  speak throw away the 
ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. 
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. (6.54-7)
What is one to make of this?  Are we not to re-read the text, since the author himself 
seems to dismiss it in its entirety to be 'senseless'?  What a depressing thought to convey 
to the reader after she has just followed Wittgenstein down the narrow paths and the 
sparse landscape that comprise the Tractatus.  Wittgenstein's view here is consistent with 
other places in the text, ex. 4.003, where he says that “Most propositions and questions, 
that  have  been  written  about  philosophical  matters,  are  not  false  but  nonsensical” 
[unsinnig].
170 TLP, Preface
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Wittgenstein's commitment to fact-stating language in the  Bild theory seems to 
shackle him with a performative contradiction: he must speak about things which, by his 
own philosophical position,  are unable to be spoken.  So it  follows that Wittgenstein 
would need to amend certain things in the process of ascending the ladder.  However, his 
solution  only pushes  the  contradiction  to  the  level  of  absurdity:  one  must  throw the 
propositions out as “nonsense.”     
The  standard  reading  seems  to  give  Wittgenstein  an  'out':  we  should  render 
'sinnlos'  as  senseless  (viz.,  not having sense)  whereas we can use the stronger  word, 
'unsinnig,'  to  indicate  nonsense.   This  would be  fine,  were he  to  use  'sinnlos'  in  the 
passage above.   But as if to make the interpreter's job harder,  Wittgenstein's German 
reveals  the  'unsinnig'  ('nonsense')  in  6.54—not  the  weaker  term 'sinnlos.'  Thus,  we 
should conclude either that Wittgenstein was not being careful in his word choice in 6.54, 
or that he truly meant that his propositions are nonsense in the more strict usage.  
The  question  must  be  asked:  is  the  Tractatus self-defeating?   Surely  we 
understand the propositions  in  the  text;  therefore,  how can they be nonsense?   Peter 
Hacker  tries to  explain away Wittgenstein's  condemnation of his  own propositions as 
nonsense from undermining the scope of the work.  “Wittgenstein was quite correct and 
consistent;  the  Tractatus does  indeed  consist  largely  of  pseudo-propositions  .  .  . 
Apparently what someone means or intends by a remark can be grasped even though the 
sentence uttered is strictly speaking nonsense.”171  Hacker here interprets this remark in 
terms  of  the  class  of  philosophically  illuminating  nonsense,  not  the  class  of  plain 
nonsense.  
171 Hacker, The False Prison, 26
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Max  Black,  in  his  Commentary,  defends  Wittgenstein  on  similar  grounds. 
Wittgenstein is speaking—in violation of the central and final doctrines of the Tractatus
—about  that  of  which  one  cannot  speak,  and  in  so  doing  has  'stretched'  the  proper 
boundaries of the concepts employed.  But this does not imply that Wittgenstein's project 
is in some way self-defeating:
By the 'world' he does not mean the physical cosmos, but something vaster 
and philosophically more interesting; by a 'name' he means not the familiar 
names of persons and places, but the 'pure name' whose necessary existence 
follows from the over-arching conception of what language in its essence must 
really be like, and similarly for other expressions that he uses in 'stretched' 
ways.  Such an exercise in 'revisionary metaphysics' . . . is neither absurd nor 
self-authenticating.  Wittgenstein is trying out a new way of looking at the 
world, which forces him to twist and bend language to the expression of his 
thoughts.  His own conclusion that the new vision is incoherent was a result 
that had to be won by severe mental labor . . . A negative metaphysics is, such 
as that of the  Tractatus, has its own rules of procedure: the ladder must be 
used before it can be thrown away.172
Both  Hacker  and  Black's  defenses  try  to  save  the  Tractatus from  the  threat  of 
performative contradiction—perhaps obviously so, as Black  did see fit to write a 400 
page commentary on the book.  However, not all interpreters are satisfied by this, as we 
shall see.  Black is right to point out that there can be interesting philosophical uses to 
words or concepts which do not 'fit' their determinate uses.  An example that he gives in 
his  exposition  is  “the  greatest  of  all  numbers,”  for  which  we might  use  the  infinity 
symbol as a notation to refer to this denoting phrase.  After the development of the trans-
finite arithmetic, the aleph notation would be used to express the cardinality of infinites; 
so the simple symbol must be discarded.  But, although we may be able to say that the 
infinity symbol is 'senseless' due to developments in twentieth century mathematics, I 
172 Black, Commentary, 385-6.
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think  it  would  be a  stretch to  say that  this  symbol  is  'nonsense'  as  if  to  mean plain 
nonsense.  
Consider, also, the practice of teaching the Bohr model of the atom in the context 
of introductory level  chemistry classes.   Although it  is  false picture of the atom that 
electrons sail around the nucleus in fixed paths—like planets around the sun—it is not 
completely true that it serves no purpose.  Rather, such models as this help to introduce 
us to the basics of atomic physics.  Later, the student will learn that the position and 
velocity of an electron cannot be measured exactly, and that the electron has a probability 
of being anywhere around the atom—even having a non-zero probability of being inside 
the nucleus at a given time!  Once one has a better view of quantum dynamics, one then 
can  “see  the  atom rightly,”  and can  then  “throw away”  this  simpler  view.   It  is  not 
nonsense, just  false.  But might still serve a useful purpose pedagogically in aiding the 
student  to  come to a  entry-level  understanding of the atom.  So too,  perhaps for the 
student of the Tractatus.  How are we to understand this as plain nonsense?  Or rather, 
how are we to declare the book nonsense when it is clear we understand it?  These are 
serious questions which remain unanswered by the standard reading.
§8 Conclusion
Most Wittgenstein interpreters to this day remain convinced of the truth of one 
form or another of the standard reading.   It is the common view taught in seminars on the 
Tractatus,  and  great  pains  are  taken  to  understand the  text  in  its  context,  unlike  the 
positivist interpretation, which did not take into account the context in which the text was 
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written.  However, there is one serious question that the standard reading cannot account 
for: if Wittgenstein maintains that we can understand things which, properly speaking 
have no sense, then how can he declare in 6.54 that his “propositions are nonsense.”  The 
standard readings seem to be consistent with Russell's quip in the Introduction that “Mr. 
Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said . . .”173  Such criticism 
was repeated by Russell in Wittgenstein's 1929 dissertation defense, where Wittgenstein 
responded: “Don't worry, I know you'll never understand it.”174  Recently, a new school of 
interpretation has grown around this problem, taking the question raised in 6.54 as its 
starting place.  That will be subject of the next chapter.
173 TLP, p. 22
174 quoted in Ray Monk,  Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius  (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 
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Throwing Away the Ladder: The Resolute Reading
§1  Introduction
For years following the renunciation of the positivist interpretation, the standard 
reading remained—and to a large degree still  remains—the dominant interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's  Tractatus.   Most Wittgenstein specialists,  and nearly all non-specialists, 
accept it as the definitive understanding of Wittgenstein's early philosophy.  Recall that 
according to these commentators, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus is portrayed as a sort 
of reluctant metaphysician, who later saw the error of his ways and then authored an 
entirely  new philosophical  method,  inconsistent  with  the  first.   This  new method  of 
“language games,” instead of focusing on the necessary logical aspects that must exist for 
language to exist at all, focuses on the diversity of linguistic practices.  According to this 
received view of Wittgenstein's  corpus,  the posthumously published 'later'  philosophy 
exemplified by the Philosophical Investigations is in direct opposition to the philosophy 
of the Tractatus. 
In  the  late  1970's  and early 80's,  the idea  that  Wittgenstein  was putting forth 
metaphysical  doctrines  in  the  Tractatus started  to  come  into  question.   Inspired  by 
commentators such as Rush Rhees, Brian McGuiness, Peter Winch and Hide Ishiguro,175 
the anti-metaphysical interpretation began to increasingly hold sway over Wittgenstein 
scholarship.  This opened up new avenues for at last amending the 'two systems' view—
175 Peter Winch, “Persuasion”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1992), 123-137. McGuiness, “The So-
Called Realism of the Tractatus,” op. cit; Ishiguro, “The Use and Reference of Names,” op cit.
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which  is  now  increasingly  being  exposed  as  a  fundamental  dogma  of  Wittgenstein 
scholarship.  If the schism between Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy is that in the 
former he was a sort of metaphysician, which he later sought to repudiate from the 1930's 
onward, then denying that Wittgenstein intended to put forth specific metaphysical theses 
in  the early work might  also provide a way to amend this  perceived discontinuity in 
Wittgenstein's thought.  Since that time, an exciting new interpretation of the  Tractatus 
has emerged, initially outlined by Cora Diamond and expanded upon considerably by 
James  Conant.   The  “Resolute  Reading,”  as  Tom Ricketts  has  named  it,176 has  been 
quickly  gaining  attention  and  is  currently  attempting  to  gain  status  as  the  dominant 
reading of the text.  Without hyperbole, this new interpretive model may be the most 
original  and  controversial  proposal  for  understanding  Wittgenstein  since  Kripke's 
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.177  It borrows some of the most powerful 
insights from the anti-metaphysical interpretation, but at the same time denies some of its 
characteristic 'standard' features, including allowing language to “show” us things which 
cannot properly be said.   And indeed,  Diamond and Conant's  work has gained many 
admirers, such as Juliet Floyd, Michael Ostrow, Rupert Read, Alice Crary and Michael 
Kremer;  and  likewise,  many  detractors,  including  Ian  Proops,  Peter  Hacker,  H.  O. 
Mounce and John Koethe.178
176 See Thomas Ricketts, “Pictures, Logic, and the Limits of Sense in Wittgenstein's  Tractatus” in  The 
Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein,   ed.  Hans Sluga and David Stern (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 93.
177 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1982).
178 For the purposes of this chapter, I will limit my focus to the two major proponents of the resolute 
reading for its positive doctrines, Cora Diamond and James Conant.  Other resolute readers will be 
mentioned only where necessary.
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In the last  chapter  I  outlined the standard reading,  which was developed as  a 
reaction to  the reading of the Tractatus  put forth by the Vienna Circle.   Rather than 
understanding  Wittgenstein  as  an  empiricist  and  anti-metaphysician,  certain 
commentators  tended  to  react  in  the  opposite  dialectical  fashion:  to  read  him as  not 
putting forth any specific epistemological position in the text, whether empiricist or not. 
Rather, through the distinction between saying and showing, he indeed meant to indicate 
that language can reveal ontological, ethical or even existential 'truths,' which are strictly 
speaking ineffable through language.  The standard readers argue that while these insights 
into the nature of the world are not fact-stating, and thus according to the  Bild theory 
cannot be spoken of, they nevertheless can be shown by a scrutiny of the logical structure 
of  language.   This  aspect  of  ineffability—that  the  most  fundamental  insights  are 
indirectly reflected by the structure of language—is characteristic of standard readings. 
Through the identification of two separate categories of nonsense into which non-fact 
stating truths can fall, the standard readers agree that these revelatory pseudo-truths fall 
into the former class, not the latter; that is to say, although they do not have sense in a 
fact-stating manner, they can nevertheless reveal to us certain features of the world which 
transcend the proper bounds of language.  Taking the distinction between saying [gesagt] 
and  showing [gezeigt]  as  central  to  Wittgenstein's  philosophical  project,  the  standard 
reading uses it  to define the distinction between the two categories.  In this way, the 
standard reading paints Wittgenstein as a type of contemporary Kantian, who sought  to 
annul language in order to make room for the mystical.  
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Unlike the standard reading, the resolute reading does not take Wittgenstein to be 
laying  the  groundwork  for  the  necessary  conditions  of  language.   Instead  these 
commentators deny that Wittgenstein is literally putting forth any philosophical theory 
whatsoever in the Tractatus.  While the resolute reading does address and seek to amend 
some of the more obvious defects of the standard reading—including the contradiction of 
needing  to  speak  about  the  truths  which  surpass  the  power  of  language,  and  taking 
seriously Wittgenstein's injunction at 6.54 to understand his propositions as nonsense—it 
is not universally accepted as the definitive reading of the text.  In this chapter, I intend to 
analyze the arguments for the resolute reading as put forth by its major proponents, and 
articulate some of the criticisms put forth by its major detractors.  I intend to demonstrate 
that the resolute reading is a powerful suggestion for understanding the text, but cannot 
on its most canonical form claim to be the truly definitive understanding of the text.
§2  Throwing Away the Ladder
One of the most characteristic features of the resolute reading is its starting place. 
At 6.54 Wittgenstein writes, in conclusion of the text: 
My propositions  serve  as  elucidations  in  the  following  way:  anyone  who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical [unsinnig], when 
he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them.   (He must,  so to 
speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)  He must transcend 
these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.
The resolute readers of the  Tractatus take Wittgenstein's claim here seriously, that the 
propositions of his text are in fact nonsense.  That is, not senseless [sinnloss] in the sense 
that they surpasse the representational capacity of language, but rather  plain nonsense 
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[unsinnig].  The resolute readers take this remark as their hermeneutic anchor, insisting 
that the proper interpretation of the text  is  to understand that  the propositions  of the 
Tractatus themselves are in fact nonsense, and thus in the end must be thrown away.  
Standard readers will be tempted to interpret this remark at 6.54 to mean that his 
propositions are nonsense in the weaker connotation; that is, although they have no sense, 
they can still inform us about 'truths' which transcend the proper bounds of language. 
Indeed,  the  original  translation  of  the  text  by  Ogden  and  Ramsey  used  the  word 
'senseless' in this passage, instead of 'nonsense'—leading an entire generation of readers 
to  gloss  over  the  significance  of  this  remark.   However,  even  a  cursory look at  the 
original German of 6.54 above reveals that the word used is not sinnlos, meaning 'without 
sense' or 'senseless,' but rather unsinnig—'nonsense'!  That is, Wittgenstein is not saying 
that his propositions fall into former category, but rather the latter; his propositions are, 
by his own word, just plain nonsense—that is, they are no better than gibberish, and thus 
show us nothing.
Many standard readers contend that the propositions of the Tractatus are literally 
meaningless, because in the course of the book he needed to speak about things which 
are, by the lesson of the text, ineffable.  But a variety of commentators who endorse the 
standard reading have tried to downplay or interpret this remark such that it denies the 
obvious.   Such a  defense is  put forth  by Black in  his  Commentary on Wittgenstein's  
Tractatus.179  He notes that Wittgenstein's conclusion is “profoundly unsatisfactory,” and 
suggests  that  “this  ladder  need  not  be  thrown away.”180  Arguing  that  while  most  of 
179 Max Black, A Commentary on Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1964).
180 Ibid., 376-7.
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Wittgenstein's remarks in the text cannot be literally meaningful since they cannot be 
modeled on the  Bild theory, he suggests that Wittgenstein really means to say they are 
“senseless,” and not nonsense.  Instead he rejects the suggestion that the remark at 6.54 
implies  that  the remarks  in  the book are  nonsense.   Black  argues  that,  “[i]f  we take 
'seriously' the conclusion that metaphysics is nonsense, it seems our confidence that we 
succeed in understanding the book must have been a self-delusion.  It is one thing to say 
we must throw away the ladder away after we have used it; it is another to maintain that 
there never was a ladder at all.”181
Black seeks to put forth a line of defense which thwarts the temptation to read 
Wittgenstein as equating “'nonsense'  with gibberish,” and “what  'cannot be said'  with 
what cannot be rationally communicated.”182  Instead he takes Wittgenstein as meaning 
that his propositions are meaningless since they illicitly employ what Wittgenstein calls 
“internal”  or  “formal”  concepts,  rather  than  and  legitimate  “external”  or  “material” 
concepts.  Wittgenstein calls the former “pseudo-concepts,” as they stand for terms which 
belong  to  the  symbolism  itself.   The  terms  'object,'  'complex,'  'fact,'  'function,'  and 
'number,' are examples that he provides—all of which Wittgenstein thinks are properly 
symbolized through an adequate Begriffsschrift, but are ineffable in language (4.1272).  It 
is nonsense by Wittgenstein's own philosophy to say, for example, 'There are objects.' 
Although this is constructed in a similar grammatical style to the expression 'There are 
books,' it is only by analogy that we feel the former expression is legitimate.183  Objects in 
the  Tractatus  instead are only shown in symbolic form by the use of a bound variable. 
181 Black, Commentary, 379.
182 Ibid., 379.
183 “So one cannot say, for example, 'There are objects', as one might say, 'There are books'” (4.1272). 
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Although the latter statement actually says something about the world, the former is an 
attempt to treat  the concept  which is  itself  internal  to  the symbolism as  if  it  were a 
symbol for it.  In this way a formal concept will 'show' us its logical role, through the way 
it is symbolized.  Thus they are not properly concepts which can be spoken of, but rather 
show themselves in the use of language. 
Black explains that “[l]ogical syntax cannot include such remarks as 'The world is 
everything that is the case' or 'The world is the totality of facts, not of things.'”  Since 
these remarks use the pseudo-concepts 'world,' and 'fact,' which are “used by Wittgenstein 
in invented or stretched senses.”184  In each case of these remarks, terms which stand for 
formal concepts are employed, thereby giving us the illusion that they have legitimate 
usages  in  language.   Sentences  which  use  these  words,  just  as  with  tautologies  and 
contradictions, are not fact-stating. They do not express propositions according to the 
Bild theory.  But when we reach 6.54 at the end of the book, we simply realize that to get 
to the point he was trying to make, it required him to appear to speak about things which 
could not be spoken about; throwing the ladder away is constitutive of this realization. 
For Black, “Wittgenstein is trying out a new way of looking a the world, which forces 
him to twist and bend language to the expression of his new thoughts . . . A negative 
metaphysics, such as that of the Tractatus, has its own rules of procedure: the ladder must 
be used before it can be thrown away.”185  
Peter  Hacker  argues  that  Black's  line  of  reasoning  is  “mistaken,”186 but 
nonetheless mounts a line of defense similar to Black's.  Hacker rightfully points out that 
184 Black, Commentary, 382.  The quoted expressions are remarks 1 and 1.1, respectively.
185 Ibid., 386.
186 P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein Revised edition (New 
York: Clarendon Press, 1986), 25.
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Black  confuses the categories of senselessness and nonsense.  Senseless propositions, 
like tautologies and contradictions have legitimate uses outside language—but do not 
have  meaning  in  a  fact-stating  way.    Sentences  which  use  formal  concepts,  unlike 
tautologies and contradictions, are always illegitimate for Wittgenstein.  Hacker readily 
admits that Wittgenstein's propositions, such as the ones quoted above, are nonsense—but 
not  pure  nonsense.   Rather  they  are  what  he  calls  “illuminating  nonsense.”187  This 
strange notion of nonsense, he tells us, “will guide the attentive reader to apprehend what 
is shown by other propositions which do not purport to be philosophical; moreover it will 
intimate, to those who grasp what is meant, its own illegitimacy.”188  He also when we 
reach the conclusion, we must realize that they are nonsense.  But they still do have the 
power to enlighten us about the structure of logic and language, which is the conclusion 
we come to understand after the ladder has been tossed.
One can't help but be struck by the vagueness of Hacker's explanation here.  He 
might be defended on this charge by pointing out that of course it must be vague—he's 
trying to express what is ineffable.  But this points to exactly what is so philosophically 
troublesome about this doctrine.  Both Black and Hacker seem to presuppose, strangely, 
that there really is a sense to be understood underlying nonsensical sentences.  And this is 
reflected in how daunting a task it is to write about their commitment to communicate the 
ineffable.  To do so, commentators must use troublesome phrases such as “illuminating 
nonsense,”  and  assorted  grammatical  tricks  in  order  to  somehow  talk  about  what 
Wittgenstein supposedly thinks is shown but cannot be spoken.  While they try to claim 
187 Ibid., 18.
188 Ibid., 18.
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that these are 'truths' of a sort, they are not 'truths' in the sense that they correspond to an 
existing fact;  and then somehow they attempt to pull  an ontological moral out of the 
Tractatus,  to  articulate  these  pseudo-truths  on  Wittgenstein's  behalf—all  the  while 
denying that they are really saying anything.  As Conant points out: 
Some of [the standard readers] think it helps to call what is at issue here a 
'fact,' placing the word 'fact' in quotes to mark the difference between such 
facts and garden-variety facts.  Facts are what can be spoken of, what can be 
depicted by meaningful propositions.  What is at issue here is not that sort of 
fact, but rather something much deeper.  Something?  Well not some thing.  It 
is something much deeper than a fact or a thing.  It is like a fact, in that we 
can, in our thought about it, get it right or wrong; but it lies at too deep a level
—deeper than any ordinary fact—to be a mere fact.189  
This type of “backpedaling” as he calls it, is common to ineffability interpretations of the 
Tractatus. And yet still the standard readers have composed volumes on a philosophical 
doctrine which they claim cannot be articulated, and yet still think that we can understand 
what Wittgenstein meant to say all along.
Not only is the category of “illuminating nonsense” philosophically troubling and 
difficult to understand, but it also leaves Wittgenstein in a strange position.  Throughout 
the literature, standard readers cite many things which can only be shown by language—
which by the lesson of the text itself, are ineffable.  Yet, nonetheless, they feel confident 
interpreting Wittgenstein not only as attempting to speak about these things of which one 
cannot speak through the course of the book, but moreover they assume that these lessons 
are able to be communicated to the reader.  
Cora Diamond, in her seminal article “Throwing Away the Ladder,” first outlines 
what would be called a 'resolute reading' of the  Tractatus.  She frames her discussion 
189 James  Conant,  “Why  Worry  about  the  Tractatus”  in  Post-Analytic  Tractatus ed.  Barry  Stocker 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 169-70.
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through  a  critique  of  P.  T.  Geach's  article  “Saying  and  Showing  in  Frege  and 
Wittgenstein.”190  Diamond agrees with Geach that Wittgenstein developed this leitmotif 
as an expansion of Frege's analysis of the distinction between concepts and objects; but 
she  denies  that  Geach  understands  the  exact  implications  of  the  differences  between 
Frege's use of the distinction and Wittgenstein's.
For Frege, the distinction between concept and object is not be drawn in language. 
Rather,  what  makes  something a  concept  or  object  is  its  combinatorial  role  within a 
logical statement;  concepts and objects  show themselves by their  symbolization in an 
adequate Begriffsschrift.191  As Wittgenstein put it in the 1914 “Notes Dictated to Moore”: 
“It is impossible to say what [the logical properties of language] are, because in order to 
do so, you would need a language which hadn't got the properties in question” (NM 108). 
For in order  to speak about  the distinctive logical  roles of concepts  and objects,  one 
would need to use these same linguistic items to talk about them—thus employing them 
as both as  explanans and  explanandum.   Simply put, if  we were to use words which 
denote concepts in language, then one must refer to them—and that would be to treat 
them  as  objects,  not  as  concepts,  in  order  to  draw  the  distinction  between  then  in 
language.   This  is  because,  for Frege,  the distinction is  an ontological  one,  which is 
“founded deep in the nature of things.”192  To understanding this distinction drawn in 
language is to understand something about the world.
For Geach's Wittgenstein, the distinction between saying and showing allows one, 
from a scrutiny of the structure of language, to gain insight into the nature of the world. 
190 See Peter Geach, “Saying and Showing in Frege and Wittgenstein.”  Geach's argument was presented 
in more detail above, so so I will not repeat myself here.  See Chapter 3, §4.
191 See above, §4.
192 Frege, “Function and Concept,” 148.
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“Paradoxical  as  is  the  doctrine  of  aspects  of  reality  that  come  out  but  cannot  be 
propositionally expressed,” Geach tells us, “it is hard to see any viable alternative to it so 
long as we confine ourselves to philosophy of logic: and in this domain Wittgenstein 
revised  Frege's  views  without  unfaithfulness  to  Frege's  spirit.”193  Yet  these  ineffable 
'truths,'  to Geach and other standard readers, do somehow succeed 'gesturing at'  these 
features of reality nonetheless.  Although they are not strictly speaking 'truths' in a fact-
stating way, and although language has no capacity to represent them, standard readers 
believe them to be conveyed by language.  Just as the distinction between concept and 
object is real, although it transcends the representational capacity of language—so too, 
they  think,  Wittgenstein  meant  to  hint  at  the  fact  that  there  is  more  to  reality  than 
language can represent.  
What Diamond objects to is that, despite the express intent of the author of the 
Tractatus, standard interpreters still try to pull an ontological moral out of the Tractatus 
by  'reading  between'  the  propositions,  as  it  were.   She  tells  us:  “One  thing  which 
according  to  the  Tractatus  shows itself  but  cannot  be  expressed  in  language  is  what 
Wittgenstein  speaks  of  as  the  logical  form of  reality.   So  it  looks  as  if  there  is  this 
whatever-it-is, the logical form of reality, which has reality alright, but which cannot say 
or think it  has.”194  Diamond calls  this,  and similar ways of reading Wittgenstein,  as 
“chickening out.”   She explains what an alternative picture would entail:
What counts as not chickening out is then this, roughly: to throw the ladder 
away is, among other things, to throw away in the end the attempt to take 
seriously the language of 'features of reality.'  To read Wittgenstein himself as 
193 Geach, “Saying and Showing,” 68.
194 Cora Diamond, “Throwing Away the Ladder” in  The Realistic Spirit  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1991), 181
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not chickening out is to say that it is not, not really, his view that there are 
features of reality that cannot be put into words but show themselves.  What is 
his view is that that way of talking may be useful or even for a time essential, 
but it is in the end to be let go of and honestly taken as real nonsense, plain 
nonsense,  which  we  are  not  in  the  end  to  think  of  corresponding  to  an 
ineffable truth.195
According to her analysis,  both the positivist  and standard readings constitute  such a 
chickening out at the end.  That is, both readings take the lessons of the Tractatus to be 
meaningful,  and  to  contain  philosophical  insight,  contrary  to  Wittgenstein's  explicit 
statement that his propositions are nonsense and that the ladder must be thrown away.     
It is also important to note that in the penultimate remark Wittgenstein says “he 
who understands me finally recognizes them [his remarks] as nonsense.”196  This indicates 
that in 6.54, the author does not ask us to understand the doctrines espoused in the text—
if there are any; but rather him, the author of the text.  This can be read as indicating that 
Wittgenstein had no intent to endorse the supposed “doctrines” of the text itself.   As 
James Conant puts it:
The  primary  characteristic  that  marks  out  a  reading  of  the  Tractatus as 
“resolute”  . . . is its  rejection of the following idea: what the author of that 
work, in section 6.54, aims to call upon his reader to do (when he says that she 
will  understand  him  when  she  reaches  the   point  where  she  is  able  to 
recognize his sentences as nonsensical) is first to grasp, and then to apply to 
the sentences of the work a theory that has been advanced in the body of the 
work—a theory  that  specifies  the  conditions  under  which  sentences  make 
sense and the conditions under which they do not.197
Once the ladder is thrown away, one comes to realize that the Tractatus does not “show” 
us something about the world, or about language.  Instead, to the resolute readers, the 
195 Ibid., 181.
196 Emphasis mine.
197 James Conant, “Mild Mono-Wittgensteinianism” in Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor 
of Cora Diamond ed. Alice Crary (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 42.
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penultimate remark shows something about the text itself—that the sentences he is using 
throughout the Tractatus literally mean nothing.
§3 Austere Nonsense
As  mentioned  above,  the  central  feature  of  the  standard  reading  is  the 
identification of two separate categories of nonsense.  First, 'philosophically illuminating' 
nonsense—which  is  not  able  to  be  stated,  but  can  only  be  shown—relies  upon  the 
structure of language to show us ineffable features of language and the world.  It is often 
pointed to Wittgenstein's use the term sinnlos, meaning 'senseless' or 'without sense,' to 
where this ineffability doctrine exists in the text.  Standard readers take various things 
discussed in the  Tractatus to populate this category of redeemable nonsense, including 
but not limited to the propositions of logic, and the “form of representation” between 
language and the world—and in stronger cases, even existential, ethical and metaphysical 
insights—all  of  which  Wittgenstein  alludes  to  (although  cannot  say)  throughout  the 
course of the text.  Anscombe's provides the example of the sentence “'Someone' is not 
the  name  of  someone”  as  an  example  of  this  type  of  philosophically  illuminating 
nonsense.198  She thinks that the grammatical form of this statement shows the logical 
role of the word “someone,” and indicates to us that it cannot be used as a proper name. 
That is, not through the literal meaning of the sentence itself, but through the underlying 
feeling it leaves its reader or hearer that it does not quite make sense.
198 Anscombe, Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 85-6
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However, the second category of nonsense for which Wittgenstein uses the term 
unsinnig, is just gibberish or plain nonsense.  Included in this category are statements 
which contain terms whose linguistic role has not been defined within a sentence.  The 
nonsense  utterance  “Kree  Jaffa,”  on  the  other  hand,  is  just  pure  nonsense;  it  means 
nothing to us.  While the standard readers take this dual notion of nonsense as central to 
Wittgenstein's position, the resolute readers deny this dual notion of nonsense exists in 
the text.  Indeed, the resolute readers accuse both the standard and positivist readings of 
falling into the same error, of attributing to Wittgenstein a “substantial” view of nonsense. 
Instead,  they  interpret  Wittgenstein  as  only  putting  forth  a  single,  austere notion  of 
nonsense—there's  sense,  and then there's  just  plain nonsense,  and nothing else.   And 
according to this new interpretation, Wittgenstein only accepts one type of nonsense—
just plain nonsense.  
To get clearer on Wittgenstein's theory of nonsense, let us go back to the text.  In 
5.473, for example, Wittgenstein uses the example “Socrates is identical” as an example 
of nonsense.  He tells us that the reason it is nonsense “is that there is no property called 
'identical.'  The proposition is nonsensical because we have failed to make an arbitrary 
determination,  and  not  because  the  symbol,  in  itself,  would  be  illegitimate”  (5.473). 
Likewise, in 5.4733, he adds that: “'Socrates is identical says nothing, because we have 
given no meaning to the word 'identical' as an adjective.”  
A word on the distinction between sign and symbol here is in order.  Wittgenstein 
defines a symbol as “any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense” (3.31) and a 
sign as “what can be perceived of a symbol” (3.32).  That is, the latter is the written or 
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spoken  form  of  the  word  or  phrase,  and  the  symbol  is  what  that  sign  represents 
linguistically.  It is important to note that in natural language, it often happens that “the 
same word has different modes of signification—and so belongs to different symbols—or 
that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in 
what is superficially the same way” (3.323).  Wittgenstein provides the example of the 
verb  'is.'  
[T]he  word  'is'  figures  as  the  copula,  as  a  sign  for  identity,  and  as  an 
expression for existence . . . (In the proposition, 'Green is green”—where the 
first  word is  the proper name of a person and the last  an adjective—these 
words do not merely have different meanings: they are different symbols.) 
(TLP 3.323)
  
The phrase 'Green is green' can have three separate interpretations, in all of which the 
word 'is' has a different logical function.  This is revealed to us by making it explicit 
through an adequate symbolism.199  In the first case, we might read it as an instance of the 
predicative 'is,' a relation between concepts and objects, with the first occurrence of the 
word 'green' as a proper name (Mr. Green), with the latter as an adjective: 'Mr. Green is 
green.'  Secondly, as a relation of objects, an 'is' of identity with proper names on either 
side: 'Mr. Green is Mr. Green.'  Lastly, we can read the 'is' in this sentence as a claim to 
co-extensionality, a relation between concepts: 'Every green thing is colored green.'  In 
each case, the translation into symbolism (where the predicate Gx is 'x is green' and 'g' 
stands for the proper name 'Mr. Green') shows that each variant uses a different sense of 
the word 'is.'  These three variations may be symbolized accordingly:
199 This  discussion  is  borrowed  from  James  Conant's  “Two  Conceptions  of  Die  Uberwindung  der  
Metaphysik:  Carnap  and  the  Early  Wittgenstein”  in  Wittgenstein  in  America,  edited  by  Timothy 
McCarthy and Peter Winch (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 27-8.
121
(1) Gg
(2) g = g
(3) (∀x)(Gx ↔ Gx)
The text at 5.4733 above seems very clear-cut, and from it one is led to believe 
that the expression “Socrates is identical” is nonsense because it illicitly uses a two-place 
relational term where a one-place predicate should be used.  It is this type of nonsense 
that the standard readers rely upon to “show” us something about the logical forms of the 
terms, and why such a combination is linguistically or logically impermissible.  It might 
be said that this type of illicit grammatical combination  shows us something about the 
logical syntax of language itself—the logical role of the relation “identical” as a two 
place predicate term.  The statement is nonsense, on this reading, because there are not 
two terms to fill this relation.  We are shown that this construction is impermissible by the 
combination of otherwise acceptable terms which together do not make good sense.  In 
this way, standard readers will consider this piece of nonsense to be a case of illuminating 
nonsense, which indicates to us that the term 'identical' only has meaning as a relation, 
not as a singular predicate term.  Due to a violation of logical grammar, this statement 
means  nothing;  but  insofar  as  it  is  nonsense,  it  can  “show” us  something  about  the 
impossibility of  such a  linguistic  combination.   The  lack  of  sense  of  these linguistic 
items, it is thought, merely follows from Wittgenstein's commitment to bivalence as a 
necessary prerequisite for a proposition to have meaning.  In each case,  as necessary 
features of language, it is impossible for these to be false, and thus according to the Bild 
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theory cannot be modeled.  And just as with tautologies and contradictions, although they 
has no meaning, it is not just gibberish.
Hans  Glock's  analysis  of  nonsense  in  The  Wittgenstein  Dictionary is  an 
illuminating  statement  of  this  two-fold  notion  of  nonsense  in  the  Tractatus.   Using 
Glock's  own  terms,  we  might  call  these  two  criteria  for  sense  “contextualism”  and 
“compositionalism.”200  Contextualist nonsense is generated when there is no role defined 
for a given word, relative to the context in which the term appears in a sentence.  In 
Tractarian terms, this type of nonsense emerges when one cannot understand the symbol 
from the sign—just like with 'green is green'  above.   Compositional nonsense results 
from an inappropriate combination of symbols, often viewed as an impermissible 'clash' 
between two logical categories.  Put in Tractarian terms, this type of nonsense emerges 
when a proposition is composed of signs that do symbolize something, but for which the 
logical (or perhaps, ontological) categories of the signs clash in their composition.  It is 
this second type of nonsense that the resolute readers reject.  Using Wittgenstein's own 
example, 'Socrates is identical,' Glock tells us the first type of nonsense “is a matter of 
deprivation, that is, due to the fact that we have failed to give 'identical' any adjectival 
meaning.”  This is nonsense,  not because the sign 'identical'  is illicit,  but because no 
meaning has been given for the word as it appears in the context of the sentence.   But he 
continues: 
At the same time, the  Tractatus  espouses a form of compositionalism: the 
sense  of  elementary  propositions  is  determined  by  the  meanings  of  their 
constituent names,  that  is,  by what objects  they stand for.   Objects  have a 
logical form, which is their possibility of entering into certain combinations 
200 See  Hans-Johann  Glock  “All  Kinds  of  Nonsense”  in  Wittgenstein  at  Work:  Method  in  the  
Philosophical Investigations ed. Erich Ammereller and Eugene Fischer (New York, Routledge, 2004).
123
with other objects.  Objects, and derivatively their names, fall into different 
logical categories . . . In the case of a meaningful proposition, to grasp the 
meaning and logical form of its names is to grasp the possible combinations of 
objects it depicts . . .”201
In  the  passage  cited  above,  Glock  cites  3.318  for  evidence  that  Wittgenstein  meant 
violations of compositional rules create nonsense: “Like Frege and Russell I construe a 
proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it.”  But even in this seemingly 
direct  statement  of  compositionalism,  it  is  important  to  note  that  it  is  rooted  in  the 
contextualist thesis, given the requirement at 3.314: “An expression has meaning only in 
a proposition.”  Indeed, all of the remarks in this section are comments on 3.3, the most 
explicit  statement  of  the  context  thesis  in  the  text.   Resolute  readers  hold  that 
“contextualist”  nonsense  is  the  only  type  that  the  text  allows,  and  “compositional” 
nonsense is an illusion, perhaps a legacy from the understanding of Wittgenstein as a 
Russellian atomist.
This reveals a difficult interpretive question, which the standard readers tend to 
ignore: how are we to know that the word 'identical' is a two-place relational term in this 
context, since ex hypothesi the utterance itself is nonsense?  If it truly is nonsense, then 
we should not be able to discern the linguistic roles of its constituent parts.  Simply put, 
nonsensical utterances have no grammatical or logical parts.  Diamond makes clear this 
difficulty in a celebrated series of papers concerning the role of nonsense in Frege and 
Wittgenstein.  She makes two key points about nonsense sentences: first, that nonsense 
sentences have no discernible logical parts;  and secondly, that pieces of nonsense cannot 
play a role in a sensible sentence.   As to the first point, she alleges that we are no more 
201 Hans-Johann Glock A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 259-60.
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able to understand the logical role of the items in the sentence 'Socrates is identical,' than 
we are to fix the logical role of a term in plain nonsense utterances, such as 'Kree jaffa.' 
She criticizes the view that a term has a sort of implicit “logical power,” an essential role 
determined by the character of the word itself.
The discovery that, although we can put words together so that they make no 
sense, there is no such thing as putting together words within a certain role in 
the language, or with certain logical powers, so that on account of these roles 
or these powers, the whole is nonsense—this is surely one of the great things 
in Frege, and one of the most important things owed to him by Wittgenstein.202
To Diamond and the resolute readers, there is no such thing as fixing the role of words in 
nonsense  sentences  because,  simply put,  nonsense  has  no  sense.   Wittgenstein  relies 
solely upon his own version of Frege's context principle: “Only propositions have sense; 
only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning” (3.3).  It is only in the 
context of a sensible sentence, for both Frege and Wittgenstein, that a word has a logical 
role.  To think otherwise is to draw an analogy to other similarly constructed sentences, 
such as 'Socrates is happy,' and to presume that only a term with that logical role that can 
satisfy the construction 'Socrates is ( ).'  That is, “Socrates is identical” is constructed in a 
similar  fashion  to  “Socrates  is  wise,”  but  trying  to  force  a  relational  term  where  a 
predicate  should  be.   On  this  compositional  view,  it  is  because  the  relational  term 
'identical' does not fit where the adjective should be that nonsense results.  But one might 
wonder how this can be recognized as a predicate rather than a relational term which 
accidentally omits the second term in the relation, modeled on something like “Socrates 
is identical to the teacher of Plato”  To recognize the word 'identical' as a relational term 
in “Socrates is identical” would then be to fix the logical role of the word outside the 
202 Cora Diamond, “Frege and Nonsense,” in The Realistic Spirit, op. cit., 91.
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context of the sentence, and then smuggle it back into the nonsense utterance with its 
logical role fixed.  But words can only have meaning in the context of a well-formed 
sentence.
On the Frege-Wittgenstein view, if a sentence makes no sense,  no  part of it 
can be said to mean what it does in some other sentence which does make 
sense—any more than a word can be said to mean something in isolation. . . . 
In general, then, what the assignment of meaning to Logical Elements does is 
connect a sentence's being constructed out of these Elements in some definite 
way with its expressing some definite sense. . . . If I know the rules of the 
language, I know what a sentence composed in such-and-such a way out of 
such-and-such Elements says; but I do not know (there is no such thing as 
knowing) that what I see or hear is this Element, unless the whole of which it 
is part has a sense to which the meaning if this Element contributes in the way 
determined by the rules.203
Just as Benno Kerry misunderstood Frege's distinction between concept and object204 due 
to the failure to understand the logical role of the word within the context of the sentence, 
so too do the standard readers fall prey to the same error in advocating a compositional 
theory of nonsense.  In this sense, as Diamond puts it elsewhere, “[w]e are all Benno 
Kerrys through and through.”205
The second point, that nonsense cannot be part of a sentence with sense, is made 
by her explicitly in “Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.”206  
 . . . the Tractatus view is that, when you ascribe to someone the thought that 
p, you give what the person thinks by using a sentence you understand.  Your 
understanding of the person who talks sense is an understanding of what he or 
she says, an understanding that is the same thing as your capacity to use an 
intelligible  sentence  of  your  own  language  in  giving  the  context  of  that 
person's saying or thought . . . “Smith said that p” is itself nonsense unless 
what we put for “p” makes sense.207  
203 Ibid., 100-1
204 See above: Chapter 3, §4
205 Diamond, “Throwing Away the Ladder,” 184.
206 Cora  Diamond,  “Ethics,  Imagination  and  the  Method  of  Wittgenstein's  Tractatus”  in  The  New 
Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and Rupert Read (New York: Routledge, 2000), 149-173.
207 Ibid., 156.
126
While Diamond's discussion is tied here to belief  attribution, the point she is making 
underlies her theory of austere nonsense.  Not only is it the case that it is improper to 
speak about the logical role of nonsense phrases, but otherwise sensible sentences cannot 
contain pieces of nonsense.  The expression “Smith said p” will make no sense to us 
when what  is  substituted for  'p'  is  a  nonsense  utterance.   But  it  is  important  for  the 
resolute readers that nonsense can nevertheless play a psychological role.  As we shall see 
below, the resolute readers rely upon this as the purported function of the text.
There is textual support in the  Tractatus for Diamond's conception of nonsense. 
One of the most explicit pieces of textual evidence is that Wittgenstein tells us that “any 
possible proposition is legitimately constructed, and, if it has no sense, that can only be 
because we have failed to give a meaning to some of its constituents” (5.4733).208   It is 
important not to lose sight of the word “only” in this passage.  The resolute readers take 
this to indicate that there is only one type of nonsense, and it results from a failure to 
recognize the symbol in the sign, not from the result of taking two logically incompatible 
words  and trying  to  out  them together.   The  obvious  reason why this  is  the  case  is 
Wittgenstein's commitment to the context principle.  If a word is understood outside of 
the context of the proposition, there is no clear way to discern exactly what role it has. 
As  pointed  out  in  the  last  chapter,  this  is  a  reformulation  of  one  of  Frege's  three 
“fundamental principles” in the Introduction to the Foundations of Arithmetic, “[N]ever 
ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of the proposition.”209 
Confusions result (as they did with Benno Kerry) when one attempts to fix the logical 
208 Emphasis mine.
209 Gottlob Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980), x.
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role of a given word outside of the context of the proposition.  In fact, Frege is careful to 
point out that concept words can, at times, be used as object words; an example that 
Frege provides is “moon,” such as in the sentence “The moon is  bright tonight” and 
“Titan is a moon.”  In the former case it is being used as a object word, and the latter case 
as a concept word.  “We should not be deceived by the fact that language makes use of 
proper names . . . as concept words, and vice versa,” he tells us.  “This does not affect the 
distinction between the two.”210  To recognize the logical role of the word 'moon,' one 
must look to see how it is being used in the context of the sentence.  There is no set 
logical role of a word outside the context of its significant use in a sentence.  Thus it is 
not the case, for either Frege or for Wittgenstein, that there is a special type of nonsense 
generated by category errors; that is, when otherwise meaningful signs are put together in 
illicit ways.  Rather it is only when a sign has no clearly defined meaning that we arrive 
at nonsense.
Austere nonsense does not result from a violation of logical syntax, or similar 
category mistake—but rather when a symbol cannot be perceived in the sign or or group 
of signs that compose the proposition.  This is in harmony with what he says in 6.53: 
“The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except 
what  can  be  said  .  .  .  and  then,  whenever  someone  else  wanted  to  say  something 
metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs  
in his propositions.”211  Note that he would have needed to say “symbol,” not “sign,” if 
his intent was to allow category mistakes to be nonsense.  Failure to give meaning to a 
210 Ibid., 64.
211 Emphasis mine.
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symbol might exist for example in the case of ambiguity.  That is not what he means here. 
Rather, for Wittgenstein, there is no sense that underlies nonsense.
The resolute readers present a unique and powerful interpretation of the text.  But 
this conclusion does not come cheap.  Detractors have criticized them, as we shall see, for 
offering a reading not unlike Carnap's.  In collapsing the two categories, they argue, the 
New Wittgenstein interpretation collapses into the positivist interpretation.  In reaction to 
the positivist interpretation, the standard readers had taken a great deal that the positivists 
had  considered  nonsense,  and  instead  argued  that  they  were  merely  senseless.   The 
resolute readers seek to return these 'philosophically illuminating' insights and move them 
back to the realm of pure nonsense.  But in so doing, they out positivist the Positivists, if 
you will; they populate the category of pure nonsense with much more than the Vienna 
Circle had ever dreamed.  The entire book, on the resolute reading, is not intended to 
assert any positive philosophical doctrines whatsoever.  Rather, the entire book, as James 
Conant puts it, “forms a continuous train of nonsense.”212
§4 Not Chickening Out
The standard  reading,  as  outlined  in  the  last  chapter,  is  deeply troubled  by a 
seeming  contradiction.   Wittgenstein  explicitly  states  that  propositions  which  do  not 
model the world in a fact-stating way are not genuine propositions.  However this puts 
Wittgenstein in an unfortunate place, since a good deal of the text is spent talking about 
just  those  things  which,  by  Wittgenstein's  own  lights,  are  inexpressible.   Although 
212 James Conant, “The Methods of the Tractatus,” 223n85
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commentators attempt to downplay this contradiction, it is a necessary consequence of 
every interpretation which contends that Wittgenstein intends to show the ineffable, and 
thus cannot be overcome by the standard readings.  One is reminded here of Ramsey's 
quip, “[w]hat we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it either.”213  And likewise 
one  might  also  concur  with  Ramsey's  sentiment,  when  he  says  “we  must  then  take 
seriously that it is nonsense, and not pretend, as Wittgenstein does, that it is important 
nonsense!”214
One  clear  advantage  in  reading  the  text  in  accordance  with  the  resolute 
interpretation is that, by denying the distinction between the two types of nonsense, the 
resolute reading does not commit Wittgenstein to the inconsistency of needing to speak 
the  ineffable,  as  the  standard  reading  does.   If  the  Tractatus contains  no  positive 
philosophical  theses  and  therefore  does  not  contain  philosophical  insight,  then 
Wittgenstein was not in the uncomfortable position of needing to utter that which one 
cannot.  The text hints, gestures at, or communicates nothing.  On the resolute reading of 
the Tractatus, most of Wittgenstein's propositions in the text should be tossed away after 
they have been surmounted.  If they are right, most of the sentences in the text cannot be 
taken to express propositions, by his own standard.  
However, clearly one cannot take every remark in the text as nonsense, otherwise 
we would  be forced to  take  6.54 itself  also as  nonsense—and perhaps  be  led  to  the 
conclusion that none of it is nonsense.  To the resolute readers, the Tractatus contains two 
distinct  types  of  remarks,  which  operate  on  two  different  levels,  and  have  different 
213 F. P. Ramsey, “Law and Causality” in Philosophical Papers, ed. D. H. Mellor (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 146
214 F. P. Ramsey “Philosophy,” in Philosophical Papers, 1
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functions.  The upper level consists of a sort of 'instruction set' for how to read the book, 
which are referred to as “framing remarks.”  The Preface of the text and the closing 
propositions  (6.53  -  7)  are  usually  taken  to  be  framing  remarks,  as  also  are  certain 
remarks early within the fourth proposition—“in the precise middle of the book”—on the 
nature of philosophy.215   All the rest of the text which is not included in the set of framing 
remarks  is  on  a  'lower'  level,  and  the  resolute  readers  consider  these  remarks  to  be 
nothing but  gibberish,  just  plain nonsense.   It  is  these surface level  propositions that 
Wittgenstein is talking about in 6.54, which the reader must throw away after she has 
“climbed out  through them, on them, over  them.”   Since,  according to  the resolute 
readers, there is no 'philosophically illuminating' notion of nonsense, propositions thus 
either have sense, or they are just gibberish.  Thus Wittgenstein should be understood as 
intending all of his propositions, save the framing remarks, to be considered nonsense in 
the ordinary meaning of the term.   And even if there were such a category, as pointed out 
earlier,  the  German  text  at  6.54  reveals  that  he  meant  his  propositions  not  to  be 
considered  sinnloss,  but  rather  unsinnig—relegating  them  to  the  category  of  plain 
nonsense.   The  only remarks  which  Wittgenstein  actually  intends  to  endorse  are  the 
framing propositions.  All else—his supposed theory of propositions, of logic, of the Bild 
theory of meaning and his ontological opening remarks—all get tossed out as ladder is 
thrown away.  As Michael Kremer has recently explained it:
.  .  .  when we reach this pseudo-conclusion [6.54] we simply withdraw our 
assent to the idea that any of [the propositions of the  Tratatus] made sense. 
We declare it to be nonsense.  In so declaring we are not using 'nonsense' in 
some technical way whose meaning is defined by the “picture theory” [sic] or 
any other  theory.   We are  using the word “nonsense” in  a  pre-theoretical, 
215 Conant, “The Methods of the Tractatus,” 223n84
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common-sense  way.   We  are  simply  saying,  lo  and  behold,  none  of  this 
actually made any sense!216
However, this is not just nonsense for nonsense's sake; rather these nonsense propositions 
do have a function, according to the resolute reading:  to get one out of one's ordinary  
philosophical ways of thinking about logic and language.  They are intended to have a 
'therapeutic' goal, to rid one of philosophical confusions, which are represented by the 
supposed “doctrines” espoused in the text.   That is, although the nonsense remarks that 
comprise the Tractatus are not intended to have a logical or philosophical role, they can 
nonetheless have a psychological role in tempting one into a certain metaphysical views 
of the nature of language.  They tempt us into philosophizing in our traditional ways, lure 
us into waxing metaphysical, and creating theories which justify the use of language—in 
order  to  undermine  these  beliefs  in  the  end  as  one  finally  ascends  the  ladder. 
Wittgenstein's aim in the Tractatus is, as he will put it much later, “to teach you to pass 
from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense” (PI §464).  To 
read  the  Tractatus  without  chickening  out  then  is  to  understand  that,  just  as  the 
Philosophical Investigations should be read as a complexly ironic dialogue between a 
voice of philosophical temptation and the voice offering “therapy” for these ills—so too 
must the  Tractatus  also be read in this way.  In fact, according to the resolute readers, 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus anticipates the methodology of the later work.  
An advantage  of  the  resolute  reading  is  that  it  allows  for  greater  consistency 
throughout  Wittgenstein's  corpus.   The standard potted history of  analytic  philosophy 
often interprets Wittgenstein as having two discrete phases of philosophical development. 
216 Michael Kremer, “The Purpose of Tractarian Nonsense,” Noûs 35, no. 1 (2001): 42-3.
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In his early years, including up to the publication of the Tractatus, he was mostly inspired 
by Russellian  logical  atomism, and was a  type  of  reluctant  metaphysician.   After  he 
returned to philosophy in 1929, he gradually began changing his mind about the views 
expressed in the Tractatus, and started taking a quite different standpoint to analyze the 
philosophical  problems  of  language.   His  later  methodology,  exemplified  by  the 
Philosophical Investigations, is often considered to be a renunciation of his earlier work. 
Instead of espousing a view which ascribes the metaphysical conditions underlying logic 
and language, his later work shows the insufficiencies of this by renouncing philosophical 
theories about language.  Instead, the goal of his later philosophy is therapeutic, to rid us 
of  our  philosophical  confusions,  and the  urge  to  wax metaphysical.   Throughout  the 
Philosophical Investigations, he often likens philosophy to a type of “therapy” (PI §133) 
or “treatment” (PI §254), and refers to philosophical problems as a type of a “disease” (PI 
§593) or “an illness” (PI §255).  “There is not  a philosophical method,” he tells us at 
§133, “though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.”  If the resolute reading 
is correct, then Wittgenstein is consistent in his methodology and views on the nature of 
philosophy in both the  Tractatus and the  Philosophical Investigations.  Both share the 
same goal, of attempting to rid us of our confusions concerning logic and language.  And 
both  also  share  the  same  therapeutic  project,  just  offering  therapy  for  different 
philosophical diseases.
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§5 Imagination and Nonsense
What does it mean to read the  Tractatus resolutely?  This is a difficult question 
which has not yet been fully explained by any of its proponents.217  One of its largest 
difficulties  still  present  to  this  new  interpretation  is  understanding  how  the  putative 
passages of the text reinforce what they see as its aim.  Some have begun this project in 
piecemeal phases, but this research project is still currently being developed.
There are aspects of the resolute reading which initially appear to be implausible. 
For instance, how can we to say that the Tractatus is complete nonsense, if we seem to 
understand it in the process of reading?  After all, isn't the hallmark of nonsense that it 
should  not make  sense?   First,  it  is  important  to  note  that  nonsense  is  not  always 
transparently so.  It is vital to understand that even nonsense utterances can nonetheless 
appear  to  make  sense.   In  ordinary  language,  often  the  grammar  of  the  sentence 
obfuscates the emptiness of the thought contained in it; “So much so,” Wittgenstein tells 
us, “that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the 
thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the 
form of the body, but for entirely different purposes” (4.002).  In other words, natural 
language can still give the illusion of sense to sentences which really have none.  If that 
were not the case, then the philosophical nonsense of the theologian would have readily 
occurred to her  as such before the temptation to wax metaphysical  arises.   What  the 
Tractatus is trying to combat, according to the resolute reading, is what might be called 
the  “metaphysical  impulse”  of  philosophers.   This  impulse  might  take  many  forms, 
217 Conant has recently described the resolute reading not as so much a doctrine about how to read the 
text, but rather as a “research program,” yet to be finished.  See “Mild Mono-Wittgensteiniansim,” 
111n4
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including: the urge to theorize about the transcendent, or from a transcendental, God's eye 
perspective  on  reality—or  even,  as  John  McDowell  has  termed  it,  theorizing  about 
language, from a “sideways-on” perspective.218  Wittgenstein was attempting, throughout 
his career, to show us that this impulse is misguided, and that the use of language to 
express the insights is doomed to failure
But moreover, since according to Diamond nonsense can neither constitute nor be 
a part of an otherwise sensible sentence, one might wonder how the resolute readers can 
be  confident  in  talking  about,  much less  condemning,  nonsense.   If  a  given pseudo-
proposition 'p' is in fact nonsense, then to tell someone else “It is nonsense to say  p” 
should itself be nonsense.  This is because, as Diamond points out, nonsense cannot play 
a logical role in an otherwise sensible statement.  To do so would require that one to 
understand 'p' in the first place as nonsense—to understand, in a way, that this locution 
cannot be understood—which, of course, is not understanding it at all.  Diamond's theory 
of austere nonsense addresses this concern directly.  She points to another function of 
Tractarian  nonsense  that  is  relevant  here,  which  she  calls  the  'imaginative  activity' 
involved in taking nonsense for sense.
To want  to  understand the  person who talks  nonsense is  to  want  to  enter 
imaginatively the  taking  of  that  nonsense for  sense.   My point  is  that  the 
Tractatus, in its understanding of itself as addressed to those who are in the 
grip  of  philosophical  nonsense,  and  in  its  understanding  of  the  kind  of 
demands it makes on its readers, supposes a kind of imaginative activity, an 
exercise of the capacity to enter into the taking of nonsense for sense, of the 
capacity to share imaginatively the inclination to think that one is thinking 
something  in  it.   If  I  could  not  as  it  were  see  your  nonsense  as  sense, 
imaginatively let  myself  feel its attractiveness, I could not understand you. 
And that is the very peculiar use of imagination.219
218 John McDowell, Mind and World (New York: Harvard University Press), 34-5
219 Diamond, “Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus,” 157-8.
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The point is that, in trying to understand a nonsense locution, one can imaginatively enter 
into the game of taking that nonsense for sense.  It is readily apparent that this is the case. 
Consider Davidson's example of understanding Ms. Malaprop—interpreting the literally 
meaningless expression in the way the author intended to mean it;220 or, to use perhaps a 
more familiar example, interpreting what my cat might want when she squares up and 
gives me a hearty “meow.”  In each of these cases, one can imagine what the utterance 
might mean, and can understand the motivations that underly it, by giving content to the 
contentless claim.   
To  Diamond,  a  similar  phenomena  is  happening  in  the  Tractatus.   Although 
Wittgenstein  himself  never  himself  fell  into  this  metaphysical  “disease  of  the 
imagination,”221 Wittgenstein understood the temptations that might lead a philosopher to 
do so.  He meant for the reader of the text to enter imaginatively into the game of taking 
nonsense for sense, with the eventual goal of getting the reader to understand what might 
inspire one to philosophize about language in the traditional sense.   And each of the 
supposed “doctrines,” surveyed in the Tractatus—from the opening “ontological myth,” 
and the Bild theory of meaning, to the distinction between saying and showing—all are 
attempts  to  'lure  us  in'  to  the  nonsense,  to  make  us  feel  the  temptation  to  provide 
metaphysical conditions on which logic and language must rest; that is, until the ladder is 
pulled from under our feet at the close of the book.  In so doing, Wittgenstein is able to 
undermine  this  impulse  to  do  philosophy in  the  way it  has  traditionally  been  done, 
220 Donald Davidson, “Nice Derrangement of Epitaphs” in  Truth,  Language and History  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 89-107
221 Ibid., 160.
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eventually to bring one to the realization that this impulse is misguided.  This is perhaps 
why  Wittgenstein says in the opening of the preface that “this book will be understood 
only by someone who has already had the thoughts that are expressed in it.”  Or perhaps 
as  he  should  have  put  it:  someone  who  has  already had  the  temptation  towards  the 
pseudo-thoughts expressed in it.  That is, those who have felt the urge to philosophize in 
a manner consistent with the pseudo-doctrines in the text.  Additionally, he points to the 
subject matter of the book as showing “the reason why [the problems of philosophy] are 
posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood.”
In her infamous paper “Throwing Away the Ladder,” Cora Diamond discusses the 
stages that the reader psychologically undergoes in the process of passing “from a piece 
of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense” (PI §464).222  First, the reader 
attempts to make sense of a given locution in the text—for example, “'A' is an object”—
by imagining it is a significant proposition.  This would require imagining it as a bivalent 
proposition, and understanding the conditions under which such a pseudo-sentence might 
be considered either true or false.  That is, the reader begins by imagining “its truth and 
its  falsity  both to  be graspable.”223  As one enters into this  philosophical  stance,  one 
gradually comes to recognize it as illusory: “Wittgenstein's aim is to let us recognize [this 
perspective] to be only the illusion of a perspective.”224  Once one comes to realize why 
this does not make sense, we realize the error involved in this impulse.  This second 
phase shatters the illusion of sense into which we had previously imaginatively entered. 
As Diamond puts it:
222 Although Diamond does not describe these as discrete stages or number them as I do, I think it is 
easier to understand the import here by referring to them as such.
223 Diamond, “Throwing Away the Ladder,” 195.
224 Ibid., 196.
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When Wittgenstein says that we cannot say “There are objects,” he does not 
mean “There are, all right, only that there are has to get expressed in another 
way.”  That the sentence means nothing at all and is not illegitimate for any 
other reason, we do not see.  We are so convinced that we understand what we 
are trying to say that we see only the two possibilities: it is sayable, it is not 
sayable.  But Wittgenstein's aim is to allow us to see that there is no 'it.' 225 
Finally,  as  the  ladder  is  tossed,  we  come  to  realize  that  there  is  no  thought  which 
corresponds to these supposed sentences, that instead they are just plain nonsense.  
Warren  Goldfarb  has  given  a  few  specific  examples  of  such  “transitional 
vocabulary” in the Tractatus.   In the opening stanzas, for instance, Wittgenstein “helps 
himself to talk of possible situations.”226  However for Goldfarb, this talk of possibilities 
of objects combining in states of affairs is not ontological, “[f]or this would make the 
obtaining  of  a  state  of  affairs  a  property  of  the  combination  of  objects,  whereas 
Wittgenstein is explicit that the combining of objects is the obtaining of a state of affairs. 
Wittgenstein's talk of possible states of affairs in the 2's is simply inconsistent with the 
conception of the fact that he is adumbrating.  I would suggest this is intentional.”227
Goldfarb thinks that Wittgenstein was well aware of the difficulties in taking these 
possibilities as ontological possibilities of objects.  It is instead a “transitional mode . . . it 
dissolves from the inside, so to speak.”  When we reach 5.525, “The certainty, possibility, 
or impossibility of a situation is not expressed by a proposition, but by  . . . a proposition 
with a sense,” we come to realize this transitional mode of speaking.  “So we see what 
the  transitional  vocabulary  was  meant  to  lead  us  to:  an  appreciation  that  our 
understanding of possibility is not ontologically based in some realm of the possible, but 
225 Ibid., 197-8.
226 Warren Goldfarb, “Metaphysics and Nonsense: On Cora Diamond's  The Realistic Spirit” Journal of 
Philosophical Research 23 (1997): 65.
227 Ibid., 65.
138
arises from our understanding of and our operating with the sensible sentences of our 
language.”228  On Goldfarb's example, this means that one throws away the talk of the 
combinatorial possibilities of objects.  Likewise later, this “conception of fact” which was 
the reason for the dismissal of the former pseudo-doctrine, is itself also overcome.
As  the  reader  progresses  in  the  text,  and  certain  supposed  “doctrines”  get 
surmounted,  she comes to realize that the rungs that have lead her to this  point have 
spontaneously  disintegrated.   The  resolute  reading  thus  understands  the  book  as  a 
complex dialectic,  where previous rungs of the ladder  must  be overcome,  due to  the 
insights  reached in  later  phases.229  But  unlike a  Hegelian dialectic,  there  is  no final 
synthesis—one is left at the end holding on to nothing.  When one reaches, for example, 
the picture theory, one overcomes what McGuinness calls the “ontological myth”230 in the 
opening stanzas; likewise, when one surmounts to the 3's, one realizes that all of this talk 
of modeling was all a way of talking about the way propositions are understood, etc. 
Finally  when one  reaches  the  closing  remarks,  one  has  surmounted  all  of  the  rungs. 
There is no way to go 'higher,' one must then throw away the ladder, having realized that 
all of the propositions are literally nonsense—but hopefully the reader is better off for the 
journey itself.  
In  this  way,  the  resolute  reading  thus  brings  Wittgenstein's  method  in  the 
Tractatus close to that of Kierkegaard,231 specifically in regard to what he calls “indirect 
228 Ibid., 66.
229 A complete interpretation of  the text  in this  dialectical  fashion has been put  forward in Matthew 
Ostrow,  Wittgenstein's  Tractatus:  A  Dialectical  Interpretation  (New  York:  Cambridge  University 
Press, 2002).
230 See “The So-Called Realism of the Tractatus,” op. cit. McGuinness is not himself a realist reader, but 
the anti-realist picture he puts forth of Wittgenstein's account of language in the Tractatus shares some 
basic features with the resolute readers.
231 The comparison  between Wittgenstein  and  Kierkegaard  was  made respectable  by Stanley Cavell, 
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communication.”232  In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as well as several of the 
other pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard does not seek to express his doctrines directly, 
but rather communicates them  indirectly.  In the  Postscript, for example, the “author” 
Johannes Climacus describes the opposition between the truths of Christian ethics which 
are by their  very nature “subjective” truths and defy rational expression; these are in 
opposition with doctrinal  teachings,  which can be communicated directly.   The overt 
assumption of the work is that the two are fundamentally different, and that the truths of 
Christianity are misunderstood if  they are expressed directly.   At the end of the text, 
Kierkegaard breaks his pseudonymity, declaring himself to have been the author all along
—remaining  faithful  to  the  point  that  the  content  of  the  work  cannot  be  directly 
communicated.   In so doing, Conant thinks, Kierkegaard undercuts the distinction which 
was operative in the rest of the text.  “My pseudonymity or polynymity has not had a 
causal ground in my person,” he tells us, “but it has an essential ground in the character 
of the production.”233  He continues:
So in the pseudonymous works there was not a single word which is mine, I 
have no opinion about these works except as a third person, no knowledge of 
their meaning except as a reader, not the remotest relation to them, since such 
a thing is impossible in the case of doubly reflected communication.234
specifically in  relation to  the  Philosophical  Investigations.   James  Conant,  in  a  series  of  articles 
developing  the  resolute  reading,  has  used  similarities  between  Wittgenstein's  Tractatus  and 
Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript as sharing a common method.  See Stanley Cavell, 
“Existentialism and Analytical Philosophy” in  Themes Out of School: Effects and Causes  (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 195-234; James Conant, “Must We Show What We Cannot Say?” 
in  The Senses of Stanley Cavell ed. Richard Fleming and Michael Payne (Lewisberg, PA: Bucknell 
University  Press,  1989),  242-283;  James  Conant,  “Kierkegaard,  Wittgenstein  and  Nonsense”  in 
Pursuits of Reason : Essays in Honor of Stanley Cavell ed. Ted Cohen, Paul Guyer and Hilary Putnam 
(Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 1992), 195-224.
232 This is perhaps why many of its detractors prefer to describe it polemically as the “postmodern” or 
“deconstructive” reading.
233 Soren Kierkegaard,  Concluding Unscientific Postscript  trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941), 551.
234 Ibid., 551.
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Although Kierkegaard does not openly declare his work is nonsense, the closing stanzas 
reveal to us, just as with Wittgenstein, that he denies the truth of his own “doctrines” in 
the text.  At the end, we take away the lessons from the work, which were not literally 
what  was  written  by  its  'author.'   So  too  in  Wittgenstein's  text,  the  resolute  readers 
believe,  by gradually  coming  to  terms  with  the  book as  nonsense,  we withdraw our 
consent from the initial impulse to take his nonsense remarks as having content.  At the 
end, we are left with just this: the understanding that such a locution is nonsense.  We 
understand that that the 'doctrines' in the text are nonsense, and in throwing them away, 
hopefully we will forebear from waxing metaphysical in the ways described henceforth. 
As it turns out, the resolute reading shares with the positivist reading an opposition to 
metaphysics, but for very different reasons.
§6 Criticisms of the Resolute Reading I 
The resolute reading has come under severe criticism from commentators such as 
Peter Hacker, H. O. Mounce, Ian Proops, Peter Sullivan and John Koethe.  Each of them 
has put forth different criticisms, but as I see it, they can roughly be divided into two 
main charges.  First, they object that the resolute reading fails to accurately take account 
of the Tractatus textually.  This includes not only the question of how the resolute readers 
are to account for some of the more troubling parts of the text; but also, what to do with 
what seem to be the most prominent doctrines in the text, such as the  Bild  theory of 
meaning and the distinction between saying and showing.  This is the question of internal 
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consistency.  Secondly, they charge that the resolute reading cannot accurately account 
for the changes that takes place in Wittgenstein's “turn” from the early philosophy to the 
later philosophy.  In this section I will address the first criticism.  The second will be my 
concern in the next section.
One might identify a bit of sophistry in the argument put forth by Diamond and 
Conant, which critics have not resisted exploiting.  In taking 6.54 as the locus of their 
analysis, one gets the the feeling that the resolute readers are holding on to this remark so 
tight, that they let the rest of the text slip through their fingers.  Peter Hacker points to 
“the spareness of evidence they muster” to support their interpretation.235  But for the 
resolute  reading  to  be  successful,  it  need  not  only  be  interesting  and  interpretively 
advantageous to read the text this way, but also accurate to the text itself.  Critics of the 
resolute reading argue that they fail on this count.
Peter Hacker's “dissenting opinion” in  The New Wittgenstein  collection, entitled 
“Was He Trying to Whistle It?,” is one of the earliest and most comprehensive criticisms 
of  the resolute  reading.   Throughout  he points  to  several  methodological  and textual 
problems, for which the resolute reading has not yet accounted.  His argument is largely 
polemical, and he resorts sometimes to just making fun of the positions of the resolute 
readers.  But one of his more cogent charges is that Diamond and Conant seem to be 
methodologically inconsistent, in that they seem to want to use evidence from the text to 
support their reading which, according to them, should be considered nonsense.  Hacker 
remarks that “Wittgenstein did not say, in  Tractatus 6.54, 'My propositions elucidate in 
the  following  way:  anyone  who  understands  me  eventually  recognizes  them  as 
235 Hacker, “Was He Trying to Whistle It?” in The New Wittgenstein, op. cit., p. 360.
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nonsensical—except for propositions 4.126-4.1272'!”236  In effect, Hacker thinks that in 
attempting to save Wittgenstein from the charge of performative contradiction, they end 
up allowing for  the same thing in  the end—since the resolute  readers still  have him 
speaking about what constitutes nonsense.  I think Hacker here misses the point.  First, 
the resolute readers do not use the term 'nonsense' in the pejorative way, the way that 
Hacker seems to take it.   Secondly,  he seems to overlook the distinction between the 
framing remarks and the rungs of the ladder.  The resolute readers do exempt a handful of 
remarks in the 4's as constituting part of the frame.237  The remarks which, according to 
Wittgenstein's  own philosophy contain  “formal  concepts,”  do not  show us  something 
deep  about  their  nonsense,  which  Hacker  readily  admits.   But  in  these  passages, 
Wittgenstein here is talking about remarks using these formal pseudo-terms, revealing 
that  sentences  which  employ  them  are  nonsense.   That  Wittgenstein  can  mention 
sentences containing formal concepts as nonsense without  using them, is a hair which 
Hacker does not wish to split.
Another critic of the resolute reading is H. O. Mounce, who has published his 
criticisms  in  his  review of  The New Wittgenstein  collection.238   Mounce's  refusal  to 
accept the resolute reading centers upon his refusal to downplay the distinction between 
saying and showing—not only in the Tractatus, but also its role in the later philosophy of 
Wittgenstein.239   He even goes so far as to attack Hacker's paper in the collection, which 
itself is critical of the resolute reading itself, saying that his disagreement is “not so great 
236 Ibid., 362.
237 This will lead to another textual problem, addressed below.
238 H. O. Mounce, “Critical  Notice of  The New Wittgenstein,” in  Philosophical  Investigations 24 (2): 
185-192
239 Ibid., p. 191.
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as  one  might  have  supposed”  on  the  import  of  the  distinction  between  saying  and 
showing.   He  offers  two  main  lines  of  criticism:  first,  that  the  resolute  reading  of 
Wittgenstein is “indistinguishable from positivism;”240  and secondly,  that the resolute 
readers ignore the historical influences that lead to specific things contained in the text. 
To the second charge, Mounce provides Schopenhauer as an example, whose “influence 
on Wittgenstein is entirely neglected” by the resolute readers.  He points to the discussion 
of solipsism in the 6's as an example of the influence of Schopenhauer on the Tractatus.   
Mounce thus claims that an inappropriately anti-historical view of the Tractatus'  
development leads the resolute readers to easily dismiss the doctrines in the text out of 
hand.  I will deal with this objection more fully in the next section, but in brief one might 
point  to  the  fact  that  the  passages  on  solipsism  may  still  have  been  influenced  by 
Schopenhauer, without Wittgenstein simply reiterating Schopenhauer's philosophy in the 
Tractatus.  The argument can be made that, although Schopenhauer was the inspiration to 
some of the supposed doctrines of the text, that the goal of the Tractatus is to show the 
misguided nature of his philosophical predecessor.  If Wittgenstein is not understood as 
attempting to communicate doctrines, then this objection has no teeth.  And in fact, this 
seems to square better with Wittgenstein's pronouncement that he has sought “the final 
solution” to the philosophical problems plaguing the tradition.  It is only because Mounce 
believes  that  Wittgenstein  is  endorsing  these  passages  that  this  problem  surfaces. 
Moreover,  it  is  false  that  the  resolute  readers  ignore  the  historical  influences  on 
Wittgenstein.  They, perhaps more than any other group of commentators, seek to show 
240 Ibid., p. 187.
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the continuity of the Tractatus  with certain other thinkers in the tradition, most notably 
with Frege.
The  first  charge  of  Mounce's—that  the  resolute  reading  lapses  back  into  the 
positivist interpretation of Wittgenstein—can also be shown to rest  upon a confusion. 
The first chapter of this essay, I laid out in great detail some of the problems that follow 
from too hastily reading the  Tractatus  in harmony with the philosophy of the Vienna 
Circle.  The standard reading itself was developed as a response to the defects of the 
positivist reading.  So, one might think, if the resolute reading of the Tractatus seeks to 
deny  the  distinction  between  senselessness  and  nonsense,  which  was  central  to  the 
objections against the positivist interpretation, doesn't this mean that the resolute readers 
are just lapsing back to positivism?  What Mounce misses is one of the characteristic 
features of the resolute reading, the denial of the distinction between austere nonsense 
and  substantial  nonsense.   As  was  pointed  out  above,  the  resolute  readers  deny the 
doctrine of “illuminating nonsense” which results from a cross-category clash between 
logical items.  Mounce seems to ignore the fact that the positivists themselves endorsed 
the substantial conception of nonsense—which is, in fact, central to Carnap's critique of 
Heidegger  in  “Elimination  of  Metaphysics.”   Carnap  there  describes  two  ways  that 
nonsense arises—the first is using a term in an otherwise sensible context, when the term 
has  no  meaning.   The  second  way  he  describes  are  sentences  which  “consist  of 
meaningful  words,  but  the  words  are  put  together  in  such  a  way  that  no  meaning 
results.”241  The latter  is  what the resolute  readers would call  a  substantive theory of 
241 Carnap, “Elimination of Metaphysics,” 67.
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nonsense since, according to the austere theory of nonsense, there are no such things as 
meaningful words used syntactically in a way that does not constitute meaning.  
The common charge that Hacker and Mounce both articulate is that the resolute 
readers fail to understand the significance of the distinction between saying and showing. 
Hacker points to the fact that early versions of the distinction, which appear as early as 
1913-1914, are present in the last section of “Notes on Logic” and in the “Notes Dictated 
to Moore.”242  Likewise recall that in a 1919 letter to Russell, Wittgenstein says: “I'm 
afraid you haven't got a hold of my main contention, to which the whole business of 
logical  prop[osition]s is only corollary.   The main point is the theory of what can be 
expressed by prop[ositon]s—i.e.,  by language .  .  .  and what can not be expressed by 
prop[osition]s, but only shown; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy” 
(WC 98).
Michael  Kremer has  proposed a  solution to  this  problem.243  He points  to the 
Preface of the text, where Wittgenstein tells us that “[t]he book deals with the problems 
of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that 
the logic of our language is misunderstood.”  Later he tells us that he has “found, on all 
essential points, the final solution to these problems.”  If the distinction between saying 
and showing is in fact a “problem of philosophy,” then it follows that the goal of the 
Tractatus is to solve it, and to show how it follows from a misunderstanding of “the logic 
of our language.”  If  it is, as Wittgenstein says, the “cardinal” problem of  philosophy, 
then Kremer thinks that “we will find the key to the resolution of all the problems of 
242 See Hacker, “Was He Tryiung to Whistle It?,” 371-2
243 Kremer, “The Purpose of Tractarian Nonsense,” 64.
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philosophy in its dissolution.”244  If Kremer is right, then the distinction between saying 
and showing is  one  of  the  main  problems to  be  overcome in  the  text—not  its  main 
insight.
But there is another set of textual problems with regard to the status of the so-
called  “framing  remarks.”   Recall  that  the  resolute  reading  prescribes  a  distinction 
between the rungs of the ladder, which are thrown away at the conclusion of the text, and 
the framing remarks which are the only things to be understood literally in the text.  The 
“framing remarks” are often taken to include the Preface and closing comments 6.53-7, 
and as well as certain passages in the early 4's.   First, nearly all resolute readers include 
the  Preface  of  the  text  in  the  framing  remarks.  However,  one  might  point  to 
Wittgenstein's  claim  in  the  Preface  of  the  book  that  “the  truth of  the  thoughts 
communicated  here  seems to  me  to  be unassailable  and definitive.”245  According  to 
Conant and Diamond, the Preface is part of the 'frame' and this should be taken literally, 
which is inconsistent with the claim that Wittgenstein did not intend any philosophical 
theses.  However,  this  might  still  possibly  be  answerable.   Michael  Kremer  has 
interpreted this remark to refer to the framing propositions themselves.246  But this does 
not answer some of the other puzzling passages which are considered part of the frame. 
For example, 4.11-4.116 are also considered to be framing remarks, but one might point 
to  4.115  as  an  appearance  of  the  distinction  between  saying  and  showing  in  these 
remarks.  Here he tells us that philosophy “will signify what cannot be said, by presenting 
clearly what can be said.”  As Hacker points out, “It seems implausible to suppose that 
244 Ibid., 64.
245 TLP p. 29. Emphasis in original.
246 Kremer, “The Purpose of Tractarian Nonsense”
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this is a sudden intrusion of irony into an otherwise serious sequence of remarks.”247  Or 
likewise,  if the concluding remarks are part of the frame, one wonders how to interpret 
6.522, which reads: “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make 
themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.”  After all, the supposed mysticism of the 
Tractatus is one of the main misunderstandings that the resolute readers seek to combat.
Not only do resolute readers need to explain  how the supposed doctrines of the 
text appear in the framing remarks, but likewise they need to explain  why some of the 
text is  not  considered part  of the frame which probably should be.  David Stern has 
pointed out certain remarks which the resolute readers rely upon for their interpretation, 
“such as those passages that set out the conception of sense and nonsense that Diamond 
considers  its  central  contribution.”   Two  examples  that  he  provides  are  3.3,  the 
reformulation of Frege's context principle, and 5.473-33, which the resolute readers rely 
upon to argue that Wittgenstein only admitted an austere conception of nonsense.  Neither 
these passages are generally contained in the frame by these commentators.
Lastly,  the  resolute  readers  are  not  consistent  about  exactly  which  remarks 
constitute the frame of the work, and which are to be thrown away as nonsense pseudo-
propositions.  They provide no consistent criteria for distinguishing between the two; and 
in  fact,  James  Conant  seems  to  have  changed  his  mind  several  times  about  which 
propositions are to be included in the frame of the book.  In some early papers Conant is 
more extreme, saying that “the propositions of the entire work are to be thrown away,”248 
but later he adopts Diamond's view that the Preface and the Conclusion are part of the 
247 Hacker, “Was He Trying to Whistle It?,” 370.
248 Conant, “Must We Show What We Cannot Say?,”  274
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frame,  and  all  else  is  to  be  thrown  away.   Still  more  recently,  Conant  has  denied 
specifying  that  location  in  the  work  determines  the  frame,  but  has  said  that  “[w]hat 
determines whether a remark belongs to the frame of the work . . . [is] its role within the 
work.  [It is not] simply a function of where in the work it occurs (say, a the beginning or 
the end of the book).   Rather,  it  is  a  function of how it  occurs.”249  He instead now 
specifies that “It will depend on the kind of sense a reader of the text will (be tempted to) 
make of it.”250  Given Conant's  recent  perspectival  understanding of  the text  and the 
nonspecific  type  of  therapy  that  it  purports  to  provide,  there  resolute  readers  put 
themselves in a position of being unable to criticize modified or weakened versions of the 
resolute reading, which might allow for example a different set of remarks constituting 
the frame than they intend—including perhaps even the distinction between saying and 
showing.  And in fact, some standard readers have recently put forth interpretations just 
like  this,  which  adopt  an  austere  conception  of  nonsense,  while  at  the  same  time 
preserving the doctrine of showing.251
§7 Criticisms of the Resolute Reading II
As the resolute reading has it, the methodology of the Tractatus is identical to that 
of the Philosophical Investigations.  That is, Wittgenstein sought to resist the urge to put 
forth theories about logic and language, but rather was aiming to provide therapy to cure 
249 Conant, “The Method of the Tractuatus,” 457-8n135
250 Ibid.
251 Marie McGinn,  Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Logic and Language 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, “The Good Sense of Nonsense: 
-A Reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus as Nonself-repudiating” Philosophy 82 , no 1 (2007): 147-77.
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us of this  disease.   However,  it  seems at  best  a  little  convenient,  and at  worst  flatly 
anachronistic, to apply his later methodology as an interpretive strategy for understanding 
the Tractatus, as James Conant has self-consciously pointed out.252  A conclusive answer 
to the question of how to divide Wittgenstein's corpus is still a topic of debate amongst 
scholars;  but many—myself included—have been under the impression that the sharp 
division, which the potted history of Wittgenstein's “two philosophies” implies, warps the 
understanding of the philosophy on both sides of this false dichotomy.  For one thing, this 
understanding  of  Wittgenstein's  corpus,  which  sharply  divides  the  Tractatus and  the 
Investigations,  does  not  take  proper  account  of  Wittgenstein's  'middle  phase'—the 
transitionary period between 1929 and 1945.  Further, amongst the commentators who 
take Wittgenstein to  have an early and later  philosophy,  it  remains  an open question 
where exactly to draw the line; some place it as early as “Some Remarks on Logical 
Form,” or as late as the “Big Typescript.”253  Just  as with Frege and Heidegger,  two 
thinkers who too often are interpreted in this bipolar model,  Wittgenstein's constantly 
evolving thought-process is too nuanced to split into neat chunks.  Thus there is reason to 
doubt  the  “two  Wittgensteins”  story  of  a  clean  separation  of  his  early  and  later 
philosophy. 
However,  at  the  same  time,  one  cannot  help  but  be  struck  by the  seemingly 
irreconcilable differences between these two texts.  After all, in the Tractatus he spends a 
great  deal  of  time  talking  about  things  like  logical  analysis,  and  these  themes  are 
252 See Conant, “Must We Show What We Cannot Say?” op. cit., 246.
253 For an excellent discussion of many of the debates between these commentators see David Stern, 
“How Many Wittgensteins?” in  Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works  ed. Alois Pichler and 
Simo
Säätelä (Frankfort: Verlag, 2006), 205-229.
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conspicuously absent from the  Philosophical Investigations.  Amongst other things, his 
later work is directly critical of this tendency “to sublime the logic of our language,” 
which often is taken to be the project of the Tractatus  (PI §38).  Thus not only do the two 
texts seems to be irreconcilable on their face, but many critics of the resolute reading 
point to several places in the  Investigations where his analysis is directly critical of his 
early work.   
 What  evidence  is  there  to  substantiate  the  resolute  readers'  claim  that  the 
Tractatus operates with a therapeutic methodology?  One of the most prominent places 
such evidence exists is in 6.54, as discussed above.  When one is careful to distinguish 
between the framing remarks and the rungs of the ladder, one will not be so easily led 
into the temptation to read Wittgenstein as endorsing the supposed doctrines of the text 
and to view that Wittgenstein's later work at odds with his earlier work.  Likewise, in the 
Preface to the  Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein seems to explicitly downplay 
the differences between the two texts.  He mentions that he would have liked to “publish 
those old thoughts [of the  Tractatus] and the new ones [of the  Investigations] together: 
that  the  latter  could  be  seen  in  the  right  light  only by contrast  with  and against  the 
background of my old way of thinking.”  It is clear from the last phrase “my old way of 
thinking” that the two methodologies are not identical, but certainly he does not seem to 
be saying here, as it is commonly thought, that his earlier philosophy is irreconcilable 
with his later thought.  As Anscombe reports, “Wittgenstein used to say that the Tractatus 
was not all wrong: it was not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock 
that  did  not  tell  the  right  time.”254  To  keep  with  the  analogy,  perhaps  some minor 
254 Anscombe, Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 78.
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adjustments to the gears are necessary; but that does not mean that the clock must be 
thrown away. 
However, there are other problems in the attempt to connect the early and later 
philosophy.   How is  it  then,  one  might  wonder,  that  in  so many places  Wittgenstein 
corrected or criticized things that he had said in the Tractatus, if he actually intended to 
hold no philosophical positions in the text?  One reason perhaps to deny the resolute 
reading's claim that Wittgenstein intended to put forth no genuine philosophical theories 
in the text, is the wealth of self-corrections made of his earlier position—not only in his 
notes and lectures in the 1930's, but also in the Philosophical Investigations itself.  For 
example, consider his reductio ad absurdum argument in the Tractatus for the existence 
of logically simple objects (2.021-2.0212).  This is directly contrary to his analysis in PI 
§46-64, where he rejects the idea that language can be reduced to simple parts.  Here he 
tells us, “[t]o the philosophical question: 'Is the visual image of this tree composite, and 
what are its component parts?' the correct answer is 'That depends upon what you mean 
by “composite.”'  (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question.)” 
(PI §47). Consider, also, the following lengthy passage from Philosophical Grammar:
The idea of constructing elementary propositions (as e.g. Carnap has 
tried to do) rests on a false notion of logical analysis. It is not the task of that 
analysis  to  discover  a  theory of  elementary  propositions,  like  discovering 
principles  of  mechanics.
My  notion  in  the  Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus was  wrong:  1) 
because  I  wasn't  clear  about  the  sense  of  the  words  "a  logical  product  is 
hidden in a sentence" (and suchlike),  2) because I  too thought that  logical 
analysis  had  to  bring  to  light  what  was  hidden (as  chemical  and  physical 
analysis does) . . . If you want to use the appellation "elementary proposition" 
as I did in the  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and as Russell used "atomic 
proposition",  you  may  call  the  sentence  "Here  there  is  a  red  rose"  an 
elementary proposition. . . . Formerly, I myself spoke of a 'complete analysis', 
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and I used to believe that philosophy had to give a definitive dissection of 
propositions  so  as  to  set  out  clearly  all  their  connections  and  remove  all 
possibilities of misunderstanding. I spoke as if there was a calculus in which 
such a dissection would be possible. I vaguely had in mind something like the 
definition that Russell had given for the definite article, and I used to think 
that in a similar way one would be able to use visual impressions etc. to define 
the concept  say of a  sphere,  and thus exhibit  once for  all  the connections 
between the concepts and lay bare the source of all misunderstandings, etc. At 
the  root  of  all  this  there  was  a  false  and  idealized  picture  of  the  use  of 
language (PG 210-11).
Throughout  this  passage,  Wittgenstein  seems  clearly  to  be  criticizing  genuine  views 
concerning logical analysis  that he held in the Tractatus.  Not only does he refer to  his 
“notions,”  and  what  he  “formerly  believed,”  but  also  his  “theory of  elementary 
propositions,”  which  he  claims  was  mistaken.   And this  is  by no  means  an  isolated 
example.  On the next page he discusses the Bild theory of meaning, where the notion of 
“agreement of form” is an “error” (PG 212).
Likewise, one can easily find places in his later published work where he seeks to 
correct other such errors, again which seems to indicate that  PI §28 where, in criticizing 
“what  logicians  have  said  about  the  structure  of  language,”  he  parenthetically  notes 
“[i]ncluding the author of the  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.”  It might be objected, 
perhaps, that the cold, third person reference might indicate that he was resisting taking 
authorship of the doctrines expressed therein.  But there are other places in his later work 
which are inconsistent with this defense.  For instance at PI §46, at the beginning of his 
discussion on simples and composites—which is often taken to be an attempted refutation 
of  his  Tractarian  position—he  gives  the  examples  of  “Russell's  'individuals'  and  my 
'objects'” as “such primary elements.”  The first person pronoun is used, unlike the earlier 
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passage, which seems to be a clear sign of self-attribution.  So was Wittgenstein being 
merely poetic in the first quote and did he in fact endorse his early thought, or was he 
merely being sloppy in the second?  
A  more  prominent  mention  is  made  in  the  Preface  to  the  Philosophical  
Investigations, where he says that the Investigations “could be seen in the right light only 
by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.”255  Additionally, 
he continues: “since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again . . . I have been 
forced  to  recognize  grave  mistakes  in  what  I  wrote  in  that  first  book [viz.,  the 
Tractatus].”256   Again, in each case, he does seem to be rejecting the views laid out in the 
Tractatus—which, of course, implies that there  were views that he did hold in the text.  
Each of  these  quotations  on its  own seems to  indicate  that  Wittgenstein  was  in  fact 
putting forth specific views in the Tractatus, which he later sought to amend; and when 
taken together, it is difficult to contend otherwise.
These passages certainly seem damning.  However the proponent of the resolute 
reading might charge that using evidence from this late in Wittgenstein's career might be 
troublesome.  For in the first place,  with the exception of the quotes above from the 
Philosophical Investigations, most of the evidence is taken from notes of lectures and 
draft manuscripts, none of which were edited for publication.  It might be the case that 
Wittgenstein was using shorthand by talking about “his” views.  Secondly, and I think 
more  convincingly,  Conant  argues  that  using  such  evidence  is  methodologically 
troubling: 
255 Emphasis mine.
256 Emphasis mine.
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[M]any  of  [the  critics  of  the  resolute  reading]  look  to  evidence  in 
Wittgenstein's  later  writings  to  bolster  their  case  against  the  approach that 
resolute readers take to the early work.  This is fair play, of course, if  the 
proper  interpretation  of  the  evidence  and  its  bearing  on  the  debate  is 
reasonably clear.   If,  however,  putative refutations  of the resolute  readings 
proceed in part by looking to passages in Wittgenstein's later writings . . . [by] 
simply  proposing  their  preferred  understanding  of  the  later  philosophy 
(reading it in ways that it is open to resolute interpreters to contend rests upon 
a misunderstanding related to the original question under consideration), then 
such  a  procedure  of  refutation  runs  a  serious  risk  of  begging  the  original 
question.257
The reason for this is that, as Conant sees it, such critics are “drawn to view the Tractatus 
through the lens of the Investigations.”258  That is, one presumes that Wittgenstein's early 
and later philosophy are irreconcilable because the philosophical intent of later work is to 
criticize the Tractatus—which is itself only possible if read in the light that the two are 
irreconcilable.
§8 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I have surveyed the evidence for and against the resolute 
reading.  It is still unclear how history will adjudicate upon this understanding of the 
Tractatus—whether it will gain more traction and become the dominant reading of the 
text, or succumb to the objections put forth by its critics.  But just as with the previous 
interpretations of the text, it is contextually situated within a given historical period.  It is 
to the analysis of each interpretation, and the reasons for their emergence that I shall now 
turn in my concluding chapter.
257 Conant, “Mild Mono-Wittgensteinianism,” p. 35-6
258 Ibid., p. 82
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Concluding Thoughts 
§1 Three Wittgensteins Revisited
In the past three chapters, I have presented the three major interpretations of the 
Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus  since its initial publication in 1921.  The standard and 
the positivist readings, each in their own time, were widely accepted as the  definitive 
interpretation of the text; and each, in turn, has been shown to create its own distinctive 
problems—whether internally consistent with itself, or externally consistent with the text. 
The Positivist interpretation was the commonly accepted interpretation in the 1930's and 
1940's.  The Vienna Circle understood Wittgenstein's text as a plea to put philosophy on 
the  secure  path  of  science,  and  to  resist  the  urge  to  wax  metaphysical  when 
philosophizing.  This interpretation is largely rejected today, primarily due to its inability 
to  take  a  properly contextual  view of  Wittgenstein's  thought.   Instead,  they read  the 
Tractatus primarily through the lens of the logical and epistemic views of Russell, which 
gave  them  a  skewed  perspective  on  the  text,  as  I  have  shown  in  Chapter  2.   The 
positivists,  themselves  influenced  by  the  phenomenalism  of  Mach  and  Schlick, 
mistakenly assumed  that  Wittgenstein's  views  were  identical  to  their  own—even,  for 
example, when Wittgenstein was careful enough not to formulate any epistemic views. 
As a consequence of this confusion, they ended up reading Wittgenstein as a reductive 
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empiricist, which in turn led them to interpret Wittgenstein's “elementary propositions” as 
simple  sense-data  statements.   Also  due  to  their  misunderstandings  concerning 
Wittgenstein's supposed epistemology and the “verification” that seemed to be implied by 
the  Bild theory  of  meaning,  they  were  likewise  unreceptive  to  the  lesson  of  the 
“conclusion”  of  Wittgenstein's  text—from 6.4  onwards.   And  as  a  consequence,  the 
Vienna Circle ultimately ended up downplaying the role of ethics and metaphysics in the 
Tractatus.
The standard reading reacted to the inappropriately non-contextual reading of the 
Positivists  by  following  what  might  be  described  as  a  'hyper-contextual'  path,  re-
interpreting the text based on evidence mined from posthumously published manuscripts, 
letters and memoirs of friends and colleagues.  The standard readers realized the defect of 
the positivist reading, especially in regard to the role of ethics and metaphysics.  Instead 
of relying on the nature of the proposition as the central thesis in the text, they rely upon 
the distinction between saying and showing in order to highlight the ethical, aesthetic and 
existential  aspects  of  Wittgenstein's  thought.   That  which  was  most  important  to 
Wittgenstein, they argue, is precisely that about which he needed to remain silent in the 
text.  The Tractatus is, in this sense, a preparation for the reader to somehow grasp these 
insights which surpass the ability to be articulated, when she has finished surmounting 
the ladder.  But this new generation of Wittgenstein scholars, mostly students and friends 
who were largely influenced by his  later  philosophy,  ended up reading  the  Tractatus 
against the later work.  According to them, the Wittgenstein of the  Tractatus  was too 
locked up in Russell's atomism and the methods of extensional logic to see the organic 
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character of language—and it is exactly this which he later came to understand in the 
1930's and 40's.   As a consequence the standard readers, captivated by the picture of 
language put forth in the latter work, interpreted the  Tractatus in stark contrast to the 
Philosophical  Investigations.   This  has  lead  the Tractatus  largely  being  ignored  by 
commentators as philosophically dated or irrelevant–except, of course, as it relates to the 
later philosophy.  The standard reading, however, is neither consistent with the text nor 
with itself.  It opens itself up to perhaps the most common objection to Wittgenstein's 
“position” in Tractatus—that Wittgenstein does needed to speak about that, which by his 
own admission, is ineffable.
Finally, from the 1980's to the present, the resolute reading has sought to amend 
the contradiction left over by the standard reading, by instead throwing the ladder away. 
They take Wittgenstein seriously at 6.54 when he says that one who understands him 
realizes that his propositions as nonsense.  That is, there is an understanding of the author 
which is independent of understanding the text.  According to this interpretation, there is 
nothing “shown” by the Tractatus; rather nearly all of the text is literally nonsense.  They 
have spawned a highly original, but highly volatile reading of the text—which has been 
charged  by commentators  as  both  opening  up  perhaps  too  perspectival  a  reading  of 
Wittgenstein's early philosophy,  and perhaps even undermining its own legitimacy.
What are we to make of all this?  One has sympathy for the opinion of David 
Stern, who questions the possibility of ever coming to a consensus on how Wittgenstein's 
early philosophy is to be understood.  “The conviction that it must be possible to give a 
single coherent exposition of the book's doctrines or its methods is, I believe, an illusion,” 
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he tells us.259  This inability to ever get a synoptic view of what Wittgenstein 'really' 
meant  is  a  consequence of what  he sees as a  creative tension in  Wittgenstein's  early 
philosophy, between “a metaphysical vision” and an “equally powerful anti-metaphysical 
drive.”  Due to the pull of these two opposing forces, Stern thinks “one can only give a 
unified and systematic interpretation of the book if one carefully selects and construes the 
appropriate passages.”260  In the previous three chapters I have discussed the strengths of 
each interpretation, in terms of the textual evidence which speaks in its favor.  It seems as 
if each respective reading has secured its grasp on a few specific passages, and reading 
the  rest  of  the  text  around  a  handful  of  cherry-picked  remarks,  while  creatively 
interpreting—or ignoring entirely—contrary evidence to suit their needs.  Whether it be 
the positivists, who regarded his discussion of the proposition and its relation to reality as 
the central lesson of the text, ignoring the remarks on mysticism and ethics; or whether it 
be the standard readers who interpreted the distinction between saying and showing as 
Wittgenstein's central thesis, ignoring his explicit avowal in 6.54 of the doctrines in the 
text as nonsense; or even the resolute reading, which takes 6.54 to be nearly the only line 
in  the  text  that  should  be  taken  as  literally  meaningful—in  each  case,  it  seems  that 
interpreters have set their gaze so intently upon a few selected passages that they have, so 
to speak, let the rest of the text recede into the background.
259 Stern, “Methods of the Tractatus,” 126
260 Ibid., 126
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§2 The Reification of History in the History of Philosophy
One of the young Marx's more prevalent arguments against the laws of capitalism, 
like the good Hegelian he was, is that they tend to establish themselves as absolutes. 
Without a proper historical understanding of the way that economics has progressed, he 
thought,  we fall  prey to the tendency to reify our current form—viewing the laws of 
bourgeois  economics  as  eternal  'laws  of  nature,'  on  par  with  those  of  physics.   As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, analytic philosophy has been practiced largely by 
disregarding history, and thus not taking account of the influence of history on the way 
we philosophize in the Anglo-American tradition.
I believe that a phenomenon similar to Marx's notion of reification is present in 
the analytic philosopher's hasty dismissal of historical research.  Contained within the 
claim that our questions are the 'real' ones, is also implicit denial of the contingency of 
our own historical place—as if the way that we currently do philosophy is the only game 
in  town.261  While  I  do  not  endorse  denying  the  privilege  of  our  own philosophical 
position, I do believe that we should also have  a sense of humility about it.  By this I 
mean first that, although unsettling as it is to admit, we don't have it all figured out yet—
philosophically, or otherwise.  We only tend to think that history does not temper our 
understanding of texts, because our context is unobtrusive.  This is merely a consequence 
of being the type of historical animals we are.  However, just because our context is taken 
for granted does not mean it does not inform the way we understand philosophical issues. 
Secondly,  humility  also  requires  that  we  admit  that  the  current  status  of  analytic 
261 I sometimes wonder if Leibniz had a similar opinion of the Cartesian tradition before Kant introduced 
a new paradigm.
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philosophy is  itself  a  development  from a definite  set  of  thinkers,  who were in  turn 
reacting to very different set of concerns than our own.  That is to say, our own way of 
doing philosophy is as historically dependent for its existence and its development as 
philosophy has been in any other period of time.
   Interesting conclusions follow from thinking through the lineage of these three 
interpretations.   There  are,  as  I  see  it,  two  main  forces  at  play  in  each  of  the 
interpretations so far discussed.  The initial reaction to the text was offered by Russell 
and the Vienna Circle, as outlined in Chapter 2.  Early in the tradition of what would 
become analytic philosophy, the positivists sought to restructure the methods and aims of 
philosophy as a scientific enterprise.  Applying the logic of  Principia Mathematica and 
the empiricism of Mach, they put forth a powerful anti-metaphysical programme which 
largely worked along the same lines as Hume: trying, in effect, to awake philosophy from 
its  dogmatic  metaphysical  slumber.   Initially,  it  was  the perceived similarity between 
certain views of Wittgenstein and those of the logical positivists that  lead the Vienna 
Circle to read their own philosophy into the text.
They were followed by a new generation of commentators, who recoiled from the 
positivist interpretation: taking hold of just what they had missed, and elevating it to the 
centerpiece of the work itself.  The standard readers, whose position was outlined in the 
third chapter, argue that Wittgenstein's intent was not only to show how the proposition 
directly says something about reality, but also how it indirectly shows us something about 
the structure of language.   Even propositions which are nonsense—which do not say 
anything  at  all—have  the  ability  to  show,  and  be  'philosophically  illuminating' 
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nonetheless.  And in turn, the insistence of the standard readers on the centrality of the 
distinction between saying and showing, as well as the distinction between two categories 
of nonsense in the text, are exactly the theses being denied by the resolute readers.  Each 
phase has flourished in its own time, and each in turn has subsequently been disregarded 
by a successor phase, by fixing what the later commentators saw as the defects of the 
earlier interpretation.
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